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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent, highly visible accounting scandals in which major
corporations such as Enron and WorldCom inflated revenues to gain
stock market advantages have affected the employment and
retirement prospects of millions of Americans. Those greedy
excesses, made possible at least in part by global accounting firms with
the aid of sophisticated investment banks and law firms, resulted in
Congress's enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley to refocus auditors and
companies on the importance of transparency of financial
information.' Those scandals also brought into question the integrity
of the financial sector, because of the role of financial institutions as
accommodation parties or planners of complex financial derivatives
engineered for their bottom-line effect on publicly released financial
statements.2 Later scandals raised additional questions about the
financial sector's ability to withstand profit pressures, as the New
York attorney general and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) probed the role of bank analysts in hyping stocks to favor their
firms' major clients (or worse, their own firms' positions), and
investigated the mutual fund industry's hidden practices of favoring
certain parties by permitting them to engage in market timing of the
funds. As a result of these scandals, investors have become more
aware of the extraordinary power that financial institutions hold in the
markets and the potential for abuse of that power.
At the same time, the potential for finance-and-tax games
revealed by Enron's use of tax avoidance transactions to enhance its
financial statement revenues has brought renewed interest to the
relationship between financial and tax accounting.' One line of
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
2 See infra note 406.
' See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING
FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (Joint
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inquiry has considered the desirability and feasibility of making more
tax information available to those who make investment decisions. In
an earlier article about corporate tax shelters, I proposed that the
SEC should ensure that investors and creditors are better informed
about public companies' (and their auditors') involvement in
corporate tax shelters through publication of a tax risk profile, strict
liability penalties for failure to report, and enhanced internal
information availability to board members about reportingS 4
companies' involvement in aggressive tax transactions. Congress has
recently acted to enhance penalties for failures to disclose certain
aggressive tax transactions: these provisions include strict liability
penalties, in some instances, and a requirement that reporting
companies disclose certain penalty payments in reports filed with the
SEC.5 The Internal Revenue Service (Service) has also recently taken
steps to improve required taxpayer disclosure by expanding the tax
return schedule that reconciles financial statement income to taxableS 6
income for large corporations. These steps towards full disclosure of
Comm. Print 2003) (detailing, in the text and appendices, Enron's use of tax
transactions to enhance its book income); Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron
End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 35 (considering book-tax issues in light of Enron scandal).
' See Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax
Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame, and Strict Liability, 29 J.
CORP. L. 219 (2004) [hereinafter Tax Risks].
' American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 811-22, 118 Stat.
1418 (providing disclosure requirements, penalty provisions, and other changes to
increase effectiveness of tax shelter provisions); H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 375 (noting
that "a public entity that is required to pay a penalty for failing to disclose a listed
transaction (or is subject to an understatement penalty attributable to a non-disclosed
listed transaction or a non-disclosed reportable avoidance transaction) must disclose
the imposition of the penalty in reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission"); I.R.S. News Release IR 2004-38 (Nov. 16, 2004) (announcing the
release of interim guidance reflecting the changes to disclosure and penalty rules for
reportable transactions in accord with the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004).
6 See I.R.S. News Release IR 2004-14 (Jan. 28, 2004) (releasing initial proposed
Schedule M-3 for large corporation reporting of book-tax differences); DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, TREASURY AND IRS ISSUE FINAL VERSION OF TAX FORM FOR
CORPORATE TAX RETURNS (Oct. 25, 2004) (releasing "final" draft of Schedule M-3
requiring large corporations to provide more detailed information regarding book-tax
differences), available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=
119992,00.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). Commentators have also suggested
consolidating the tax return reconciliation schedule with the similar financial
accounting Schedule L. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos & Edward D. Kleinbard,
Disclosing Book-Tax Differences, 96 TAx NOTES 999 (Aug. 12, 2002) (proposing an
extended tax return reconciliation schedule that would be consolidated with Schedule
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aggressive tax planning are commendable, though I stand by my
recommendations for even broader disclosure of the participation of
reporting companies, their lenders and their auditors in aggressive tax
planning transactions. Even more useful disclosure could be
accomplished by generally requiring public dissemination of publicly
traded companies' tax returns.
A second line of inquiry has considered the divergence between
financial statement and taxable income as an indicator of corporate
tax shelters. Commentators have questioned whether Congress or the
Treasury Department (Treasury) should take actions to narrow the
gap between tax accounting and financial accounting rules or even
adopt provisions requiring conformity of tax to financial accounting
(generally referred to herein as "book-tax conformity").7 As the
history of the development of tax accounting readily demonstrates,
the relationship between financial and tax accounting principles has
never been strictly isomorphous.8 At the beginning of the income tax,
the more advanced financial accounting profession provided ready-
made guidance for tax accounting. As tax accounting developed,
Congress and Treasury displayed ambivalence about the degree of
conformity that should exist between the accounting rules used to
measure income for financial statement purposes (referred to herein
as "financial statement income" or "book income") and those used for
determining the amount of taxable income. Financial accounting
views, however, are frequently expressed in terms of a broadly stated
normative standard favoring conformity,9 whereby accountants mean
that tax accounting should follow financial accounting (not vice
versa).1" Much of this debate rehashes old arguments underlying the
almost palpable tension between the accounting profession's
predominant views of the correct measurement of business income
L). I have discussed this issue in slightly more detail in an earlier article. See Tax
Risks, supra note 4.
7 See, e.g., Mitchell L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and Narrowing the
Book/Tax "GAAP," 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 539; Luppino, supra note 3; Alvin D.
Knott & Jacob D. Rosenfeld, Book and Tax: A Selective Exploration of Two Parallel
Universes (Parts One and Two), 99 TAx NOTES 865 (May 12, 2003) & 99 TAX NOTES
1034 (May 19, 2003) (sampling of recent articles).
8 See infra Part II.
9 See infra Part II
10 Even comprehensive conformity proposals do not extend to adjustments
mandated by explicit Internal Revenue Code (Code) provisions (such as accelerated
depreciation or the limitation on capital losses) that Congress intended as behavioral




and what on the surface appears to be a somewhat chaotic
development of the concept of taxable income.
This Article is intended as a further contribution to this ongoing
corporate tax shelter inquiry, with particular emphasis on the
appropriateness of conformity for the financial sector in light of its
role in the various accounting, energy derivatives, and mutual fund
scandals. The Article therefore has two goals. First, it reassesses the
historical arguments for and against book-tax conformity to determine
whether there are normative considerations important in evaluating
conformity proposals that are less emphasized in other areas of tax
policy and to what extent pragmatic considerations of administrative
convenience and simplification should be weighed in the balance.
Second, it applies the criteria articulated in that reassessment to
evaluate Treasury's tentatively proposed book-tax conformity safe
harbor applicable to securities broker-dealers for marking swaps to
market under section 475."
In the first inquiry, this Article concludes that the most important
characteristics of the tax system that should be considered in
evaluating any particular conformity proposals are structural
coherence and self-assessment. Does the provision conform to the
overall structure of the income tax system in place or does it shift the
paradigm? Does the provision result in taxpayers who must self-
assess having appropriate degrees of discretion or too much potential
for self-help manipulation of their tax liabilities? These same concerns
are present, of course, whenever any new tax provision is evaluated.
Potential book-tax conformity requirements are different mainly in
the extent to which concerns about self-help manipulation come to the
fore because of the necessity to account for multiyear business
transactions within an annual accounting period. Furthermore, they
11 Safe Harbor for Satisfying Statutory Requirements for Valuation under Section
475 for Certain Securities and Commodities, I.R.S. Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Ann. 2003-35, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,632, 2003-21 I.R.B. 956 (May 5, 2003)
[hereinafter ANPRM]. The Service has used an accelerated issue resolution (AIR)
procedure to develop more (nonpublic) information on the issue. Paul Claytor, from
the financial services sector of the Large and Midsize Business Division of the
Service, indicated regulations would likely be forthcoming mid-year 2004 based on
the Service's satisfaction with the administrability of the conformity requirement. See
Sheryl Stratton, ABA Tax Section Meeting, IRS Reps Highlight BOLl, Bank One, and
Zero Month Audit Cycle, 102 TAX NOTES 706 (Feb. 9, 2004) (reporting on Claytor's
comments at the January ABA meeting). Service Chief Counsel Donald Korb stated
on October 28, 2004 that he expects the Service to issue proposed rules on the elective
safe harbor in the near future. DAILY TAX REPORT, Oct. 29, 2004, at G-1. The
Service has yet to issue proposed regulations.
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are of particular concern if applicable to an industry that has shown
itself to be susceptible to profit pressures that push individual
participants to "profit center" mentalities willing to take overly
aggressive, self-favorable positions. Only if a conformity proposal puts
minimal stress on these income-tax and anti-manipulation values
should the pragmatic considerations of administrative convenience
and taxpayer simplicity tip the balance to favor the conformity
proposal.
The second inquiry is whether the proposed safe harbor
appropriately implements the normative criteria (structural coherence
and anti-manipulation) or whether its emphasis on pragmatic
concerns merely facilitates financial institution tax shelter activity.
The safe harbor is an ideal candidate for testing the normative
hypothesis. The commercial swaps industry has undergone
tremendous growth in the short period from its inception in the last
quarter of the twentieth century. Valuation practices reflect both this
period of tumultuous growth and the perceived importance of
proprietary systems in the securities industry. The safe harbor's
justification is thus almost exclusively in the language of
administrative convenience and taxpayer simplification.
In assessing the safe harbor, the Article briefly discusses the Tax
Court's consideration of the valuation issue in Bank One, the first
court case to address dealer valuations of derivatives under section
475. 2 Because the case deals with the returns of an isolated taxpayer
(First National Bank of Chicago, referred to hereinafter as FNBC)
from more than a decade ago, however, it can only provide some
12 See Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 174 (2003), reprinted in IRS's,
Bank One's Interest Rate Swaps Accounting Methods Don't Clearly Reflect Income,
Tax Court Concludes, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 5, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 86-3 [Part 1 of 2] [Part 2 of 2]) [hereinafter Bank One, with
citations to the relevant item number or paragraph of the Lexis version]. The Bank
One case has been a marathon litigation in the Tax Court, beginning with the filing of
the bank's petition in 1995 and including two separate periods of trial, with testimony
from expert witnesses for both parties as well as two appointed by the Tax Court. See
Linda M. Beale, Tax Court's Decision in Bank One Raises More Questions Than It
Answers, 21 J. TAX'N OF INVESTMENTS 3 (2003) (describing the litigation in more
detail). The bank has now filed for reconsideration of the case. A Virginia
bankruptcy court recently also addressed a section 475 question in a much shorter and
less contentious opinion. See In re Heilig-Meyers Co., 94 A.F.T.R.2d 1 2004-5451
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2004) (allowing the Service's proof of claim against
Chapter 11 debtor corporations based on corrected valuations of accounts receivable,
permitted to be marked to market under the original form of section 475, and
disallowance of claimed pre-petition loss under the mark-to-market rules).
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guidance to the types of issues to be considered. Of more direct
relevance is the swaps industry's portrayal of its valuation
methodology as a proprietary discipline with individuated modeling,
subjective inputs, and selective utilization. Securities dealers
generally use some version of a midmarket valuation method, but they
vary from each other in how they determine midmarket valuations.
That determination itself may permit deferral of a significant portion
of dealers' profits on swap transactions. Furthermore, dealers'
adjustments to midmarket valuations to arrive at the accounting fair
value of their dealer positions are uniquely determined by their
proprietary technology and may, because of financial accounting's
distinct focus, include reductions in value that are not supportable for
determining taxable income. Perhaps the most questionable of these
adjustments is the typical dealer adjustment for credit risk, which
appears to include not only a component for expected default losses
(i.e., a reserve for expected losses) but also a component that defers a
dealer's profit margin earned by serving as a credit intermediary for
the swap counterparty. This Article concludes that adjustments made
by dealers may inappropriately permit deferral of the dealer spread
that was intended to be accelerated under mark-to-market accounting
and therefore threaten both structural coherence and the -self-
assessment norm.
The Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part
II provides a brief history of key points in the consideration of
conformity in tax accounting and the main arguments made for and
against it, with particular emphasis on the development of inventory
and mark-to-market accounting. That summary lays the groundwork
for a discussion in Part III of the criteria by which any conformity
proposal should be evaluated. Part III.A. focuses on the normative
standards for evaluating conformity proposals. Part III.B. considers
pragmatic issues and how those should interrelate with the normative
parameters. Finally, with these guidelines in place, Part IV applies
these criteria to a specific problem of current interest - Treasury's
consideration of a conformity safe harbor for mark-to-market
accounting for over-the-counter swaps under section 475. Following a
brief overview of the swaps market, Part IV.A. describes current
swaps valuation methodologies, based primarily on the industry's
response to the safe harbor proposal and the current quantitative
financial literature. Part IV.B. briefly reviews the Bank One case for
additional insight into the historical development of valuation
methodologies. Part IV.C. analyzes this valuation data using the
criteria developed in Part III and concludes that conformity is not the
[Vol. 24:301
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right answer for valuations in a mark-to-market regime. As an
alternative, Part IV.D. proposes some very tentative considerations
for comprehensive valuation regulations. Part V. concludes.
II. HISTORY OF BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY: PROBLEMS AND
RATIONALES
Any article on book-tax conformity must deal in some way with
an inconsistent history of vague or specific attempts to achieve book-
tax conformity in tax accounting, as limited by the clear reflection of
income standard. 3 There are' a number of alternative links between
financial statement and taxable income and corresponding accounting
methods that Congress (or, when applicable, Treasury) could
theoretically choose to implement. First, Congress could adopt
comprehensive conformity - i.e., a normative standard that supports
identity of financial and tax accounting rules throughout the Code
except for unique Code rules implementing behavioral incentives (or
disincentives), for which adjustments between financial and tax
accounting are required. Under comprehensive conformity, taxpayers
(other than ordinary wage earners taxed on a cash basis) would simply
be taxed on their financial statement income.
Most commentators acknowledge that numerous concerns -
ranging from questions about the nature of the federal tax authority
(in whom would reside the authority for determining the rules of a
unified book-tax income measurement?) to questions of how to adjust
for tax expenditures or public policy exceptions - make
comprehensive conformity an unlikely choice.14  Whatever its
advantages or disadvantages, comprehensive conformity is not the
13 Various articles have dealt with aspects of the material discussed here. See,
e.g., Luppino, supra note 3, at 108-43 (providing a historical overview of conformity
in terms of the statutory provisions, clear reflection case law, the accounting
profession's pronouncements, and Treasury positions); Lee A. Sheppard, Financial
Accounting Conformity: Not the Silver Bullet, 101 TAX NOTEs 676 (Nov. 10, 2003)
(presenting a quick overview of history and arguing that financial accounting can
guide tax on some issues). The purpose here is to survey the cycles of discussion of
conformity and the arguments made by proponents and opponents in order to
understand the source of the continued interest in conformity and to arrive at some
view of when conformity is worth pursuing.
14 See, e.g., Clarence Reimer, Major Differences Between Net Income for
Accounting Purposes and for Federal Income Taxes, 23 Acr. Rev. 306, 307 (1948)
(noting thirty-one items treated differently for tax and generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) and considering that "[s]ome restrictions on allowing deductions
may be necessary for practical tax administration").
2004]
Virginia Tax Review
rule today nor has it ever been in the history of the income tax.
A second possibility is conformity of tax accounting rules to the
financial accounting rules within a well-defined domain, such as repair
companies' accounting for rotable parts. This alternative could be
implemented in one of two quite different ways. First, the tax law
could permit a particular method of tax accounting for the relevant
domain only when that method of accounting is used consistently for
financial statement and other business purposes for that domain. This
type of conformity is generally referred to as a "mandatory booking
requirement" - e.g., a taxpayer cannot use a particular method to
determine taxable income in respeci of the domain unless the
taxpayer determines financial statement income for presenting
information to shareholders and creditors about that domain by the
same method. Eligibility to use the last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory
accounting method for tax purposes has depended upon such a
mandatory booking requirement since 1939, although there have been
numerous modifications since its enactment in respect of the degree of
conformity required and the particular parts and uses of financial
statements that must conform.15  The availability of a partially
worthless debt deduction under section 166 in respect of debt
obligations that are not evidenced by securities also requires booking:
to take advantage of the deduction, a taxpayer must charge the
unrecoverable portion of the debt off on its financial statements. 6
Mandatory booking requirements -- even those of narrow scope in a
relatively small and clearly delineated area of tax law - cause many
of the same concerns as comprehensive conformity. The LIFO
experience reveals that implementation of a mandatory booking
requirement for a method of accounting used in a significant area of
business may require complex rules with numerous exceptions to
satisfy the objectives of the two separate regimes of financial and tax
accounting - i.e., not just exceptions for legislated tax incentives (or
disincentives) but modifications apparently required to permit the two
actually disparate systems to function appropriately.
Instead of a mandatory booking requirement, a taxpayer's book
method in a particular domain could be treated as a "safe harbor" for
tax purposes) The concept of a book-tax conformity safe harbor for
15 See infra beginning at note 75 and accompanying text.
16 See I.R.C. § 166(a)(2) (authorizing losses for charged-off portions of partially
worthless debts, at the Secretary's discretion); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3(a)(2) (as
amended in 1998) (requiring charge-off, including a deemed charge-off, when a
creditor recognizes gain on a significant modification of a debt instrument).
17 A thorough analysis of safe harbors is beyond the scope of this article, but it is
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a particular item (or component of income determination) means that
a taxpayer should be able to rely for tax purposes on consistent use of
a method that satisfies generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) for that item, so long as the method complies with any
additional, secondary tax requirements such as record-keeping for
verification of the taxable income so determined. Safe harbors are by
their nature available to some taxpayers even though other taxpayers
who are in almost all respects similarly situated to the availing
important to note at least some of the salient features of safe harbors as they have
been used in tax in order to understand how a conformity safe harbor might be
evaluated. Safe harbors seldom draw scholarly comment, but they are a frequent
feature of tax provisions. They are generally considered helpful because they
facilitate tax administration and reduce taxpayer controversies. See TAX SECTION OF
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON IRS ANNOUNCEMENT 2003-35
(SAFE HARBOR FOR VALUATION UNDER SECTION 475) (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter
NYSBA RESPONSE], at 11. The safe harbor lease under section 168(0(8), enacted by
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and later repealed by the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 for leases entered into after 1983, is illustrative. If
the safe harbor applied, tax benefits of ownership such as depreciation deductions
could be effectively assigned to a party who might not be considered the owner under
general tax law principles that look to risk, reward, and ability to control and dispose
of property. This type of safe harbor provides statutory certainty to replace the
ambiguity inherent in a facts-and-circumstances analysis of factors relevant under the
common law. If a taxpayer satisfies the specified eligibility requirements, it is
generally eligible for the treatment vouchsafed to the safe harbor. Another example
is the safe harbor that applies to a transferor in a purported section 351 transaction
who receives stock in exchange for both property and services. The safe harbor
permits stock received for services to "count" as part of a transferring control group
of stock if stock received by the same transferor for property is at least 10 percent of
the stock received for services. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.07, 1977-2 C.B. 568. Other
safe harbors merely create a presumption that a compliant taxpayer is eligible for the
safe harbor treatment. This type of safe harbor is itself generally phrased in broad
terms that are subject to facts-and-circumstances analysis. For example, the
regulations promulgated under the real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC)
rules provide that transfers of REMIC negative-value residual interests that have a
significant tax-avoidance purpose will be disregarded. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860E-
l(c)(1) (as amended in 2002). Such a purpose exists if a transferor has knowledge at
the time of the transfer that the transferee will be unwilling or unable to pay the taxes
due on the interest. Id. However, the regulations include a provision labeled "Safe
harbor for establishing lack of improper knowledge." See Treas. Reg. § 1.860E-
I (c)(4) (as amended in 2002). The safe harbor does not guarantee that a transfer will
not be penalized; instead, a transferor's "reasonable investigation" establishes a
presumption that the transferor does not have improper knowledge. Id. Presumably,
the mark-to-market valuation safe harbor under consideration by Treasury, supra
note 11, is of the former type in that it would ensure acceptance by tax administrators
of the taxpayer's valuation if the recordkeeping requirements are satisfied and the
taxpayer's valuation is consistent with the required financial statement.
2004]
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taxpayers may be treated differently. In the case of a tax accounting
safe harbor, that means that taxpayers in the same industry with
similar items to take into account, or with equivalent amounts of pre-
tax economic income, might be able to use a different method with a
different (higher or lower) resulting tax liability. A safe harbor could
be explicitly elective. In that case, one taxpayer could opt to come
within the safe harbor and receive the treatment accorded by the safe
harbor, whereas another taxpayer could gamble that Treasury would
approve (if brought into question on audit) a desired treatment that is
different from the result under the safe harbor. The safe harbor under
consideration for securities dealers' valuations of certain over-the-
counter derivatives under section 475's mark-to-market regime is an
elective regime."
Another type of direct linkage between tax and financial
accounting is tax adoption of a particular GAAP rule or principle.
This type of linkage is often discussed in the literature as providing
the greater part of the rationale for a specific conformity requirement
rather than as an independently operating conformity regime. For
example, a number of commentators have argued over the years since
the initiation of the income tax that tax either already follows or
should adopt the GAAP "matching principle" that defers cash
receipts for services and goods until "earned" and accelerates
expenses into the period when the related income is taken into
account.1 9  These matching principle arguments stem from
accountants' deeply rooted convictions that matching yields the
"right" measure of business income for all business purposes. On the
other hand, significant tax commentary (tied in part to theories of
statutory interpretation) views the GAAP matching principle and its
lack of a time-value-of-money concept as aptly illustrating the
divergence between book and tax concepts of income and as evidence
that the Code establishes a concept of taxable income that is not
synonymous with book income, even without the various tax
preferences and penalties." The famous Supreme Court trilogy of
American Automobile Ass'n, Automobile Club of Michigan, and
Schlude, in which the Court required inclusion of prepaid service
income on receipt, can be viewed as recognizing that the matching
See supra note 11. This Article will return to the section 475 valuation safe
harbor in much greater detail in Part IV, as an example of the normative and
pragmatic considerations for deciding conformity issues discussed in Part III.
19 See infra beginning at note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the
divergent tax and accounting treatment of prepayments).
20 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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principle has no place in the tax hierarchy.21
Other than these direct linkages between financial and tax
accounting (any of which will be referred to herein as types of
"conformity requirements"), the tax law could rebuttably presume
that appropriately and consistently used financial accounting methods
determine taxable income. Financial accounting rules for calculating
book income, in other words, would be the default method for
measuring taxable income as well, unless Congress (or Treasury)
provided special tax rules in a particular context or the Commissioner
demonstrated in litigation under the general tax accounting provision
in section 446 that conformity in a particular case failed to measure
taxable income correctly. The accounting profession has often argued
that tax accounting does or should include such a presumption
favoring financial accounting methods, and litigating taxpayers have
claimed that their consistently applied financial method of accounting
should be considered acceptable under section 446 so long as it is
reasonable and complies with GAAP.22  In the seminal Supreme
Court case in the area, however, the Court rejected any such
presumption favoring a taxpayer's accounting method because of the
radically divergent objectives of tax and financial accounting.
There is at the least an evidentiary relationship between financial
and tax accounting, one in which the underlying financial accounting
24
records inform, but do not necessarily command, tax accounting.
This is undoubtedly true, in spite of the strong position on tax and
accounting divergence expressed in Thor Power.25 The Code and
Treasury regulations are replete with references to methods used
consistently in a taxpayer's books or customarily in the taxpayer's
particular industry. This "weakest link" relevance of financial
accounting follows from the demonstrable maturation of the tax
system in the intervening years since financial accounting first
acclaimed its own objective, scientific basis and urged that the infant
tax system should follow its lead in determining income. We now
recognize that taxable income is a term, defined by the structure of
the tax system itself, that is not wholly synonymous with either
financial accounting net income or "economic income" as determined
21 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bank One, supra note 12, 9[ 342-50 (citing and rejecting taxpayer
argument that any reasonable valuation should be acceptable).
13 See infra note 129 (discussing Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S.
522 (1979)).
24 See infra note 34.
25 See infra note 129 (discussing Thor Power).
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by the financial gurus in academe and investment banks.
Interest in variants of these types of conformity proposals appears
to be cyclical, perhaps reflecting heightened levels of frustration with
the growing complexity of the Code and corresponding compliance
and administration burdens or even ideological positions of
administrations that view tax relief, whether by statutory change or
regulatory fiat, as a high priority. This Part looks at key movements
towards or away from greater use of financial accounting principles in
tax accounting. This history informs us about the types of provisions
for which conformity has been an issue, the rationales urged by
conformity proponents and opponents, and the relative success of
specific conformity proposals over time. As background for
evaluation of the current Treasury consideration of conformity in
securities dealers' mark-to-market valuations of their inventory-like
derivatives positions, this Part provides more detail on the history of
inventory and mark-to-market accounting.
A. Early Revenue Acts
In the early years of the income tax, tax and financial accounting
lacked the sophistication present in today's accounting rules. The
1909 corporate income tax required corporations to compute income
26on the cash method . In contrast, financial accounting had already
developed accrual principles, and businesses commonly used accrual
accounting. Treasury ensured by regulations that those businesses
using inventory and accrual accounting would not have to maintain
unrelated sets of financial records but would be able to compute their
taxable income from the same evidentiary records that formed the
basis for their financial statements. 7 In the Revenue Act of 1916,
26 The Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 (which included provisions imposing
an income tax on corporations four years before the constitutional amendment
permitted individual income taxes) made no provision for accrual accounting; instead,
it used terms that we have come to understand to require a cash method of
accounting: taxpayers were to include income "received" and were permitted to
deduct "expenses actually paid," "losses actually sustained," and "interest actually
paid." Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, § 38 (1st), (2d), 36 Stat. 11, 112, reprinted
in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS:
1938-1861, 1008, 1012 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1938).
" See Regulations 31, arts. 1-5 (Dec. 3, 1909) (permitting taxpayers to use
inventory accounting and to determine income based on their business books); T.D.
1675, 14 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 16 (1911) (original interpretive decision indicating that
Treasury would not dictate a particular accounting method but would require
corporations to retain books that would permit verification of income on audit);
[Vol. 24:301
Book-Tax Conformity
Congress for the first time expressly permitted taxpayers to use for tax
purposes either the cash method or the same non-cash method on
which they kept their books, with the proviso that the method must
clearly reflect income.8
These earliest authorities on appropriate tax accounting provide
mixed signals. Treasury from the beginning clearly viewed it
necessary to permit taxpayers to use at least some variant of the
accrual method that many already used for financial statement
purposes. There is no indication that Treasury acted from a rigid
normative view that tax should conform in all cases to financialS 29
accounting: its motive was reasonable accommodation of businesses.
The usual directionality of conformity arguments (the extent to which
financial accounting rules should determine tax accounting rules; not
vice versa) thus appears to stem from the accidental history of the
income tax as newcomer to a business world with developed accrual
accounting principles.
Given the limitation imposed by the clear reflection of income
standard under the 1916 act, it is clear that Congress did not
contemplate that financial accounting concepts of accrual accounting
Regulations 33, arts. 100, 104, 158, 161, 182, 183 (Jan. 5, 1914) (various provisions for
accrual accounting, inventory, and use of books as guide to correct income).
28 The 1916 Revenue Act provided that if a corporation's method of accounting
clearly reflected income, the "corporation... may, subject to regulations... make its
return upon the basis upon which its accounts are kept, in which case the tax shall be
computed upon its income as so returned." Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 13(d), 39
Stat. 756, 771; see also id. § 8(g) (similar provision applicable to individuals), reprinted
in SEIDMAN, supra note 26, at 974. Most commentators interpret the 1913 act, the
first to impose the income tax directly on individuals, as permitting only the cash
method of accounting, though there is some uncertainty. See Corporation Income
Tax Act of 1913, c.16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172; United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S.
422, 437-38 (1926) (stating that the 1916 act was the first to explicitly permit
corporate taxpayers to use a non-cash method of accounting); Law Opinion 1059,
1921 C.B. 147 (same); Harrop A. Freeman, Tax Accrual Accounting for Contested
Items, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 727, 728 (1958) (considering it "well known that prior to 1916
the only method of accounting acceptable for tax reporting was the cash method");
Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX
REV. 1, 4-5 (1984) (indicating that the 1913 act required the cash method). But see
SEIDMAN, supra note 26, at 974 (quoting the Ways and Means Committee Report as
indicating that "present law requires that the income tax shall be levied on the
accrued basis"); Donald Schapiro, Prepayments and Distortion of Income Under Cash
Basis Tax Accounting, 30 TAX L. REV. 117, 128-35, 129 n.35 (1974-75) (analyzing the
text of the 1913 act to support accrual inclusions but not deductions). The 1916
provision is now embodied in section 446(b). See infra note 32.
29 See Gunn, supra note 28, at 6.
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should be the sole determinant of taxable income for taxpayers using
non-cash methods. The clear reflection standard functioned at the
least as an anti-abuse mechanism whenever a taxpayer's financial
accounting method wandered too far from (unstated) tax principles of
income. It protected against overt taxpayer manipulation of financial
accounting books to lower tax liability.3° Although the clear reflection
standard is famously circular,31 it is the one phrase that makes clear
that taxable income is to be determined by the tax system and not by
some financial accounting measure of income.
It is true that the language of the basic tax accounting statutory
provision set out in section 446 suggests book accounting is the basis
for tax accounting.32 Nevertheless, the section cannot be interpreted
as requiring conformity of a taxpayer's tax returns to a taxpayer's
financial statements. The clear reflection of income standard reduces
the apparent section 446 conformity requirement to an evidentiary
provision and audit aide.33 Section 446 merely requires that taxpayers
30 See Harold Dubroff, M. Connie Cahill & Michael D. Norris, Tax Accounting:
The Relationship of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, 47 ALB. L. REv. 354, 357 (1983) [hereinafter Clear Reflection] (noting that
the clear reflection standard may have been intended to "safeguard against hybrid
account-keeping practices adopted by taxpayers to reduce taxes, for example,
reporting receipts on the cash method and deductions on the accrual method").
31
The statutory phrase is not only hopelessly vague but circular to boot, since
the "income" that must be clearly reflected by the taxpayer's accounting
method is taxable income, not financial, economic, or any other variety of
income. In short, income is clearly reflected by an accounting method if the
ultimate result of using the method is taxable income.
BORIS BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs § 105.1.6
(1981), quoted in Clear Reflection, supra note 30, at 365.
32 See I.R.C. § 446(a) (stating flatly that "[tiaxable income shall be computed
under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly
computes his income in keeping his books"); I.R.C.§ 446(b) (imposing the clear
reflection standard).
33 Alan Gunn notes that the clear reflection standard "leads more often to
differences than to conformity between tax and financial accounting." Gunn, supra
note 28, at 4. After nearly a century of the federal income tax, the clear reflection
standard is far from clear. It could be read to assure that the tax system does not
incorporate financial accounting rules that result in distortions of some externally
defined concept of "economic income," such as the Haig-Simons definition. It could
be interpreted merely to require that accounting rules not violate any other statutory
provisions. I believe, however, that it should be viewed as acknowledging a unique
concept of taxable income that is different from financial accounting or economic
income in ways mandated by the overall structure of the Code. Cf. BI~rKER, supra
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note 31. The fact that the income tax at its origins was understood as being essentially
the same as business income does not change this result. See Validity of Inventories
Under Treasury Decision: Legal Points Involved in Recent Turnabout by Official
Pronouncements Regarding Tax Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1918, at 8
[hereinafter Validity of Inventories] (providing the text of the Investment Bankers
Association's brief in the appeal of Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 236 F. 686 (1918), to the
Supreme Court, in which it argued that the clear reflection of income standard was
intended by Congress to capture the accounting/business concept of income).
Today's income tax should be viewed as an integral whole that defines taxable income
separately from the business context or accounting rules. No accounting method can
clearly reflect income if it operates contrary to the Code, since the Code is the only
template for ascertaining taxable income. We cannot simply have a rule that each
taxpayer shall pay his or her fair share of the federal taxes, because it is the rules that
define the overall tax structure which in turn determines what a fair share would be.
The Code is not specific on many details, however, so it is possible to "clearly reflect
income" in areas where the Code is vague. A method may also ostensibly be in
agreement with a method authorized by the Code, yet fail to reflect income clearly.
The finding that the method does not clearly reflect income in that instance is not a
finding that the method imposed by the tax administrator is in contravention of the
Code, but rather a finding that the scope of the Code authorization does not extend to
the particular situation. Although there is theoretically only one perfect measure of
taxable income for any accounting period, our ability to interpret the set of rules
constituting the Code does not always result in one single acceptable interpretation.
The focus of clear reflection of income is, therefore, on limiting distortion from
inaccurate interpretations in contexts not contemplated by the drafters rather than on
making sure the income measurement is perfect. Clear reflection thus operates very
much like the judicial doctrines of business purpose and economic substance; that is, it
permits the tax administrator to find that a method of accounting that is ostensibly in
conformity with the Code and regulations may yet be inappropriate when the overall
structure of the tax system is considered. For further discussion of this concept, see
infra Part III.A (discussing structural coherence and the income tax value). This view
of the clear reflection standard is supported by several court decisions that recognize
that the role of time value of money principles in the overall tax system supports a
finding that a method that appears to be within the scope of applicable provisions is in
fact not a clear reflection of income. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 71
F.3d 209 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that current deduction of the entire cost of an
accrued tort settlement to be paid over time by means of an annuity was improper);
Mooney Aircraft Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969) (disallowing
deduction for zero coupon bonds given upon purchase of planes that would at best be
paid in twenty years). This interpretation of the clear reflection standard as a tax-
generated standard that serves as a limitation on the scope of conformity is at
variance with the position of some commentators. Compare Leo F. Nolan II, Can the
Cash Method of Accounting Clearly Reflect Income? (Parts I and II), 74 TAX NOTES
1063 (Feb. 24, 1997), 74 TAx NOTES 1175 (Mar. 3, 1997) (arguing that clear reflection
is satisfied when an eligible taxpayer correctly applies a permissible method of
accounting) with W, Eugene Seago, Clear Reflection of Income Under Section 446(b),
62 TAx NOTES 355, 357 (Jan. 17, 1994) (arguing that Congress intended that the
Commissioner should be able to require taxpayers to adopt methods in contravention
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maintain financial books and records that support the numbers
entered on their tax returns. In the case of many ordinary
transactions, the numbers in these evidentiary books will result in
conforming reports for tax returns and financial statements. But in a
number of other cases, such as accelerated depreciation and treatment
of prepayments, financial statements and tax returns will present
different results from these same numbers.
Yet in the seminal case on accounting methods from the first
quarter-century of the income tax, the Supreme Court expressed its
view that the purpose of tax accrual accounting "was to enable
taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns according to
scientific accounting principles. 3 ' The stage was thus set for the
debate regarding the extent to which financial accounting rules should
determine taxable income.
B. Inventories
In 1918, Congress authorized the Service to determine when
inventory accounting36 was necessary and to prescribe acceptable
of regulations in order to satisfy the clear reflection standard).
" See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS: ACCOUNTING ISSUES, at 32 (Joint Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter JCT
ACCOUNTING REPORT] (noting that the requirement that accounting methods be the
same as those used to keep the taxpayer's books is considered "satisfied when
sufficient records are kept to reconcile the taxpayer's books with the tax return");
Neil R. Bersch & Andrea S. Nadel, The Dilemma of Conformity - Tax and Financial
Reporting, 36TH ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 529, 530 (1978) (stating that the
consistency with books required in section 446(a) is a mere evidentiary standard
requiring taxpayers to keep records that provide evidence of taxable income); Knott
& Rosenfeld, supra note 7, Part Two, 99 TAX NOTES at 1044 (noting that "[t]he
conformity required by section 446(a) is not to a taxpayer's financial statements but to
its books and records").
35 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440-41 (1926) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, although Anderson implies that the financial accounting matching
principle applies for tax to determine timing, the case itself has come to stand for the
first expression of the "all events" test as a unique tax-based standard for determining
the tax timing of inclusions and deductions.
36 The basic concept of inventory accounting is recognition that sales proceeds
from inventory items during the relevant time period cannot be treated as gross
income, because a merchant generally carries some stock over from one period to the
next. Merely deducting all costs associated with producing inventory would
understate the income from inventory sales, since some of the costs must be
associated with the retained and unsold inventory. Accordingly, gross income from
inventory sales is determined by subtracting from the aggregate annual sales proceeds
the "cost of goods sold" during the year. To determine cost of goods sold, the
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methods for valuing inventories, "conforming as nearly as may be to
the best accounting practice in the trade or business and.., most
clearly reflecting the income."37 In requiring that the methods should
conform to the extent possible to business accounting practices,
Congress appeared to recognize that the range of different business
models meant that no single inventory method would easily work for
all: inventory rules would need to be tailored to the customs of
particular business types." Because financial accounting rules could
be presumed to have already addressed some of the varying problems
merchant must in some way account for stock that was on hand at the beginning of
the year, additions to stock (e.g., by purchases or production) during the year, and
reductions of stock (e.g., by sales or loss). Gross income from inventory sales is
therefore the result of subtracting closing inventory values from the sum of opening
inventory values carried over from the prior year and purchases during the taxable
year. See, e.g., Molsen v. Commissioner, 85. T.C. 485, 502 (1985) (noting the
difference between deductions from gross income and subtraction of cost of goods
sold from gross revenues to determine gross income as justification for refusing to
uphold the Commissioner's ruling that the "all events" test had to be applied to items
included in cost of goods sold when valuing inventory at market).
37 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 203, 40 Stat. 1057 (establishing basic
requirements for proper inventory accounting, in substantially the same wording as in
current section 471 and the regulations promulgated thereunder); Regulations 45,
arts. 1581-88 (1919) (establishing rules now incorporated - with various intervening
amendments - in Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 through § 1.471-8 (1958)). Indirect
authorization for inventory accounting existed under the original interpretative
regulations. See Aluminum Casting Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92 (1930); Doyle v.
Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179 (1918); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38 Congress and tax administrators have extended this concept beyond its
appropriate bounds, permitting variation of methods within an industry when the two
methods may well result in considerably different taxable income determinations.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(6)(ii)-(iii) (as amended in 2004) (permitting
taxpayers to treat economic performance as occurring upon delivery, acceptance, title
transfer, or payment); Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6 (as amended in 2002) (permitting farmers
to use either the farm-price method or the unit-livestock-price method to value
livestock inventories). Much of this choice in the tax system derives from the
flexibility of financial accounting rules- and a presumption that flexibility about such
details eases compliance for taxpayers. Recently, tax administrators have applied
similar logic inappropriately to expand the ability of taxpayers to defer income from
advance payments under regulatory proposals. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2002-79, 2002-2
C.B. 964 (proposing a revenue procedure that would modify Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2
C.B. 549); Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991 (Jun. 1, 2004) (modifying Rev. Proc.
71-21 to permit taxpayers to defer inclusion of certain advance payments until the
next succeeding taxable year if not currently included for financial accounting
purposes). There is little rationale for such flexibility in tax systems, however, where
elections that permit taxpayers essentially to choose how they will be taxed create
inappropriate discrepancies between similarly situated taxpayers.
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different businesses faced in accounting for their inventories, it likely
seemed reasonable for financial accounting practices to guide tax
accounting rules for inventory. By again referencing the clear
reflection limitation, however, Congress reinforced the notion that
taxable income is uniquely defined by the tax system and that the
priority to be given by the tax system to financial accounting standards
is not absolute.3 9
There are two aspects of inventory accounting that require
determination for either financial or tax purposes: valuation of
inventory items at year-end and identification of items in inventory at
year-end based on assumptions about sequencing of sales.
1. Inventory and Related Hedge Accounting: Valuation
Treasury did not at first prescribe methods for valuing inventory
items, though its own internal rules only permitted inventories to be
valued at cost.n° It took little time, however, for Treasury to adopt
rules conforming tax accounting for inventory with the "lower of cost
or market" (LCM) method that was gaining widespread acceptance
for financial accounting purposes when the income tax was enacted.
Subsection a, below, discusses the LCM method. In a related
development, Treasury recognized the special accounting needs of
commodities merchants who had long used market valuations to
determine their profits or losses on inventory hedges for business
purposes. Subsection b, below, discusses this origin of the "mark-to-
market" (MTM) method.
a. Lower of Cost or Market Method
LCM values inventory items using either cost or market value,
whichever is lower. For financial accounting purposes, market value
was essentially replacement cost or net realizable value.41  LCM
accounting thus is taxpayer favorable, in that depreciation of retained
inventory items in falling markets accelerates recognition of losses
3 See supra note 33.
40 T.B.R. 48, 1 C.B. 47 (1919) (finding that average cost inventory methods do
not satisfy the revenue acts and discussing the theory behind lower of cost or market
accounting), superseded by Rev. Rul. 71-234, 1971-1 C.B. 148.
41 See, e.g., William R. Sutherland, Inventories: Methods, Valuation and Uniform
Capitalization Rules, at 407, C2 CCH Transactions Library (July 1988, last updated
July 1991) (discussing financial accounting standards under ARB 43 providing that




while appreciation due to rising markets does not result in higher tax
liability. In 1917, Treasury officially recognized LCM as an
alternative for the typical inventories of merchants and manufacturers
as well as for dealers in securities. 3 The impetus for Treasury's
adoption of LCM for merchants was to accommodate their business
practices." The rationale for extending LCM to securities dealers was
not to ensure accounting conformity, but rather to protect securities
markets by discouraging securities dealers from selling off securities to
realize losses.4 ' There were initial doubts about the proposal. Large
dealers at first indicated that they would not take advantage of the
opportunity to use lower market values, because they either had
realized losses or preferred to pay current tax rather than pay what
they feared would be a significantly larger tax when securities
42 A lower value for closing inventory when market values decline below historic
cost will result in higher cost of goods sold, thus reducing gross income from inventory
and permitting a current deduction for the loss due to decline in value below cost. See
generally St. James Sugar Coop., Inc. v. United States, 643 F.2d 1219, 1222-25 (5th Cir.
Unit A May 1981). The LCM method does not require a taxpayer to treat any
increases in market value as income, even if those increases restore amounts
previously deducted as losses under this method.
43 T.D. 2609, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 401 (1917); see also Regulations 45, art.
1582 (1918).
See, e.g., Validity of Inventories, supra note 33, at 8 (reproducing the
Investment Bankers' brief for the Mitchell Bros. case, which asserts that "'[i]t is
common knowledge that business concerns usually' inventory their goods at cost or
market value, whichever is lowest, and determine their net income for the year on
that 'basis"'). The Investment Bankers also reference a July 15, 1916 Federal Trade
Commission pamphlet entitled "A System of Accounts for Retail Merchants" that
"insists upon" LCM as the "true basis" for determining income and note that the
U.K. tax system had adopted LCM in July 1917. Id. The brief defends the
appropriateness of an accounting method such as LCM that permits taxpayers to
reduce tax liability by deducting unrealized depreciation without similarly increasing
their tax liability in respect of unrealized appreciation, arguing that no income tax is
ever due until there is an "actual income produced and existing for the taxable year,"
which unrealized appreciation does not satisfy. Id.
45 See, e.g., Question of Inventories Again to the Front: Legal Difficulties in Way
of Recent Treasury Decision - Some Hasty Inferences of Doubtful Value, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 11, 1918, at 6 [hereinafter Question of Inventories] (noting that the decision to
permit LCM was "to avoid ... marketing of securities"); Validity of Inventories, supra
note 33, at 8 (noting that few securities dealers appeared to desire the Treasury
decision permitting LCM when first suggested, but many brokers with losses that had
planned to realize losses through actual sales to reduce their tax liabilities now
welcomed LCM as a "fair, permanent and approved basis of income return").
Dealers apparently had high unrealized losses because of the impact on the markets




appreciated. Treasury faced complaints that dealers would receive
windfall tax savings and belatedly referred the validity of the use of
market valuations to the Attorney General.4'7  The investment
bankers' spokesperson responded to criticisms that the provision was
a windfall by arguing that the method was necessary to ensure that
taxes were based on business income: "Courts have repeatedly stated
that the terms 'income' and 'profits' in tax statutes are to be
understood in their business sense and certainly there is no business
sense in which such corporation [with $30,000 ostensible profits but
$60,000 depreciation of assets] has a profit for the year., 48
Needless to say, nondealers soon realized that the ability to
recognize unrealized losses while not being required to recognize
unrealized gains was a gravy train they wanted to catch. Investment
bankers urged that corporations and other holders of Liberty bonds
be permitted to inventory their bonds using LCM so as to deduct
losses in 1919 without selling the bonds on the market (and thereby
49weakening the market value of the bonds). Industries that were
flush with inventory after stocking up on high-priced materials for the
war effort also complained about the "rigorous and inflexible
character" of the tax laws governing inventory that required item-by-
item accounting and did not permit writedowns to reflect reasonable
business expectations of future market downturns, as permitted for
financial accounting.0 Recognizing the boon in permitting unrealized
46 See Inventories For Tax Purposes: Doubtful Advantage to Be Gained by
Making Use of Recent Regulations Permitting Market Valuation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7,
1918, at 1.
47 See Excess Tax Inventory Ruling Goes to Gregory: Question Raised as to
Legality of Treasury Decision Fixing Basis for Tax Returns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1918,
at 9; T.D. 2649, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 26 (1918) (indicating that returns using LCM
would be "tentatively accepted" pending the outcome of the Mitchell Bros. case, with
a requirement for filing amended returns if the decision in the case disallowed LCM).
The Treasury Decision went on to define a dealer in securities as a merchant who
buys and sells to customers rather than holding for investment or speculation. Id.
48 Question of Inventories, supra note 45, at 8.
41 See Ask to Inventory Bond Losses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1919, at 16.
50 See Corporation Tax Laws Are Found Burdensome: Listing of Inventories at
Top Prices in Face of Probable Falling Market Especially Trying, WALL S. J., Dec. 22,
1919, at 6; Tax Ruling on Inventories: Market Means Current Bid Price at Date of
Inventory for the Merchandise Named, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1920, at 8 (setting forth
the text of Treasury Decision 3047 regarding definition of market value for inventory
purposes); see also Rev. Rul. 77-364, 1977-1 C.B. 183 (ruling that market value cannot
be determined by dividing inventory into classes based on sales activity and then
reducing the value of each class by a percentage of cost assigned to it, where the
determination of the percentage writedown is not established to be related to the
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loss deductions in a realization system, both the government and
51
commentators have since proposed LCM repeal, without success.
b. Mark-to-Market Method
When the United States reinstituted the income tax, a third, MTM
method of valuing inventory and related hedges had been in place for
at least fifty years among cotton and grain merchants and others who
dealt in commodities subject to considerable fluctuation in market
value and who used various contracts to hedge their risks.52 For
financial accounting purposes, such as providing financial statements
to lending banks, commodities dealers valued their generally small
physical inventory at market (whether lower or higher than cost) and
took their forward sales or purchases and other hedging transactions
into account by marking them to market to include any appreciation
"true market value" rather than merely reflecting an estimate of depreciation); Rev.
Rul. 83-59, 1983-1 C.B. 103 (disallowing benefits of purported sales of excess
inventory where there was a repurchase arrangement).
51 See, e.g., Finance Committee Releases Draft Statutory Language for
Recommended GATT Financing (Pending Legislation), HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS,
Aug, 25, 1994, at 2965 (proposing repeal of LCM method of accounting); Thomas L.
Evans, Lower of Cost or Market - The Need for Reform, 64 TAX NOTES 1349, 1349
(Sept. 5, 1994) (proposing the elimination of LCM or, at the least, reforms that would
eliminate some of the egregious advantages provided by the method and referencing
the legislative proposal for repeal as a means of funding revenues lost under GATT);
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, at 161-62 (2000).
52 See, e.g., Appeals and Review Mem. (A.R.M.) 135, 5 C.B. 67, 69 (1921)
(describing MTM as a "custom, existing over a period of approximately 50 years, for
the cotton merchant..."), restated and superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-223, 1974-1 C.B.
23; Molsen v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 485, 499 (1985) (noting that MTM "is the
longstanding practice of cotton merchants.., and was originally approved for cotton
merchants and other dealers in commodities in S.M. 5693 ... and was reapproved in
Rev. Rul. 74-227"). The accounting method stemmed directly from the particularities
of the commodities businesses. Instead of storing large quantities of commodities in
their own facilities, grain and cotton merchants engaged in transactions that were
denominated in grain elevator or warehouse receipts. The receipts entitled them to a
quantity of fungible units of a particular grade of the commodity. They entered into
contracts to purchase or sell the commodity using these receipts on a daily basis, for
either current or future delivery. To lock in their expected profits for forward
contracts at the price on the day of the transaction, they engaged in counterbalancing
forward purchasing and sales or other hedging transactions. This customary business
practice is described in detail in the 1920 and 1921 A.R.M.s, supra. A.R.M. 100, 3
C.B. 66, 67 (1920). See generally Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923)
(describing the operation of the commodities exchange).
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(or deduct any depreciation) since the last reporting period.53  The
effect was to recognize for book purposes both unrealized losses and
unrealized gains on inventory and inventory hedges.
Under the income tax, however, commodities dealers were
required to apply realization principles to determine the timing of
their income and losses from contractual hedges. As a result, hedged
inventory that provided reasonably steady flows of economic income
would be reported under tax rules that caused the dealers to have high
taxable incomes in years when hedge losses were not realized.54 After
53
In the keeping of books in the cotton business, it has been the custom,
existing over a period of approximately 50 years, for the cotton merchant to
take into consideration at market his forward sales, purchases, and hedges,
and if they show a profit, that is added to the season's business. If, on the
other hand, they show a loss, it is deducted from the season's business. His
real profit, or loss, is thereby determined for the year.
A.R.M. 135, supra note 52, at 69; see also Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929, 930-
31 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing the mark-to-market system of accounting for
commodities futures contracts).
54 A brief description of mark-to-market accounting is perhaps in order, as
background for the discussion in Part IV, infra. Mark-to-market, or accretion,
accounting differs from the basic realization regime in which taxpayers take gains and
losses into account in respect of property held by the taxpayer only upon the
occurrence of a triggering event. Under a realization regime, mere increases or
decreases in value of property held by the taxpayer have no effect on the taxpayer's
taxable income for the year. Only when a realization event occurs, such as a
disposition or other change in ownership, does the change in value figure into the
taxpayer's taxable income. The taxpayer determines the amount of gain over the
entire period that she held the property by comparing the sales price (or other
measure of fair market value at disposition) to her cost basis in the property. Unlike
a realization regime, a mark-to-market regime accelerates into the current taxable year
any expected income and deductions in respect of a mark-to-market item that affect
its current value and that have not already been taken into account in determining the
taxpayer's taxable income. Marking to market thus accelerates income in reciprocal
fashion to the capitalization rules that require deferral of deductions. See Edward D.
Kleinbard & Thomas L. Evans, The Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a
Realization-Based Tax System, 75 TAXES 788, 793-94 (1997) (noting that deferral and
mark-to-market accretion regimes should have the same economic effect, in that they
produce identical present values of tax liabilities). The acceleration mechanism is the
"mark" - the determination of the item's current fair market value at the end of each
taxable year - and the comparison of the current mark to the prior year-end's mark.
Only changes in the mark that have taken place during the taxable year require an
income inclusion or permit a deduction. That is, if an item maintained a stable fair
market value after the year of acquisition, it would be "marked to market" at the end
of each taxable year, but no increments of income or deduction would be taken into
account in income for that year. If an item increased in value during a taxable year,
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Treasury promulgated regulations permitting cost or LCM inventory
accounting," commodities merchants complained because the
regulations did not allow them to treat their hedges as part of their
inventory. This mismatch, they claimed, would impose taxes on
"unearned profits."56 They argued that Treasury should recognize the
MTM method for their inventory and hedges for two primary reasons.
First, they claimed, in effect, that a MTM method for hedge
contracts is not incompatible with an income tax based on realization
because the margin system for determining the amount of gain or loss
under a contract on a day-to-day basis, and amounts payable to or
from the margin account, functions in a manner essentially equivalent
to a disposition of the contract. Under a margin system, the change in
value is actually paid to or from the merchant as appropriate (or
accounted for in the merchant's margin account) on a daily basis. 7
the difference between the mark at the end of the prior taxable year and the mark at
the end of the current taxable year would be taken into account. A disposition of the
item during a taxable year would trigger a final accounting just as in a realization
regime, except only the difference between the mark at the end of the prior year and
the value at disposition (e.g., the sales price, in the case of a sale) would be taken into
account. See generally Thomas L. Evans, The Evolution of Federal Income Tax
Accounting - A Growing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market? 67 TAXEs 824, 825 (1989)
[hereinafter, Growing Trend] (describing the Haig-Simon model of economic income
and its relationship to mark-to-market and realization regimes); David J. Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1111 (1986) (proposing a system of taxation of economic income based on accrual
concepts without a realization requirement).
55 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
A.R.M. 135, supra note 52, at 70; see also A.R.M. 100, 3 C.B. 66, 67 (1920)
(noting that "cotton merchants and dealers in grain and its products.., have urged
most strongly that the regulations at present in force, under which their inventories
are taken, shall be modified to such an extent as will permit them to include in, or
make a part of, their inventories, 'hedges' or transactions in 'futures,' which are
recognized practices in their businesses"), restated and superseded by Rev. Rul. 74-
227, 1974-1 C.B. 119.
17 See A.R.M. 135, supra note 52, at 70. In brief, a margin account serves as
collateral to ensure that a cotton merchant is not overcommitted and unable to
perform under a futures contract with a broker. A merchant who enters into a cotton
future (a commodity forward purchase contract) with a commodities broker pays a
margin deposit upfront. On a daily basis, the merchant's margin account is adjusted
to reflect the difference between the current mark (i.e., market value as marked for
that day) and the prior mark. If the increase in the price of cotton is greater than the
amount in the margin account, the merchant pays an additional margin amount equal
to the excess. If the price of cotton has gone down, the merchant has available for
withdrawal margin amounts previously paid, to the extent of the decline in price. The
daily margin adjustment reflects the gain or loss on the contract for the 24-hour
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[I]n real practice,... the cotton merchant has in hand, if he
has a profit in the transaction, his profit from day to day. On
the other hand, if he loses in the transaction he actually pays
the loss incurred from day to day."
Second, they argued that MTM conforms to the accepted method
of accounting for inventory and hedges in a commodities business for
all other business purposes, including banking and information to
equity owners. By taking inventory of supplies on hand at market, the
merchants did not need to identify particular bales or assign costs on
an individual item basis, a largely impossible task for the fungible
commodities. By including hedges such as futures contracts in cotton
in income at market as well, the merchants avoided artificially large
fluctuations of income, because an appropriate hedge assured a
merchant of a particular profit. In fact, the merchants claimed that
[tihis system of bookkeeping is the only accurate and correct
system that has been devised that truly reflects the net profit or
loss of any given year's business, either fiscal or calendar. It is
the system in vogue, approved by auditors who certify to the
correctness of [a merchant's] financial statements which are
the basis of his credit, and is the system accepted by his
bankers for all his financial transactions and the only system
which would not be false and misleading. 9
In other words, they argued for conformity of tax with financial
accounting in a situation where the accounting system had years of
business experience and was considered the only workable system for
their particular type of business.
Relying on the open transaction doctrine, Treasury initially
period. See generally Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing
the function of margin as collateral for a merchant's obligation in a commodity
futures transaction); Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, The
Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAx REV. 1, 59-75 (1993)
(discussing commodities futures contracts, margin mechanisms, and the legislative
history of section 1256, which justified mark-to-market accounting based on
constructive receipt because of daily margin adjustments).
A.R.M. 135, supra note 52, at 70 (emphasis added); see also id. at 73 (similar
statement for grain merchants that "all outstanding hedging contracts are actually
settled at the end of each day, either by collecting the profits or by paying the losses
thereunder, with the same precise effect as if their holder had gone into the market
and sold out his contracts for purchases of grain or bought in his contracts for its
sale") (emphasis added).
'9 Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
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denied commodities merchants permission to account for hedges as
inventory.6 Just one year later, however, Treasury yielded to ongoing
lobbying to allow them to arrive at the same result by accounting for
hedges on a MTM basis. In other words, merchants marked hedge
contracts to market for determining gross income in respect of those
contracts, although they were still not permitted to treat hedging
transactions as part of their inventory accounting per se.61
The LCM method also applied to inventory of securities dealers,
but they similarly were not able to apply mark-to-market accounting
• . • 62
to their contractual liabilities, such as open short sales positions. As
the derivatives business developed, dealers became more concerned
about the timing mismatches for their over-the-counter derivatives
business. Dealers' positions in swaps and other derivatives are not
60 A.R.M. 100, supra note 56, at 70-71 (considering it "self-evident" that
purchases and sales of a like quantity of a commodity could not be considered "one
transaction" and indicating that "[t]here is in fact no profit or loss in the purchase of a
commodity until the transaction has been completed by the sale of that particular
commodity, nor is there any profit or loss in a transaction in 'futures' until the
transaction has actually been closed").
61 A.R.M. 135, supra note 52, at 78-79 (ruling that merchants could determine
taxable income by taking into account market value of hedges); see also Rev. Rul. 74-
227, 1974-1 C.B. 119 (updating and superseding S.M. 5693, V-2 C.B. 20 (1926) by
confirming in question 4 that "commodities actually on hand at the close of the
taxable year (the physical inventory) may be valued at market" because of the
longstanding industry practice); Molsen v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 485 (1985) (holding
that a cotton merchant's accrual method of accounting under which cost of goods sold
was determined by valuing year-end cotton inventory at market and marking to
market unfixed, on-call purchases at year-end clearly reflected income). The 1921
memorandum emphasized that the position taken now did not conflict with the
position stated in A.R.M. 100, because it was not necessary to treat hedges as a part of
inventory in order to adopt the mark-to-market accounting method for hedge
contracts; instead, the value of hedges was simply acknowledged to be a part of the
"balance sheet" for determining taxable income. A.R.M. 135, supra note 52, at 78-79;
see also Rev. Rul. 74-223, 1974-1 C.B. 23 (restating the position regarding tax
treatment of futures contracts held by a commodities dealer at year-end). In 1981,
Congress enacted a law requiring that regulated commodity futures contracts be
reported on the MTM method, corresponding to the daily cash settlement employed
by commodity futures exchanges for determining margin requirements. Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 503, 95 Stat. 172, 327 (enacting I.R.C.
§ 1256); see also S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 157 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105,
256.
62 See Solicitor's Memorandum S-1179, 1 C.B. 60, 62 (1919) (ruling that marking
to market could not apply to short sales positions because they were not assets). See
generally Kleinbard & Evans, supra note 54, at 796 (discussing the ruling and the
resulting lack of symmetry for treatment of elements of a dealer's business).
2004]
328 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 24:301
inventory in the classic sense, because they do not hold them primarily
for sale to customers; rather, they enter into either side of derivative
contracts with customers or other dealers and generally remain
obligated under a contract throughout its term. Like cotton dealers,
securities dealers hedge their positions to protect from market risk.
By the early nineties, most if not all securities dealers valued their
securities inventories and derivatives at market for financial statement
purposes.3 From 1958 to 1993, a securities dealer was able, under
applicable regulations, to choose a tax accounting method for its
physical securities inventory from any one of the three inventory
methods (cost, lower of cost or market, or market), provided that the
method conformed to "the basis on which his accounts are kept."
' ' 1
Most dealers "relied on mark-to-market accounting to understand and
manage many of their business segments, and filed their U.S. federal
income tax returns generally by reference to lower-of-cost-or-market-
accounting .... 65 But market valuations of physical securities under
LCM created potential whipsaw problems if related derivatives
positions could not also be marked to market.66 Securities dealers
63 House Committee on the Budget Report to Accompany the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993 at 237, 1993-3 C.B. 239; INV. IN DEBT AND EQUITY SEC.,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, 13 (Financial Accounting
Standards Bd. 1993) (requiring inclusion in earnings of unrealized gains and losses on
securities trades); Alan B. Munro & Yoram Keinan, The Case for Book-Tax
Conformity for Mark-to-Market Valuations, 16 J. OF TAX'N OF FIN. INST. 5, 8 (2003)
(noting that "the common practice in the financial derivatives industry had been to
mark swaps and other derivatives to market [for financial accounting purposes]" even
though it was not until 1998 that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 requiring that
derivatives be marked to market).
T.D. 6336, 1958-2 C.B. 176 (adopting Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5 permitting
securities dealers to use any one of the three methods for their securities inventories).
65 Securities Industries Association, Submission in Response to Advance Notice
Regarding Proposed Safe Harbor Under Section 475, at 3 (July 30, 2003) [hereinafter
S1A Response], available at http://www.sia.com/Taxlssues/pdf/
ANPRSubmission-section475. pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
66 See Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers Association et al. 1 55-56, 65,
Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 174 (2000) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97),
reprinted in Amici Contend Bank One's Derivative Swap Valuations Clearly Reflect
Income, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 3, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2001 TNT 64-36) [hereinafter referred to as Amicus Brief and cited by paragraph
number] (noting that traditional accrual accounting can create timing distortions from
realized losses (or gains) on short-dated hedges that are offset by unrealized gains (or
losses) on long-dated items and that many dealers "voluntarily adopted
comprehensive mark-to-market tax accounting"). This is a curious statement, since it
is not clear how a taxpayer can "voluntarily adopt" a method not permitted under the
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therefore engaged in a similar campaign for tax conformity with their
financial mark-to-market accounting for their entire hedged
business." Treasury responded with a proposed regulation permitting
securities dealers and traders to elect a MTM method of accounting
for their dealer activities, including derivatives and hedges: the
proposal carried a sting, in that a dealer or trader could adopt MTM
for derivatives only if neither the taxpayer nor any related party used
LCM accounting for securities held in its capacity as a dealer or trader
(or securities held as hedges).68
Congressional action forestalled further development of the
proposed regulation. The President's 1992 budget proposals for fiscal
year 1993 included a revenue raiser conforming securities dealers' tax
treatment of marketable securities to their financial accounting
treatment by requiring securities dealers to mark their securities
Code, in order to prevent fluctuations of taxable income that might cause the
taxpayer to incur more substantial taxes in some periods and losses in others. At any
rate, for dealers who had adopted mark-to-market accounting for their derivatives
portfolios for tax purposes, realization accounting for securities that hedged those
customer positions would result in similar timing mismatches to those experienced
earlier by commodities dealers. See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 13.
'7 See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 13 (referring to dealer lobbying for MTM
authority and citing, at note 38, Letter from Cynthia Beerbower, on behalf of nine
interest rate cap dealers, to D. Kevin Dolan (Mar. 4, 1988) (reprinted in 88 TNT 69-29
(Mar. 28, 1988)) and Letter from Salomon Brothers Inc., to K. Walli, I.R.S. (Dec. 6,
1991), reprinted in 91 TNT 255-37 (Dec. 17, 1991)); Kleinbard & Evans, supra note 54,
at 797-98. But see Letter from Thomas A. James, Chairman of the Securities Industry
Association, to Nicholas F. Brady, Treasury Secretary, Re: Mark-to-Market
Accounting for Securities Dealers (June 4, 1992) (letter from the SIA arguing against
proposed MTM legislation), reprinted in Securities Industry Opposes Mark-to-Market
Accounting, TAX NoTEs TODAY (June 25, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 92 TNT 131-44).
68 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,350, 1991-2 C.B. 951 (July
10, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 NPRM] (proposing regulation permitting MTM for
securities dealers); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,350 (July 10, 1991)
(withdrawn) (proposing MTM for securities dealers). Treasury was concerned that
accounting for physical securities held in a taxpayer's capacity as a dealer or trader
with the LCM method understated income by permitting recognition of unrealized
losses while continuing to defer recognition of unrealized gains. The cost method also
permitted understatements, because dealers were not subject to the wash sale rule of,
section 1091. Without a statutory change, however, Treasury could not prescribe
MTM rather than LCM accounting for all securities held in a taxpayer's capacity as a
dealer or trader. The proposed regulation was a back-door way to move dealers and
traders and related parties to MTM accounting for those securities. The proposed
regulation permitted them to avoid the whiplash caused by realization accounting for




inventory to market rather than using LCM. 69  There was little
explanation of the proposal, other than to note that it would conform
financial accounting and federal income tax accounting for securities
in inventory and eliminate understatement of income.70 The proposed
revenue provision went through various stages and was part of several
bills, including two that passed both houses of Congress but were
vetoed by the President, before its final enactment into law in 1993.7'
69 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, RECEIPTS, PART TWO 8 (1992); STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., SUMMARY OF REVENUE PROPOSALS IN THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET, at 28 (Joint Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter
JCT SUMMARY].
" See JCT SUMMARY, supra note 69, at 28; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET PROPOSALS AFFECTING RECEIPTS 89-90
(1992) (proposing to "conform the accounting and tax treatment of securities
inventories by requiring that securities be included in inventory at their market
value"); see also Committee on Ways and Means, Report together with Minority
Views to accompany H.R. 4210, H.R. REP. No. 102-432, at 60 (1992) (indicating that
"[tihe cost method and the lower of cost or market method tend to understate taxable
income compared to the market method that securities dealers use to report their
income to shareholders and creditors. The market method represents the best
accounting practice in the trade or business of dealing in securities and is the method
that most clearly reflects the income of a securities dealer.").
71 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13223, 107 Stat.
312, 481 (enacting section 475 mark-to-market rules for securities dealers). The
proposal was included as new section 475 in a tax bill introduced in the House in
February 1992, requiring dealers to mark to market both securities held in inventory
and derivatives (including options, forwards, futures, notional principal contracts,
short positions, and similar financial instruments). H.R. 4210, 102d Cong. § 372
(1992). In the Senate report on its substitute bill (which also included an amended
version of proposed section 475), the Senate stated its concern that the LCM method
permitted securities dealers to understate their taxable income. S. REP. No. 102-77, at
89 (1992). The Senate amendment provided two general mark-to-market rules: one
valued securities that were inventory in the hands of the dealer at fair market value
and the other applied constructive sale treatment to those securities that were not
inventory in the hands of the dealer. H.R. 4210, 102d Cong. § 3005 (1992) (as
engrossed in the Senate). Only certain notional principal contracts were included in
the definition of securities in the conference agreement: those were interest rate,
currency, and equity notional principal contracts. H.R. 4210 was vetoed by the
President on March 24, 1992. H.R. Doc. NO. 102-206 (1992). The MTM proposal
was also included in an unemployment compensation bill, H.R. 5260, which passed
the House on June 9, 1992. In the fall, a proposal in the same form as in the
conference agreement to H.R. 4210 was again passed by the House and Senate. See
H.R. 11, 102d Cong. § 3001 (1992). The report again emphasized the problem of
asymmetric recognition of losses and gains under the LCM method. H.R. CONE. REP.
No. 102-1034, at 770 (1992). This bill was also vetoed by the President. In 1993, the
President again proposed a mark-to-market provision. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
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During this process, the Securities Industry Association (SIA)
apparently had second thoughts about the potential tax costs of
accelerating recognition of gains under the mark-to-market revenue-
raising provision, as evidenced by a short comment letter to Treasury
expressing its "adamant" opposition to the "new tax" that represented
a "substantial departure" from the basic tax principle requiring
72
realization. The provision as adopted did not retain the header
indicating that its purpose was to conform tax to financial accounting,
and the final bill provided for mark-to-market accounting for
securities in inventory and for derivative positions and hedges. As
noted, the conference report provided as explanation for the revenue
raiser the potential understatement of taxable income under the LCM
method when unrealized losses, but not unrealized gains, are
recognized."
2. Inventory Accounting: The LIFO Method
The second important factor in inventory accounting is
identification of the items to be counted in inventory at the beginning
and end of the inventory accounting periods and the consequent flow
of values through inventory. Ordinarily, under the "first-in, first-out"
(FIFO) method, inventory items are assumed to flow through a
merchant's accounts in chronological order - the first items produced
or purchased by a merchant must be the first items sold by the
merchant. Under FIFO, the end-of-year value for retained inventory
that is subtracted from the carryover inventory value from the prior
TAXATION, 103D CONG., WAYS AND MEANS COMM. MARKUP OF ADMINISTRATION'S
REVENUE PROPOSALS, at 27-31 (Joint Comm. Print 1993). It was finally enacted into
law in August of 1993. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
Stat. 312. Temporary and Proposed Regulations were issued in December. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.475(b)-lT to (d)-lT, T.D. 8505, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,747 (Dec. 28, 1993)
(temporary regulations); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(b)-i to (d)-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,798
(Dec. 29, 1993) (proposed regulations). Further proposed regulations were issued in
1995 and 1996. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(a)-i to (e)-1, 60 Fed. Reg. 397 (Jan. 4,1995);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(b)-i to (e)-l, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,474 (June 20, 1996). Final
regulations were adopted in 1996. T.D. 8700, 1997-1 C.B. 108. Congress later
amended the mark-to-market rules to permit commodities and securities traders and
commodities dealers to elect mark-to-market accounting. See The Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001(b), 111 Stat. 251, 906 (adding sections 475(e)
and (f)). The one clear purpose of the extension of marking to market for securities
dealers, therefore, is its characterization throughout the legislative process as a
revenue enhancer.
72 See James, supra note 67.
73 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 611 (1993).
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year will tend to be higher from year to year as costs of producing
inventory items increase, thus reducing cost of goods sold and
increasing gross income from inventory.
"Last-in, first out" (LIFO) inventory accounting was a significant
innovation in the early years of the income tax. Unlike FIFO, LIFO
inventory sales during a reporting period are considered to be from
the most recently purchased or produced merchandise. When
inventory levels remain constant, LIFO treats the closing inventory
(i.e., items that are retained and not sold) as coming entirely from the
carried-over (beginning) inventory. When inventory levels increase
during a year, only the increase at end of year is treated as coming
from current year purchases. When inventory levels decrease during a
year, the annual layers of retained inventory from prior years are
considered sold in reverse chronological order. Thus, to the extent
possible, LIFO allocates the most recent costs to costs of sales and the
earlier costs to costs of retained inventory." In a multiyear period of
constantly rising prices, the result will be a higher cost of goods sold
and lower gross income from inventory. Accordingly, LIFO is
generally a taxpayer-favorable method compared to the ordinary
FIFO method during periods of inflation.
The LIFO method developed from the "base stock" method,
which was used by some taxpayers under the earliest income tax
statutes but ruled impermissible by the Service and later by the
courts.75 After the adverse court decision, taxpayers lobbied for
legislation permitting some variant of the base stock method for tax
purposes. They succeeded over Treasury's objections in 1938, but the
initial authorization was limited to a few industries that dealt in basic
raw materials - leather tanning and basic metal products.76 The
74 See generally RICHARD GARRETr ET AL., ACCOUNTING METHODS -
ADOPTION AND CHANGES, 572-2d TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO A-25 (2000)
(explaining the LIFO method).
75 See T.B.R. 65, 1 C.B. 51 (1919) (ruling base stock method impermissible);
Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264 (1930) (same). The base stock
method treated a portion of the taxpayer's inventory (an amount considered
necessary to the taxpayer's business) as though it were a fixed asset carried at its
original cost basis.
76 Congress passed LIFO after the industries had lobbied Treasury for
administrative relief in 1936, 1937, and 1938. Treasury was concerned that passage
would lead to significant revenue losses, but Senator Johnson in a statement on the
floor indicated that the method would not be applicable to "ordinary trading and
manufacturing enterprises" so should not cause such a problem. SEIDMAN, supra note
26, at 7; see also Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 258, § 22(d), 52 Stat. 447, 459 (permitting
use of LIFO in certain industries); Revenue Act of 1938: Hearing on H.R. 9682 Before
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legislative history suggested that Congress had considered important
the fact that those industries used LIFO for a number of non-tax
purposes." The 1939 act, however, expanded accessibility of LIFO
accounting to all businesses with inventories, though it was assumed
that financial accounting restrictions would mean that it would be
available for financial accounting purposes only to those industries
that required fixed quantities of raw materials for their products, such
as oil refineries and textile manufacturers.78
At the time of the expansion, Congress also added - without
explanation - a mandatory booking requirement: a taxpayer can use
the LIFO method for tax purposes only if the taxpayer also uses LIFO
for financial accounting purposes to provide information to equity
owners and creditors.7 ' The accounting profession viewed the
requirement as a turf war with tax authorities inappropriately
invading their domain.0  Commentators indicated that the
requirement was intended to deter the use of LIFO, on the assumption
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong. 145 (1938) (statement of Maurice E.
Peloubet, arguing against Treasury's contention that the base stock method was not
supported by accounting professionals).
71 Senator Lonergan, for example, made the following statement from the floor:
[I]n certain industries ... , the last-in and first-out method of taking
inventories, proposed by the amendment, is recognized by the leading
accounting authorities as most accurately reflecting income. It is employed
on their books in preparing published reports to stockholders and the New
York Stock Exchange, in declaring dividends, and in statements filed with
and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
83 CONG. REc. 5043 (1938) (statement of Senator Lonergan), reprinted in SEIDMAN,
supra note 26, at 6. The Senator went on to indicate the need for this method for the
particular industries (smelting, tanning) because of the volatility of income and losses
otherwise, which are "at variance with the conduct of the business." Id.
7 Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 219, 53 Stat. 862, 877. In fact, taxpayers were
permitted to elect to apply LIFO only to raw materials while continuing to use other
methods to account for other aspects of inventory. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9445004 (Nov.
10, 1994) (discussing promulgation of T.D. 5407 in 1944).
79 The legislative history merely restates the requirements of the Revenue Act of
1939. See S. REP. No. 76-648 (1939), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 524, 528 (indicating that
LIFO taxpayers must demonstrate that they have used no other method for business
purposes such as income statements, loan applications and shareholder reports); see
also Treas. Reg. § 1.472-2(e) (as amended in 1981) (setting forth criteria for
satisfaction of conformity requirement).
"' A recent article goes into some detail on the accounting profession's sense of
turf rights on these issues. See Luppino, supra note 3, at 121-31, 124 (describing the
"tenacity with which the accounting profession has fought against suggestions that the
tax law dictate the principles to be followed in preparing financial statements").
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that LIFO was generally viewed as an unsound accounting method for
businesses other than the tanning and metal industries, and companies
would not be willing to change to a less regarded financial accounting
method for reports to their shareholders except in those few industries
where it was customary.8' The consequences, however, were far
different, as "accountants developed 'theory' to justify its use for
financial statement purposes [, so that t]he tail definitely wagged the
dog in this case." 82
In practice, the LIFO conformity requirement has been anything
but straightforward. Over the years, questions have arisen involving
writedowns of subnormal goods, treatment of affiliated corporations,
use of dollar-value LIFO accounting, use of non-LIFO inventory
determinations as a basis for bonuses of managers, use of
supplemental explanatory information in reports to shareholders that
is based on non-LIFO accounts, and preparation of interim reports or
• 83
reports for managers and other insiders using non-LIFO accounting.
8 See, e.g., Richard B. Barker, Practical Aspects of Inventory Problems Under
Current Conditions: Lifo, Involuntary Liquidations, 10TH ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 511, 512-13 (1952) (noting that the LIFO conformity rule was "the first and
only time the revenue laws have been used specifically to control private accounting,"
and suggesting that those in Treasury who doubted the soundness of the LIFO
method expected that corporations would not be willing to use the same method for
financial accounting purposes); Arthur M. Cannon, Tax Pressures on Accounting
Principles and Accountants' Independence, 27 AccT. REv. 419, 420 (1952) (calling the
requirement a "holding action" by the Service intended to restrict the use of LIFO).
Regrettably, the conformity requirement for use of LIFO on tax returns appeared to
serve merely as a strong distorting influence on financial accounting principles. For
example, Herbert Miller noted that the success of LIFO was due to those accountants
who supported the method because of its potential income tax advantages, even while
expressing their "dislike" of the method. Herbert E. Miller, How Much Income Tax
Allocation?, 114 J. AcCT. 46, 49 (July 1962). But see Rev. Rul. 74-586, 1974-2 C.B. 156'
(stating that the purpose of the conformity requirement was to ensure that the LIFO
method clearly reflects income for the particular taxpayer).
8 Harold E. Arnett, Taxable Income vs. Financial Income: How Much
Uniformity Can We Stand?, 44 Accr. REv. 482, 491 (1969). Accountants would be
pressed to rationalize adoption of a tax-advantaged method whenever there is a
conformity requirement, "and accountants, if history is an accurate indicator, would
succumb." Id. at 484.
83 See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 95, 98 Stat. 494,
616 (treating financially related corporate group as single taxpayer for LIFO
conformity requirement); T.D. 7756, 1981-1 C.B. 316 (finalizing new rules for
complying with the financial reporting conformity requirement, including
supplemental and explanatory disclosures, internal management reports, interim
reports, use of LCM but not MTM for LIFO inventories after January 22, 1981, and
book-tax differences that may be disclosed when LIFO is used for both book and tax
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These issues have generally been resolved by permitting myriad
variances between the particular financial reporting item and the
LIFO tax accounts, in many ways undoing the equivalency
purportedly imposed by the booking requirement and casting into
question whether conformity can either simplify tax rules or result in
more accurate measurement of income.
C. Accrual Accounting: Current Inclusion of Prepayments and
Deferral of Prepaid Expenses
The ongoing debate about conformity has been sharpest
regarding prepayments. For financial accounting purposes, a
matching principle operates to defer prepaid income so that it can be
taken into account when the income is considered earned.84 Similarly,
financial accounting deductions are permitted for reasonably expected
future costs that are viewed as reducing profits from current income
(without reduction to present value)." When taxpayers attempted to
apply these advantageous financial accounting rules for prepayments
inventory identification but book and tax LIFO numbers differ because of differences
in other aspects of inventory accounting); T.D. 6539, 1961-1 C.B. 167 (adopting rules
applying retroactively to the 1954 taxable year permitting the "dollar-value" method
for computing LIFO inventories in terms of "base-year cost" of a pool of items); Rev.
Rul. 77-50, 1977-1 C.B. 137, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 88-21, 1988-1 C.B. 245 (permitting
taxpayers to write down the cost of subnormal goods for financial accounting
purposes even though such writedowns are not permitted for tax purposes).
'4 See, e.g., OBJECTIVES OF FIN. REPORTING BY Bus. ENTERPRISES, Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, 45 & n.12 (Financial Accounting Standards
Bd. 1978) (discussing the importance of relating costs to revenues), available at
http:/www.fasb.org/pdf/conl.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). An early study of
differences between tax and financial accounting provides a succinct statement of the
financial accounting matching principle. See J.K. Lasser & Maurice E. Peloubet, Tax
Accounting v. Commercial Accounting, 4 TAx L. REV. 343, 348 (1949) ("The
determination of income by matching concurrent costs and revenues is a basic
accounting concept and the determination of how and when the revenues and costs
are matched is the principal problem with which accountants and businessmen deal in
the statement of income. If income is required to be stated in one period and
concurrent costs in another period, distortion of income in both periods is
inevitable."). For further discussion of the matching principle, see infra note 102 and
articles referenced therein.
"' ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5, 9 76-80 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) (discussing the
matching concept in financial accounting in relation to the accrual of obligations for
services to be rendered and similar issues), available at http://www.fasb.org
pdf/fas5.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). These accounting standards generally
disregard the time value of money.
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to determine their tax liabilities, the Service assessed deficiencies for
underpayment of income tax. A number of court cases upheld the
Service's position, relying in part on the claim of right doctrine." The
cases, and the sharp conflict with financial accounting rules, led to a
slew of commentary and renewed calls for conformity of tax with
financial accounting, especially from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).s7
"' See, e.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934) (holding that an insurance
salesman accrual taxpayer must include commissions accrued and received, even
though some portion might have to be returned later due to cancellation of policies);
Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1943) (disallowing a
deduction for future expenses required to provide services to which members were
entitled for membership dues paid); S. Dade Farms v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818
(5th Cir. 1943) (holding that advance rental payments were income in the year
received); N. Ill. Coll. of Optometry v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 664 (1943)
(holding that an accrual taxpayer should include tuition prepayments in income when
received); Your Health Club v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 385 (1944) (holding that an
accrual taxpayer should include prepayments for services in income when received
rather than treating portions as a "reserve" for unearned income), acq. in result, 1945
C.B. 7 (I.R.S. 1945); S. Tacoma Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 411 (1944)
(finding that receipts from sales of coupons that were refundable on demand and
entitled purchasers to services to be provided at some time in the future should be
included in income when received); Auto. Underwriters v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A.
1160 (1930) (holding that membership fees for services of reciprocal insurance
association were income when received). But see I.T. 3369, 1940-1 C.B. 46 (1940)
(permitting publishers to defer certain amounts received on subscriptions extending
beyond the end of the taxable year). See generally Harold Dubroff, The Claim of
Right Doctrine, 40 TAx L. REv. 729, 729-32, 770-71 (1985) (discussing the history of
the claim of right doctrine and its application to prepaid income).
87 See William J. Bowe, Cash and Accrual Methods of Income Tax Accounting, 3
VAND. L. REv. 60, 63 (1949) (in an article purporting to merely state "the developed
law" on accounting, noting that departures from traditional accounting principles
respond in part to a "basic practical principle that taxes should be collected at a time
when cash is in hand, even though such a rule may violate some of the niceties of
accounting science"); Cannon, supra note 81, at 424 (arguing against conformity
because it leads accountants to "prostitute accounting principles to tax"); Freeman,
supra note 28, at 728 (noting that "the legislative intent to bring tax law into harmony
with accepted accounting principles has been clear, and this in spite of the necessity
for repealing sections 452 and 462 of the Internal Revenue Code"); Alfred E.
Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 MicH. L. REv. 149, 181 (1949)
(arguing that "the legal profession has substituted legal technicalities [i.e., the claim of
right doctrine] for principles of accounting"); T. Milton Kupfer, The Financial
Accounting Disclosure of Tax Matters; Conflicts with Tax Accounting Technical
Requirements, 33RD ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1121, 1122-23 (1975) (noting
that the AICPA in 1953 urged that conformity be restored as the guiding principle for
tax, to avoid inequities and hardships for taxpayers); Lasser & Peloubet, supra note
84, at 344, 347, 357 (arguing that tax rules are beset by the "demon of convenience"
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Responding to the growing chorus of concern, Congress included
in its 1954 overhaul of the Code two sections intended to address
these issues: section 452, which permitted certain prepaid income to
be reported when earned under financial accounting standards, and
section 462, which permitted a deduction to accrual taxpayers for a
reserve for estimated future expenses, in general accordance with
financial accounting standards. 88  The primary motivation was
simplification of tax accounting by generally conforming it to financial
accounting in this significant area of controversy. 9 These provisions
were modified mandatory booking requirements, in that a taxpayer
could not defer inclusions or accelerate deductions unless the
inclusions were deferred and the deductions accelerated on the
taxpayer's financial statements;90 however, the benefits of deferral
that relies on formulas rather than judgment and the "demon of anticipation" that
"exact[s] his share of money presently in possession of the taxpayer but dedicated to
the satisfaction of future and certain, if indefinite, liabilities and obligations" and
proposing a comprehensive conformity requirement, except for tax expenditure
items); Reimer, supra note 14, at 307 (listing thirty-one differences between book and
tax accounting and arguing that GAAP "should furnish the primary guide for
determining net income for all purposes, including the computation of taxable
income"). The controversy continues today, often cast in terms of whether tax should
incorporate the matching principle that is so important in financial accounting. See
infra note 102 and the articles referenced therein.
88 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (1954 Code) §§ 452, 462 (prior to June 15,
1955 repeal), reprinted in JACOB MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (as amended to Dec. 31, 1958), at 205-
07, 214-15. The provision permitted deferral in respect of certain "liabilities," defined
broadly to include an obligation to provide services, goods or use of property. Under
this provision, therefore, pure services income that would likely be almost entirely net
profit was permitted to be deferred up to five years beyond the taxable year of
receipt. Section 462 similarly permitted a taxpayer to deduct an estimated expense.
1954 Code § 462(a).
89 See T.D. 6134, 26 C.F.R. 1.452-1, 1.462-1 (June 8, 1955), 1955-1 C.B. 50, 52
[hereinafter, 1954 Regulations] (indicating that "[t]he general purpose of section 452
is to bring tax accounting more closely into harmony with generally accepted
accounting principles"). The provision did not accomplish complete conformity,
because the period of deferral for taxable income purposes was limited to six years
but not so limited for financial accounting purposes. Id. at 52. A similar statement
described the estimated reserve deduction. Id. at 60. See also William L. Raby, The
Meaning of 'Accrued' - Accounting Concepts Versus Tax Concepts, 57 TAX NOTES
777, 777 (Nov. 9, 1992) (noting that the 1954 Code attempted to align tax with
financial accounting in order to simplify tax accounting).
90 See 1954 Regulations, supra note 89, at 52 (noting that "no election under
section 452 may be made unless the prepaid income is deferred on the regular books
of account ... on the basis of which the taxpayer prepares his financial statements").
The regulations also stated that "no amount shall be taken into account with respect
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were limited compared to financial accounting methods." Adoption
of the two provisions essentially imported the financial accounting
matching principle into the tax system for shorter term obligations to
perform services or provide goods, without time-value-of-money
• • • 92
limitations. Taxpayers gamed the system, taking advantage of a lack
of transition rules to deduct expenses twice and manipulating their
estimates of future expenses inappropriately to reduce their taxable
income. 93 Accordingly, both sections were repealed retroactively in
1955 when the extent of revenue loss and the potential for
manipulation became clear.9
to estimated expenses under section 462 unless a reserve therefore has been
established and is properly recorded on the regular books of account .. on the basis
of which the taxpayer prepares his financial statements"). id. at 60.
91 1954 Code Section 452 essentially permitted deferral of prepaid income in
respect of a liability for a period of up to five years after the year of receipt if deferral
for that period or longer was permitted under the taxpayer's accrual accounting
method. 1954 Code § 452(a). If the entire prepayment would not be treated as
"earned" at the end of six years for financial accounting purposes, it was required to
be taken into account ratably over six years for tax purposes. 1954 Code § 452(b).
The estimated expense deduction also had to satisfy a reasonableness requirement,
interpreted to require, where possible, a reasonable relationship to historical
experience. See 1954 Regulations, supra note 89, at 61-62.
92 The rule permitting deferral of inclusions did not require that the net present
value be included, see 1954 Code § 452, and the rule permitting acceleration of
deductions did not limit the deduction to the net present value of the estimated future
expense, see 1954 Code § 462. However, the regulations promulgated under 1954
Code section 452 did require immediate inclusion of any prepaid amount not likely to
be related to provision of future services based on prior experience. 1954
Regulations, supra note 89, at 54-55.
93 John S. Nolan, The Merit in Conformity of Tax to Financial Accounting, 50
TAXES 761, 763 n.7 (1972) (stating that the provisions were repealed "because of a
threatened large revenue loss largely attributable to their potential effect in
permitting a doubling up of deductions" due to lack of appropriate transitional rules);
Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., A Challenge: Can the Accounting Profession Lead the Tax
System?, 126 J. Accr. 66, 69 (Sept. 1968) (reporting a speech by Jerome Kurtz, U.S.
Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel, in which he noted that Congress realized that there
were "no clear standards of what expenses could be estimated and that taxpayers
were making estimates and taking deductions for a vastly greater amount of these
items than had been anticipated. The problem turned out to be, I think, that there
were no clear lines as a matter of accounting principles as to what kind of expenses
could properly be accrued.").
Publ. L. No. 74, Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143, § 1, 69 Stat. 134 (repealing
sections 452 and 462 of the 1954 Code); see Am. Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367
U.S. 687, 695 (1961) (describing the effect on tax revenues as "a disastrous impact");
Rev. Rul. 55-539, 1955-2 C.B. 246 (noting "the effect of the repeal will generally be to
increase the tax liability of taxpayers who elected the methods of accounting provided
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Repeal did not end the prepayment conformity controversy
among courts or commentators. 95 Accepting repeal, some insisted that
healthy financial and tax systems depended on independent evolution
of financial and tax accounting principles.9 Proponents of conformity
claimed, however, that financial accounting was fairer and simpler for
both taxpayers and the Service, and they accordingly viewed the
failure to defer income until earned as a particularly "notorious"
aspect of tax accounting that eliminated the beneficial flexibility
inherent in financial accounting. 7 In spite of the repeal of sections
452 and 462, some thought the courts should nevertheless interpret
the tax laws to conform to the financial accounting matching
• • 98
principle. The Supreme Court considered these issues in a famous
by sections 452 and 462 of the Code"). One commentator claimed that
[i]t was only because the cases seemed to reverse this policy [encouraging
sound accrual practices] and produce confusion that sections 452 and 462
were embodied in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.... [But] the repeal
was to close the door to double deductions and too large adjustments in one
year, and not to thwart sound accounting or reverse the trend to bring tax
law and accounting into harmony.
Freeman, supra note 28, at 746.
" See, e.g., Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956) (permitting
deduction in year of sale of furnaces of the estimated cost of fulfilling obligation to
turn furnaces on and off for five years); Beacon Publ'g Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d
697, 700-01 (10th Cir. 1955) (refusing to apply claim of right doctrine and permitting
taxpayer to defer inclusions of prepaid subscriptions to periods to which they were
related and suggesting that the Tax Court cases holding otherwise had misinterpreted
the importance of the matching principle in tax); William M. Emery, Time for Accrual
of Income and Expenses, 17TH ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 183, 193-94 (1959)
(asserting that the government "has reaped rich rewards for opportunism" in the
taxation of prepayments). For a comprehensive listing of relevant articles from the
1950s and 1960s, see Clear Reflection, supra note 30, at 359 n.20, 360.
96 For example, Herbert Miller argued explicitly for separate development of
accounting and tax concepts:
The rules for determining taxable income should be thought of as part of
the formula for computing a tax and should meet the requirements of a
good tax system and be compatible with the objectives sought to be
achieved by Congress. In contrast, the rules for determining accounting
income should be directed to such objectives as producing amounts
indicative of the effectiveness of management. I think we should give
careful consideration to the benefits that might accrue from an effort to
separate accounting and income tax concepts.
Miller, supra note 81, at 50-51.
In Clear Reflection, supra note 30, at 359 n.20, 360.
9' See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 28, at 746-50 (providing an appendix of forty
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trilogy that addressed prepaid service income - American
Automobile Ass'n, Automobile Club of Michigan, and Schlude - and
held that deferral of prepayments for services was impermissible, at
least in those particular factual circumstances." In response to
continued lobbying, Congress did enact limited exceptions to the
deferral rule for prepaid subscription income and membership dues.'O
Based on the trilogy and those limited legislative exceptions, the
Service then took the position that accrual taxpayers must include
most other prepayments in income when received."'
claim of right and all-events test cases in 1956-57 to demonstrate the ongoing nature
of the controversy over accounting for prepayments, noting "arguments in favor of a
case-to-case approval of sound accruing, rather than through the wide open invitation
of section 462," and suggesting that the courts should develop the law to permit
accrual for "reasonable expectancies"); Sidney Gelfand, The "Claim of Right"
Doctrine, 33 TAXES 726 (1955) (arguing that section 452 was not necessary to permit
accrual of prepayments in accord with financial accounting principles, and so its
repeal "should not affect taxpayers' rights to defer receipts which in fact are not yet
earnings"); Victor R. Wolder, Deduction of Reserves for Future Expenses and
Deferring of Prepaid Income, 34 TAXES 524 (1956) (arguing that "appellate courts
seemingly may have been stepping into the gap left by the repeal of Sections 452 and
462").
99 Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (holding that a dance studio
could not defer inclusion of prepaid dance lesson income when contracts guaranteed
students a certain number of lesson hours on demand); Auto. Club of Mich. v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) (holding that a club could not allocate advance
payments of one year's membership fees ratably to the twelve-month period when
services might be rendered); Am. Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 255 (Ct.
Cl. 1960) (holding that an automobile association could not defer recognition of
annual dues paid in exchange for right to on-demand services based on statistical
evidence of service demands), affd 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
100 See I.R.C. § 455 (enacted as part of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 28, 72 Stat. 1606, 1625-26); I.R.C. § 456 (enacted as part of the
Act of July 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-109, 75 Stat. 222). Deferral of part of a
prepayment in these contexts is more justifiable than in the pure service context, since
a taxpayer receiving prepayments for subscriptions or club memberships will have
statistically certain and generally not too remote future costs in connection with
provision of the periodical or membership benefits. Nonetheless, by not requiring the
net present value of the expected profit to be included upon receipt, these exceptions
result in undertaxation compared to the general rules.
"' See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-308, 1980-2 C.B. 162 (requiring utilities to include in
income fuel adjustment charges based on estimated sales but intended to recover
increased fuel charges for preceding half year); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 (as amended in
2001) (providing only limited deferral of advance payments for sales); Rev. Proc. 71-
21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 (providing only limited deferral of advance payments for
services), modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991. The
accrual method "all-events test" requires income to be included when the right to the
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income is fixed and the amount can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2004). This may well occur before the income
has been "earned" for financial accounting purposes. Accrual deductions must also
satisfy an economic performance test, which may result in deferral compared to
financial accounting. See I.R.C. § 461(h). These rules comport with the traditional
view of an income tax that requires taxpayers to make payments according to ability
to pay (defined in terms of possession and control of income) in conjunction with an
annual accounting system based on realization, although an income tax with full
accretion taxation (considered by many proponents of an income tax to be the ideal)
would not only require current inclusion of prepayments but also permit deduction of
the net present value of future expenses, appropriately discounted for their
remoteness and contingent nature. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, The Illegitimate
"Earned" Requirement in Tax and Nontax Accounting, 50 TAx L. REV. 373, 381
(1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Earned] (discussing the failure of the financial
accounting matching principle to consider the time value of money and the resulting
miscalculation of profits). Some accountants denounced the realization income tax
emphasis on the ability-to-pay fairness criterion as a tax "demon of anticipation." See
Lasser and Peloubet, supra note 84, at 344. But those critics seldom point out the
advantages from the financial accounting system's failure to take net present value of
prepayments and accelerated deductions into account. Under the second Bush
administration, the Service has again switched to expanding deferral possibilities in
the name of "reduc[ing] the administrative and tax compliance burdens on taxpayers
and... minimiz[ing] disputes between the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers
regarding advance payments." I.R.S. Notice 2002-79, 2002-2 C.B. 964, 964 (proposing
a revenue procedure to supersede Rev. Proc. 71-21); see also Rev. Proc. 2004-34,
2004-22 I.R.B. 991 (Jun. 1, 2004) (superseding Rev. Proc. 71-21). The final revenue
procedure, like the ANPRM addressed in this Article, suggests that the current tax
administration supports leaving the determination of taxable income to accountants.
Specifically, Rev. Proc. 2004-34 defines an "applicable financial statement," id. § 4.06,
and allows a taxpayer to defer to the next succeeding taxable year the amount of
advance payments received in the taxable year for services, certain non-services, and
combinations of services and certain non-services when those payments are also
deferred on the taxpayer's applicable financial statement, id. § 5.02(1)(a)(i)-(ii).
Under the revenue procedure, the following three financial statements can qualify as
an applicable financial statement, in descending priority: (1) a financial statement
required to be filed with the SEC; (2) a certified audited financial statement that is
used for credit purposes, reporting to shareholders, or any other substantial non-tax
purpose; or (3) a financial statement required to be filed with a governmental entity
other than the SEC or Service. Id. § 4.06. Although the revenue procedure eases
compliance burdens and reduces the potential overtaxation of prepayments, it also
increases the potential for undertaxation (deferral of services income that will have
minimal associated future costs and hence a high net present value profit component)
and adds category complexity because there are now two alternative ways in which
service providers may be able to defer income: if they don't succeed under Treas.
Reg. § 1.451-5, they can still use the new revenue procedure. See Announcement
2004-48, 2004-22 I.R.B. 998 (June 1, 2004) (announcing the issuance of Rev. Proc.
2004-34 and explaining that "the Service does not believe that the revenue procedure
and the regulations should be mutually exclusive"). Not surprisingly, commentators
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Concerns about proper accounting for prepayments remain in
large part because of the insistence by some commentators and courts
on a particular type of conformity - incorporation in the tax system
of the "matching principle" from financial accounting. For example,
several courts have permitted deferral of income when the time of
performance was fixed and deferral permitted matching of income
and related expenses.'02 As commentators have noted, these cases are
arguably wrongly decided, in light of the realization principle which
forms the default rule for the federal income tax system and the
importance of the time value of money. Deferral of prepayments
disregards the "bird in hand" nature of actual receipts at the disposal
of the taxpayer as well as the fact that a portion, often substantial, of
the prepayment represents net profits. Accelerated deductions that
are not reduced to net present value (possibly quite small) to account
for their potential nature can result in significant understatement of
the net present value of profits. The problem is especially acute if
have proposed a number of measures to simplify the procedure by expanding its
scope. See Letter from Robert A. Zarzar, Chair of the Tax Executive Committee of
the AICPA, to Mark W. Everson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Re:
Notice 2002-79, on Including Advance Payments and Advance Rentals in Gross
Income (Sept. 10, 2003) (suggesting acceleration of certain cost deductions, extension
of deferral to all rental payments and to asset transfers under sections 351 or 721,
aggregation of advance payments, and use of ratable inclusion or statistical sampling
to determine how much must finally be included in any taxable year), available at
http://www.cpa2biz.com/resourceCenters/Tax/Tax+Accounting/AdvancePay-RentRegs.
htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
102 See, e.g., Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968)
(permitting deferral of ticket sales income until year in which games would be
played), action on dec. 1970 WL 23056 (Sept. 17, 1970); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
United States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976)
(permitting deferral of engineering services income until performance occurred, even
though time of performance was indefinite); Tampa Bay Devil Rays v. Commissioner,
84 T.C.M (CCH) 394 (2002) (permitting deferral of 1995 and 1996 payments for
tickets and private suites related to games played in 1998).
103 See, e.g., Johnson, Earned, supra note 101 (discussing the understatement
resulting from deferrals and the necessity of discounting future costs to determine
"taxable, not-yet-earned profit"), The Service has administratively granted deferral
of advance payments on sales under section 1.451-5 of the regulations. This similarly
results in undertaxation, in that there is clearly a net present value profit. Support for
that view is provided by Congress's enactment of the economic performance
requirement for accrual of deductions for future obligations. Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984, § 91(a), Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), 98 Stat. 494, 598-601 (enacting new
section 461(h)). The conference agreement discussion of a tax matching principle in
connection with the economic performance test should not change this conclusion.
That applies to a narrow "recurring item" exception for which economic performance
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the deferral of prepayments is related to future services, where the net
present value of the profits is likely close to the actual prepayment.'04
occurs no later than the first eight and one-half months of the following taxable year
and makes clear that GAAP compliance will be considered relevant but "not
necessarily dispositive." H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 871-75, reprinted in 1984-3 C.B. 2,
125-29.
104 Johnson, Earned, supra note 101, at 385-86, 390. For other articles arguing
that the federal income tax does not (and should not) incorporate a matching
principle, see id.; Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax
Value, 15 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 17 (1998); Julie A. Roin, Unmasking the "Matching
Principle" in Tax Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 813 (1993) (noting that the tax matching
principle has nothing to do with deferring income until earned but rather attempts to
prevent arbitrage by matching timing between parties to the transaction, as in the
section 267 related party loss rules). Alan Gunn suggests that conventional
bookkeeping does generally control - simplifying audits, saving money, and perhaps
even deterring fraud. It is only when a special tax accounting rule is substantially
beneficial that tax should and does depart from conformity. Since reporting income
on receipt is "very sensible as a practical matter," financial accounting matching is
neither normatively correct nor administratively the most reasonable approach.
Gunn, supra note 28, at 9. For the contrary view, see M. Bernard Aidinoff &
Benjamin B. Lopata, Section 461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of
Liabilities Arising From Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 TAX LAW. 789
(1980) (arguing that failure of tax to follow the matching principle leads to distortions
of income); Clarence B. Kelley, Case Note, Taxation - The Claim of Right Doctrine
vs. Accrual Accounting, 9 ALA. L. REv. 143 (1956) (disagreeing with failure of tax to
follow accounting's matching principle). Observing the disparate tax treatment of
advance payments depending on their particular classification as payments made for
goods or services (governed by the tax accounting rules discussed in the text) or
payments under financial products (generally governed by specific provisions
determining timing of inclusion, such as the original issue discount rules, or by
analogy with such provisions), Robert Scarborough has proposed that all advance
payments should be treated as imputed loans on which the lender/payer would accrue
an includible investment return at a risk-free rate, such as the applicable federal rate
established by section 1274, See Robert H. Scarborough, Payments in Advance of
Performance, 69 TAXES 798, 801-02 (1991). Note that the categorizations to which
Scarborough objects stem from the coexistence of realization regimes (applicable to
sales) and mark-to-market or pseudo-mark-to-market regimes (applicable to financial
products such as debt instruments). The imputed loan mechanism is, in essence,
another way to extend a pseudo mark-to-market regime to a wider array of taxable
items. See Kleinbard & Evans, supra note 54, at 793-94; cf. Thomas L. Evans, The
Taxation of Multi-Period Projects: An Analysis of Competing Models, 69 TEX. L. REv.
1109 (1991) [hereinafter, Multi-Period Projects] (discussing the problems with timing
models that defer gross income while permitting costs to be currently deducted and
concluding that a percentage completion or rate of return approach is more
appropriate for taxing multi-period projects).
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D. Conformity as a Goal of the Tax System in the 1970s
In the late 1960s, there was another resurgence of interest in
conformity. Accounting groups pressed for both administrative and
legislative relief, especially for consistency in treatment of
prepayments. Arguing that conformity with the superior discipline of
financial accounting would give confidence in the correctness (and
hence fairness) of the tax system, they urged that tax should conform
to financial accounting in all cases except those in which conformity
would contravene special tax conventions, limitations, and
exclusions.'O Although Treasury officials had earlier seriously
'05 See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 82, at 482, 491 (stating that the majority view of
the accounting profession was that "the interests of government, business, and the
public would best be served if the definition of business income subject to tax were
made as nearly as possible coincidental with net income under generally accepted
accounting principles" but arguing that conformity could lead to government
dictation of accounting principles); Sheldon S. Cohen, Accounting for Taxes, Finance
and Regulatory Purposes - Are Variances Necessary?, 44 TAXES 780, 780 n.1 (1966)
(reporting business view that financial accounts should serve for tax accounting
purposes and citing various AICPA recommendations and legislative amendments to
achieve conformity). John Nolan's historical account of the conformity discussions of
the 1970s quotes B. Kenneth Sanden of PricewaterhouseCoopers (then Price,
Waterhouse & Co.) in an October 10, 1972 speech as calling for
restor[ing] the 'income' tax to a tax on 'income' - not a mismatching of
revenue and expenditure. The sooner this is done, and the closer the
conformity, the easier the task of administrators, the greater reliance
businessmen will have in the fairness of the system, legislators on the
published results, and the general public that each segment is bearing its
appropriate share of the tax load.
See Nolan, supra note 93, at 764 n.10. Nolan goes to some lengths to dispute concerns
voiced by conformity critics based on the different objectives of the two accounting
systems:
The objective of income determination for federal tax purposes is, of
course, as the AICPA statement of policy provides, to raise revenue in an
"equitable" fashion, but "equitable" in the case of a business taxpayer
means by reference to the readily determinable increase in net worth or net
economic resources of the taxpayer. This is precisely the purpose of
financial accounting - the measurement of such increase on a practical
basis, pursuant to uniform standards to permit financial comparisons of
companies within an industry and of companies in different industries.
There being a general identity of objectives between tax accounting and
financial reporting, there is much to be gained by permitting tax accounting





questioned whether a single accounting system could realistically
serve the varied purposes of tax, regulatory, and financial
accounting,1" the new Nixon administration showed renewed interest
in such a system. A presidentially appointed task force recommended
conformity between tax and financial accounting as an appropriate
way to facilitate tax compliance and enhance the perceived fairness of
the tax system, repeating the reasoning offered by conformity
advocates that the systems should be substantially similar because of
the shared objective of determining a business's net income on an
annual basis.'°7
Treasury soon took several significant steps towards greater
conformity. In 1971, Treasury promulgated regulations permitting
taxpayers to elect to defer inclusion of advance payments for certain
sales and construction contracts until earned for financial accounting
purposes, with limitations depending on the degree to which payments
are front-loaded. 108  At the same time, Treasury issued a revenue
106 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 105, at 785-89 (noting the many difficulties in
conforming tax and financial accounting); Simonetti, supra note 93, at 67-70
(reporting a 1968 Treasury official's speech pointing out serious concerns about
conformity because of the need to account for special tax subsidies not reflected in
financial accounting, the differing objectives of the tax and financial accounting
systems, the greater flexibility permitted by financial accounting's variances in
practices, and the tax system's greater concern with distinguishing substance from
form); see also M. Edgar Barrett & Gerald J. Holtz, The Case Against One Set of
Books for Financial & Tax Accounting, 40 FIN. EXEC. 30, 38-42 (1972) (arguing
against conformity).
107 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BusINESS TAXATION 60
(1970) (noting that the "divergence results in unnecessary complexity and
controversy"). The task force stated that
[t]he objective of generally accepted accounting principles and tax accrual
concepts is basically the same - the determination of the net income of the
business on an annual basis. Both business taxpayers and government
auditors are generally familiar with accounting principles, and compliance
would be facilitated by conforming the determination of taxable income
more closely with such principles. Business taxpayers would have greater
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the tax if such differences were
minimized.
Id.; see also Nolan, supra note 93 (discussing the impact of the report).
108 T.D. 7103, 1971-1 C.B. 138 (promulgating section 1.451-5 of regulations,
permitting deferral of certain advance payments for sales and long-term contracts
uncompleted during the tax year in conformity with financial accounting measures).
In 1986, however, Congress enacted section 460, which generally requires taxpayers to
include amounts under long-term contracts under the percentage-of-completion
method and thus limits deferral.
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procedure extending limited deferral to advance payments for
services.'"9 As noted, under generally accepted accounting principles,
such payments are deferred until earned.""
Several of these changes towards conformity also carried out
important tax principles by making taxable income determinations
more clearly reflect economic income. For example, Treasury
adopted inventory accounting regulations setting forth the "full
absorption" and "modified full absorption" methods for accounting
for manufacturing direct and indirect overhead costs."' Prior tax
methods - such as the "prime cost" method that took no overhead
costs into account and the "direct cost" method that disregarded
indirect costs - were not clearly permissible for financial accounting
purposes and wrong as a determination of economic income.1 An
explicit purpose of adoption of the absorption method was to achieve
''a greater conformity between financial and tax accounting in the
matter of inventory valuation.""' 3 The result of the changes was to
10 See Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 (providing limited deferral by
permitting advance payments received in one year to be included in the next, with the
intent of resolving a recurring administrative problem for companies that sell and
receive payment for services without regard to year end, and thus may have received
payment in December for services to be provided in January, such as airline, bus, and
train companies), modified and superceded by Rev. Proc. 2004-34. As noted, Rev.
Proc. 2004-34 provides limited deferral in additional cases. See discussion, supra note
101. The administrative relief was limited in light of the trio of Supreme Court cases,
which held that advance payments for services should be included in income in the
year of receipt. See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); Am. Auto. Ass'n
v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353
U.S.180 (1957).
110 See supra note 84. As noted previously, there is a considerable history of
commentary on the divergence between tax and financial accounting in respect of
inclusion of prepayments for services and deferral of deductions for prepayments of
expenses. See, e.g., Johnson, Earned, supra note 101, at 379 (arguing that deferral of
inclusion is inappropriate for both tax and financial accounting purposes because it
"understates the net present value of the receipts and the contribution of the profits
to the taxpayer's wealth and standard of living").
.. See Use of Full Absorption or Modified Full Absorption Method of Inventory
Valuation, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,809 (proposed Dec. 15, 1971) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 1) (proposing full absorption and modified full absorption methods for valuation
of inventories that required manufacturers to include both direct and indirect costs);
T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163 (finalizing inventory regulations). These rules were
superseded when Congress enacted the uniform capitalization rules of section 263A in
1986 that put into place a refined system of accounting for direct and indirect costs.
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 803, 100 Stat. 2085, 2350-58.
112 See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 93, at 762 n.5.
113 I.R.S. News Release No. 1186 (Dec. 15, 1971) (discussing proposed full
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correct gross economic inaccuracies in the determinations of taxable
income in respect of inventories.
Similarly, Treasury proposed to restrict use of the "completed
contract method" (CCM), an accounting method that dated back to
1918 and permitted deferral of income inclusions from long-term
contracts until completion."4  The 1971 proposal would have
permitted CCM only if a booking requirement were satisfied (i.e., the
same method would have to be used for financial reporting
purposes)."' Because CCM was not generally a permissible method
under GAAP, the booking requirement would have resulted in
limited use of CCM and inclusions of income in respect of long-term
contract more in line with concepts of economic income.!16 Treasury
withdrew the controversial booking requirement, but eventually CCM
was repealed as part of the 1986 reforms for most long-term contracts
other than home construction and certain relatively short-term
contractual arrangements.'
17
absorption method rules for valuing inventories).
114 See generally JCT ACCOUNTING REPORT, supra note 34, at 45-49 (providing
an in-depth history of Treasury's attempts to limit CCM); Regulations 33, art. 121
(1918) (permitting CCM and percentage of completion method); Note, Deferral of
Income Under the Completed Contract Method of Tax Accounting, 64 YALE L.J. 448,
450-51 (1955) (discussing windfall benefits of tax deferral).
115 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3, 36 Fed. Reg. 5509 (Mar. 24, 1971) (requiring
conformity).
16 CCM was not a permissible method under GAAP. See Howard M. Weinman,
Conformity of Tax and Financial Accounting, 59 TAXES 419, 426 (1981).
17 Treasury withdrew the 1971 proposed regulations and proposed new
regulations that eliminated the conformity requirement but treated financial reports
as strong evidence of the reasonableness of the method. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3,
36 Fed. Reg. 23,805 (Dec. 15, 1971). Regulations finalized in 1976 expanded
availability of CCM, though limiting premature deductions of associated costs. See
JCT ACCOUNTING REPORT, supra note 34, at 46-47. Treasury continued to be
concerned about the tax benefits that long-term contractors derived from the method
and finally proposed legislation to eliminate the method. See DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL AND TECHNICAL EXPLANATIONS OF TAX REVISIONS AND
IMPROVED COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT PROPOSALS 1-4 (1982), reprinted in
BNA DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 26, 1982, at S-2 to S-3 (indicating that the deferral of
income from long-term contracts until their completion provided an unmerited tax
windfall to contractors and proposing amendments to the Code and regulations that
would prohibit CCM). Congress recognized that the method permitted distortions of
income yet essentially codified CCM with limitations and instructions to Treasury to
promulgate appropriate regulations. See JCT ACCOUNTING REPORT, supra note 34, at
48; cf. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 229, 96
Stat. 493-95 (1982) (authority for regulations); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,702, 10,705-07, 10,710-16 (Mar. 14, 1983). As usual, the accounting issue
2004]
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In line with its general trend towards conformity, Treasury
announced a plan to restrict accounting method changes to those that
would bring a taxpayer into conformity with the method it used for
financial accounting purposes."' Regulations governing accounting
for expected redemptions of trading stamps and permitting use of the
"rule of 78s" for calculation of interest in conformity with financial
accounting were also promulgated. 9 According to contemporary
accounts, Treasury also considered proposing that Congress re-enact
provisions similar to the retroactively repealed sections 452 and 462 of
the 1954 Code, to allow accrual taxpayers to defer prepayments until
earned under generally accepted accounting principles and currently
deduct at least some estimated future expenses.120
Not surprisingly, while accountants continued to peddle
comprehensive and specific conformity, 2' limitations on advantageous
tax methods generally received a lukewarm welcome, even when the
limitation was GAAP conformity. A case in point is the proposed
regulation limiting the use of CCM, mentioned in the penultimate
paragraph. The regulation would have limited the use of CCM to
those cases where it was also used for financial reporting purposes and
thus prevented the "best of both worlds" result where CCM was used
to achieve tax deferral but the percentage of completion method was
used for financial statements to present a smooth income trend.
2
Contemporary accounts report that opposition to the 1971 mandatory
generated considerable controversy. See generally Hassan Alaghband, Comment,
Abolition of the Completed Contract Method Under Fire: A Study in Legislative
Compromise, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1009, 1012 n.19 (1982) (discussing the controversial
history of CCM and providing references to commentary of the period). The 1986 tax
reforms finally repealed CCM for long-term contracts, other than home construction
and certain other small construction contracts expected to be completed within two
years. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 804, 100 Stat. 2085, 2358-61
(enacting section 460 of the Code, generally effective for contracts entered after
February 1986). For a general discussion of the percentage of completion method
(and arguments for its extension to all multi-period projects), see Evans, supra note
104, at 1168-1200.
11 I.R.S. News Release No. 1125 (Apr. 14, 1971) (announcing a study to review
conformity requirement with "all financial reports" for accounting method changes
and suggesting exceptions would be made to take into account special regulatory
requirements and tax variances (such as research and development or oil exploration
expenditures)).
19 See T.D. 7201, 1972-40 I.R.B. 8 (trading stamps); Rev. Rul. 72-100, 1972-10
I.R.B. 9 (rule of 78s).
120 See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 93, at 763.
121 See supra note 105.
12 See supra note 114.
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booking requirement was "nearly universal" because of fears that the
123tax result would ultimately inhibit changes in financial accounting.
The AICPA, for example, affirmed its general policy in favor of
conformity but explicitly opposed any mandatory booking
requirement or financial statement test. Its stated primary concern
was that pressure on accountants to preserve the related tax
advantages would deter appropriate accounting innovations that
might result in loss of those advantages."4 In other words, it was
feared that booking requirements that were intended to discourage
use of a tax accounting method would instead result in "widespread
adoption" of the tax-advantaged accounting method.'2' This concern
that tax advantages might drive the way financial results were
reported should be remembered when taxpayers suggest that
reporting of the same numbers on financial statements and tax returns
provides a check on the honesty of tax numbers (i.e., prevents
manipulation to lower taxable income) because of the desire to
impress shareholders and others with high financial statement income.
The move towards conformity lost momentum just a decade later.
The American Bar Association recommended repeal of the LIFO
booking requirement in 1977.126 Treasury acknowledged that the
LIFO conformity rules were suboptimal and recommended their
demise in 1984.12' About the same time, Treasury began to permit
123 Nolan, supra note 93, at 764; see also Bersch & Nadel, supra note 34, at 553
(suggesting that Treasury is using conformity to gain control of accounting principles).
124 STATEMENT OF CONFORMITY OF TAX AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1971), reprinted in 132 J. AcCT. 75, 75-
76 (Dec. 1971); see also Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., Washington Report, 2 TAX ADVISER
684, 684-85 (1971) (providing the text of the AICPA policy statement and noting
AICPA's resistance to any booking requirements).
15 Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., Washington Report, 3 TAX ADVISER 290,291 (1972).
126 ABA Comm. on Tax Accounting Problems, Rec. No. 1977-5, 30 TAX LAW.
1301 (1977).
127 See 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND GROWTH: GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS 189-90 (Nov. 1984)
(explaining that repeal of the LIFO conformity method would permit firms to switch
to LIFO accounting during inflationary times and prevent businesses from continuing
to use FIFO accounting merely to avoid the LIFO conformity requirement).
Although the LIFO method appears to be entrenched in the tax system, it should be
viewed as an aberration that is explicitly permitted by statute, like any other tax
expenditure that distorts economic income to achieve a non-tax purpose. Thus, it
provides little guidance on what kinds of conformity should be adopted, other than to
illustrate the apparent impossibility of establishing a strict book-tax conformity
requirement that permits whatever variant of the approved method is used for book
purposes to satisfy the tax requirements.
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some changes to the cash method of accounting even when the
changes did not result in book-tax conformity.
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Thor Power, a seminal tax
accounting case involving the proper treatment of excess inventoryS129
writedowns. The decision effectively squelched much of the
conformity debate with a powerful and oft-quoted statement outlining
the "vastly different objectives" of financial and book accounting:
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful
information to management, shareholders, creditors, and
others properly interested; the major responsibility of the
accountant is to protect these parties from being misled. The
primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is the
equitable collection of revenue; the major responsibility of
the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc.
Consistently with its goals and responsibilities, financial
accounting has as its foundation the principle of conservatism,
with its corollary that "possible errors in measurement
[should] be in the direction of understatement rather than
overstatement of net income and net assets." In view of the
Treasury's markedly different goals and responsibilities
understatement of income is not destined to be its guiding
light.
1 30
The state of affairs was aptly described in contemporary commentary.
The many differences between tax and financial accounting argued
against conformity - different objectives, made worse perhaps by
accounting's emphasis on prudent avoidance of misleadingly
optimistic statements; different tolerance for subjectivity, with
accounting rules embracing judgment and estimation; different
definitions of fairness, with the primary tax fairness test of "ability to
12s See Weinman, supra note 116, at 419-20.
129 Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979). The case
involved inventory accounting by a merchant for its so-called "excess" inventory that
it had determined might not ever be sold. The merchant reduced the value of the
inventory according to one of two alternative formulas, but retained the inventory for
sale and did in fact sell "excess" inventory at a nondiscounted price.
"0 Id. at 542 (citations omitted). The statement at the end focuses on the
significant difference in approaches due to financial accounting's need to ensure that
shareholders and creditors are not misled by managers' puffery regarding amount of
revenue, compared to tax accounting's need for a definitive and certain answer for
each annual accounting period.
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pay" irrelevant for GAAP. The arguments supporting conformity
relied primarily on the belief that consistency in a taxpayer's
determinations of his income, rather than accuracy of measurement of
taxable income, was the most important goal. In addition, arguments
for conformity placed central importance on flexibility to take into
account the customs and norms of a particular industry. Finally,
advocates of conformity simply thought that accountants had gotten it
right - i.e., that accounting principles, such as matching of receipts
and obligations (even when the obligation was one of providing
services), were more correct than the opposing tax principles that took
into account actual cash flows and the taxpayer's resulting ability to
pay.
E. Corporate Tax Shelter Disclosure of Nonconforming Book-Tax
Differences
As America approached the turn of the century, corporations
appeared to be significantly reducing their tax burdens, as revealed by
differences in income measured for book and tax purposes. This led
to a new attempt to conform taxable income to financial accounting
income through an alternative minimum tax (AMT) system. 132 The
comprehensive reforms of the 1986 Code included a short-lived "book
income preference" provision that increased AMT liability if a
corporation's AMT income was less than adjusted net book income.
It was, in short, a partial conformity measure. Its replacement is not.
131 These differences, and the arguments supporting conformity, are discussed at
some length in Clear Reflection, supra note 30.
132 Individuals were subject to a limited alternative minimum tax before the 1986
reforms. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS: TAX SHELTERS AND MINIMUM TAX, at 63 (Joint Comm. Print 1985). The
corporate minimum tax was an add-on that functioned as an "excise tax on tax
preferences." Id. at 73. 1,
133 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2326-27
(enacting former section 56(f), effective for 1987-89 taxable years, that essentially
increased the AMT base by one-half of the excess of book income over the AMT
income base computed without the preference). The book income preference was
replaced for taxable years beginning in 1990 by an adjustment based on earnings. See
id. at 2329-33 (enacting former section 56(g)). See generally Robert C. Odmark &
Gary L. Tillman, Corporate AMT Rules Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 17 TAX
ADVISER 656 (1986) (discussing the book-income preference); Daniel Shaviro,
Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91,
100-02 (1988) (noting that the book-income preference likely resulted in (i) over-
taxing income because of differences in timing in the two systems and (ii)
management manipulation of financial statements to reduce taxes).
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The adjusted current earnings preference in section 56(g), which
replaced the book income preference for tax years after 1989, utilizes
the tax "earnings and profits" concept. ' 34
As the average effective tax rate for corporations continued to
decline, the discrepancy between book and tax income became a focus
of the renewed concern with tax shelter abuses. In a 1999 Joint
Committee on Taxation study, the staff noted that corporate tax
shelters frequently involve losses for federal income tax purposes that
are not matched by corresponding reductions to earnings for book
purposes and suggested that such permanent book-tax differences,
coupled with significant tax benefits, signaled avoidance behavior.'
Treasury also identified "inconsistent financial accounting and tax
treatments" as one of a short list of factors suggesting the presence of
a corporate tax shelter.' The President's budget proposals for 2000
similarly argued that preferential financial accounting treatment
characterized many corporate tax shelters. 37 Academic researchers
investigating the sources of book-tax differences generally supported
the views that abusive corporate tax shelter transactions were on the
rise and that lack of conformity in financial and taxable income may
signal potential tax avoidance transactions.'38
134 See I.R.C. § 56(g). The 1986 reforms also eliminated (for all financial
institutions other than small banks and thrifts) the reserve method for deducting
worthless debts, which had been enacted in 1921 in spite of concerns that it would
grant too much flexibility in the timing of deductions. See Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 805(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2361; Knott & Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at
1046. The new rules retained, however, the booking requirement for recognition of
losses due to partially worthless debt: a tax loss is permitted only if the determination
is objectively supported and evidenced by a charge-off on the taxpayer's books.
I.R.C. § 166(a)(2).
135 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS As REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998
(INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS), at 244-45 (Joint
Comm. Print 1999) (stating that "while an arrangement that gives rise to a permanent
difference may not in and of itself indicate tax avoidance, the combination of a
permanent difference with significant net tax benefits indicates that a significant
purpose of the arrangement is to avoid or evade Federal income tax").
136 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS v, 14 (1999) [hereinafter
TREASURY CORPORATE TAX SHELTER STUDY].
137 OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 71 (1999).
138 See, e.g., TREASURY CORPORATE TAX SHELTER STUDY, supra note 136
(assessing the scope of the corporate tax shelter problem and considering potential
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In response to the tax shelter crisis, there were a number of new
proposals for greater conformity of tax to book measures of income.
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive is discussed by Kenneth
Wertz in a 1998 article that considers substitution of a book income
tax (with minor adjustments for certain preferences) for the current
corporate income tax. Proponents suggested that use of book income
would significantly reduce corporate management's ability to
manipulate both tax and book results.1 39 Commentators noted that
the proposal's effectiveness was limited in that it only addressed
publicly traded companies, which themselves would continue to have
considerable incentives to understate income in certain
circumstances - e.g., to record an extraordinary loss in one year to
avoid a multi-year impact or to create an upward trend in income that
will be more favorably viewed by shareholders. '0 Furthermore, the
causes and remedies); Robert S. McIntyre & T.D. Coo Nguyen, CORPORATE INCOME
TAXES IN THE 1990s 2 (Inst. on Tax'n and Econ. Pol'y 2000) (stating that 41 of the 250
companies in the study reported significant profits in years when they paid no federal
income tax and assessing the various reasons for the book-tax discrepancies),
available at http://www.ctj.org/itep/corp00pr.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004); Lillian F.
Mills & Kaye J. Newberry, The Influence of Tax and Nontax Costs on Book-Tax
Reporting Differences: Public and Private Firms, 23 J. AM. TAX'N ASS'N 1 (2001)
(concluding that book-tax differences are less an indicator of aggressive tax
transactions for private firms that have fewer incentives to report nonconforming
book income); Lillian F. Mills, Book-Tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service
Adjustments, 36 J. Acr. RES. 343 (1998) (arguing that proposed audit adjustments
increase as the excess of book income over taxable income increases); Lillian F. Mills
& Richard C. Sansing, Strategic Tax and Financial Reporting Decisions: Theory and
Evidence, 17 CONTEMP. AcCT. RES. 85 (2000) (assessing the relationship between
book-tax differences, audits, and probability that additional taxes will be collected);
Eric M. Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small
Corporations, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 125-61 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
.39 See Kenneth L. Wertz, A Book Income Tax: First-Order Computations, NAT'L
TAX Ass'N, 91ST ANN. CONF. ON TAX'N 314, 316 (1998) (noting that proponents of a
"one-book" accounting method believe that it would result in lower transaction costs
and less tax avoidance and concluding that the banking industry would have paid 18
percent more tax under a book-income tax than paid in 1993 under the regular
corporate income tax).
"' For these and other comments of a primary critic of the comprehensive
conformity approach, see Calvin Johnson, Comment: A Book Income Tax, in NAT'L
TAX ASS'N, 91ST ANN. CONF. ON TAX'N 319, 320 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson,
Comment] (concluding that "[t]axing GAAP income.., is likely to suppress valuable
financial information" and arguing instead for a MTM tax on changes in stock prices).
The recent revelations about the national mortgage giant Freddie Mac's significant
understatement of its income through use of derivatives in order to present a less
volatile earnings structure to the public is a good example of the danger in relying on
financial accounting to ensure against manipulation to understate income. See, e.g.,
20041
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tax advantage of understated income would likely only exacerbate
-• 141
those already existing incentives. Noting that the uneven treatment
of tax preferences had discredited arguments for a comprehensive
approach in the mid-1980s, Mitchell Engler proposed instead that
corporate tax avoidance could be dampened through a more limited
linkage not unlike the short-lived book-income preference under the
AMT.14 The expectation was that the requirement would play off the
tension between management's desire to understate income for tax
purposes and to puff income for financial statements to outsiders.
The degree to which tax authorities can rely on this tension is
uncertain if investors understand that financial statement income
reflects a conservative position in order to garner tax rewards. A
more innovative commentator suggested that for transactions such as
synthetic leases, where corporations have benefited from tweaking the
rules to get divergent book and tax treatment (i.e., rent deductions
without recording debt for financial statement purposes, but interest
and depreciation deductions for tax purposes), financial accounting
143should treat the transactions in accord with their tax treatment.
Rather than mandatory conformity, Treasury and Congress have thus
far favored an increased emphasis on disclosure of sources of
significant book-tax differences, backed by an enhanced penalty
regime.144
John D. McKinnon & Patrick Barta, Freddie Inquiry Snares Wall Street, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 2003, at A3 (discussing Freddie Mac's estimated $4.5 billion understatement
of earnings and the possible role played by Morgan Stanley and Citigroup in suspect
transactions).
141 Johnson, Comment, supra note 140.
142 Engler, supra note 7 (suggesting that a comprehensive conformity
approach - whether using book income as the tax base or treating it as the minimum
tax base - would be problematic, but a more limited linkage for publicly traded
corporations could curb corporate tax avoidance); see supra note 133 for a brief
discussion of the AMT book-income preference.
141 See Luppino, supra note 3. A synthetic lease is treated as a financing for tax
purposes, so that an owner has interest and depreciation deductions, but as an
operating lease for book purposes, resulting in no debt appearing on the tax owner's
balance sheet.
144 Treasury ultimately promulgated new corporate tax shelter regulations that
mandate disclosure by corporations, material advisors, and promoters in respect of
certain "reportable" transactions that are identified by selected triggers, one of which
is the existence of significant book-tax differences. See T.D. 9046, 2003-12 I.R.B. 614
(finalizing corporate tax shelter regulations, including § 1.6011-4 requiring disclosure
of participation in reportable transactions). See generally Tax Risks, supra note 4, at
249-54 (discussing the corporate tax shelter regulations). Congress then incorporated
this approach to disclosure, with enhanced penalties, in the Code as part of the
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F. Lessons from History
If the initial accounting rules under section 446 could at all be
read in the first decades of the income tax as suggesting that book-tax
conformity was a norm that should lead to the eventual
comprehensive convergence of book and tax accounting, the history
of attempts to achieve greater conformity demonstrates that
comprehensive conformity was never a realistic choice.
Underlying most arguments for conformity was a normative
assumption of identity between the net business income that was
subject to reporting to shareholders and the income that was intended
to be subject to taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment.14 ' This
assumption of identity disregards, among other things, the critical
differences between tax and financial accounting objectives
articulated in Thor Power.14 Financial accounting's conservatism,
which tends to accelerate deductions and defer inclusions, moves the
net income determination substantially away from the ideal Haig-
Simons base and towards a significantly understated income
determination for tax purposes.14 7  The assumption of identity
between business and taxable income also ignores specific differences
commanded by particular tax rules that provide economic incentives
or disincentives, such as the exclusion of gifts and tax-exempt interest
from income or the denial of deductions for lobbying expenses. In
particular, it disregards the importance of annual accounting of a
taxpayer's ability to pay for tax purposes. The similarity between
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. See supra note 5.
145 See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 93, at 767 (arguing that "ft]he Sixteenth
Amendment authorizes a tax on 'income' without apportionment, and for a business
taxpayer, this means net income, a concept which accounting standards are designed
to measure").
146 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
147 The FASB's financial statements continue to argue for a conservative
approach, though noting that conservatism must be "applied with care" to avoid too
strong a bias either towards revenue recognition or towards deferral. See
QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFO., Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 2, 92, 91-97 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1980).
A recent article on accounting-based valuation models emphasizes that there are
three different categories of conservative accounting: (1) selection of conservative
accounting policies and methods at the outset of a project, (2) use of historic cost
rather than present value of expected profits, and (3) delayed recognition
conservatism (asset impairment and other bad news is booked immediately, but
improved business environment and other positive news is delayed). See Gordon
Richardson & Surjit Tinaikar, Accounting Based Valuation Models: What Have We
Learned?, 44 ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE 223, 229 (2004).
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financial statement and tax income is thus a forced one, viable only at
the level of abstraction where both systems purport to tax net business
income.
The tax treatment of prepayments, the most prominent example
of intentional divergence between financial and tax accounting,
provides an important lesson regarding the coherence of the tax
system. In a system that taxes income rather than consumption,
investment earnings must be taxed. The combination of realization
and time-value-of-money principles do not permit either deferral of
income inclusions until "earned" or acceleration of expense
deductions prior to economic performance.'9 Although the timing
result in a realization regime may be overtaxation (compared to an
optimal full accretion taxation) of those required to include
prepayments and not permitted to deduct the present value of related
future costs currently, overtaxation is preferable to undertaxation
because of the ability of taxpayers to manipulate the structuring of
149transactions. The enactment and immediate repeal of broad
conformity provisions for prepayments, followed by congressional
passage of limited prepaid subscription and prepaid membership dues
provisions and the economic performance test of section 461(h) for
deductions, affirmed these principles and upheld the unique structure
of the tax system.
In spite of these significant substantive differences between the
tax and financial accounting regimes, proponents of conformity relied
on a number of primarily pragmatic arguments. They insisted that the
discipline of the accounting profession and the familiarity of
accountants and businesspersons with financial accounting principles
would benefit tax accounting. Tax rules would be simpler if there
were no special tax accounting rules. Consistency of tax and financial
accounting would show that the accounting was both correct and fair,
leading to "[g]reater confidence in the integrity of our tax system."'"5
This concept of fairness, of course, has little relevance to the "ability
to pay/benefits received" concepts generally accepted as relevant for
148 MTM accounting, of course, removes the realization requirement and thus
can appropriately incorporate time-value-of-money principles by taking the present
value of expected deductions (i.e., probability-weighted expectations) into account in
determining the current mark. See infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing
the Cary Brown yield exemption theory).
149 See Evans, Multi-Period Projects, supra note 104, at 1195-96 (discussing the
relevant preference for overtaxation compared to undertaxation, given the ability of
taxpayers to arrange transactions to minimize overtaxation).
150 Nolan, supra note 93, at 768.
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tax. Instead, fairness in accounting appears to be more of a
procedural notion - an accounting result might be said to be fair as
long as the financial statement numbers that it produces are "relevant
" (to the purposes of financial reporting), "reliable" (in that they do
not misrepresent the entity's business status), "consistent" (in that
they do not involve ad hoc processes that vary from time to time), and
"material" (in that they relate to items that make a difference to
investors, without too much detail about de minimis concerns)."' This
concept, and its reliance on subjective judgments and flexibility for
particular entities to use methods most convenient for them,
downplays substantive fairness (i.e., the notion that there is a single
right result, a right amount of taxable income for this taxpayer as
compared to other taxpayers that may be similarly or differently
situated). Furthermore, in the case of MTM accounting, dealers
insisted that there simply was no feasible method for their type of
business other than that used for financial accounting.
Financial accounting attempts, at heart, to describe income
consistently over time, so that investors and creditors can follow the
performance of one enterprise over time. Errors in precise
measurement of income at any point in time are of less consequence
than errors in consistency of reporting of income across time periods.
Even in the modern use of financial statements to compare relative
performance of different companies, consistency over time in the way
the companies' reports are prepared retains considerable importance.
Tax accounting, on the other hand, attempts to measure income
accurately at each relevant period in time and for each taxpayer.
Thus, consistency of results in spite of errors does not satisfy this tax
accounting standard.
The experience with LIFO inventory accounting, the most
prominent example of required conformity, directly challenges these
pragmatic arguments for conformity. First, even with a mandatory
booking requirement, it is at best difficult and likely impossible to
maintain a consistent one-to-one correspondence between a particular
tax and accounting rule, even if there is consistency at the outset, due
to the different needs of the two systems. LIFO reporting for tax is
distinct from LIFO reporting for book purposes, and non-LIFO
reporting may be used for a variety of book purposes."' The many
151 See, e.g., QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFO., Statement
of Financial Accounting Concepts No, 2, 1 46-132 (Financial Accounting Standards
Bd. 1980) (discussing these key concepts).
152 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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differences between LIFO for tax and LIFO for book purposes
undercut any enhanced perception of accounting correctness due to
conformity, and hence also undercut the possibility of achieving
greater fairness through conformity, even applying the accounting
concept of fairness. In fact, the many variances between LIFO tax
accounting and LIFO as it is used for financial reporting have resulted
in two similarly labeled but substantially different accounting methods
with all of the requirements of multiple tracking systems that two
different systems entail.
Second, a mandatory booking requirement exerts pressure on
accounting professionals to adapt accounting standards so that
taxpayers may benefit from advantageous tax accounting."5 3 As the
history of LIFO accounting rules demonstrates,'54 LIFO accounting
became widely accepted for accounting purposes only after the
institution of the mandatory booking requirement for tax use of
LIFO. Accountants essentially bent over backwards to find ways to
use LIFO accounting because of the tax advantages it provided. In
this case, conformity again did little to increase perceptions of either
outcome correctness or outcome fairness. In fact, businesspeople's
awareness of this historic interaction between financial accounting
and tax treatments likely reduced, rather than enhanced, confidence
in the integrity of both the tax and the financial accounting systems.
These historical observations carry some insights for tax
administration. Generally, they suggest a cautious approach to
conformity requirements that looks carefully at the very different
objectives, concepts of fairness, allowances for flexibility, and
potential for decreasing reasonableness over time as financial
accounting measures diverge from tax accounting measures. Any
conformity proposal must resolve the question of whether tax
accounting rules will change or remain frozen in time as financial
accounting rules metamorphose in accordance with the development
of the accounting profession, regulatory changes in emphasis, and
quantitative finance developments. Specifically, they suggest a need
to de-emphasize the pragmatic considerations of easing taxpayer
burdens and administrative tasks in order to focus on the primary
objectives for tax accounting rules. At the same time, they suggest
that the ability of conformity with financial accounting to introduce
discipline (because the taxpayer's incentive to puff income for
financial statement purposes counteracts the taxpayer's willingness to
13 See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 82, at 490-91.
114 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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use accounting rules to understate income for tax purposes) is limited,
at best. The following Part will turn to these issues in considering what
features should be paramount in evaluating a conformity proposal.
1II. NORMATIVE AND PRAGMATIC CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING
CONFORMITY PROPOSALS
The arguments reviewed in Part II appear weighted against
conformity due to the difference in objectives and degrees of
flexibility of tax and financial accounting, but no clear standard
emerged from the many discussions by which to decide what
arguments should hold sway in particular circumstances. The
question is whether it is possible to construct an appropriate set of
criteria for deciding the value of a conformity proposal in any
particular instance. Those criteria must recognize the different
objectives of tax and financial accounting, the considerable flexibility
generally permitted in financial accounting, financial accounting's lack
of a concept of fairness equivalent to the tax concept, and the
potential for distortion of tax and financial accounting when one
system determines the results in the other system.
As any introductory tax text makes clear, the three concerns
traditionally considered determinative of tax policy are fairness,
efficiency, and simplicity."' Like most abstract moral or philosophical
issues, fairness in the context of tax regimes depends on a highly
nuanced understanding. Many tax commentators suggest that a tax
proposal's fairness should be measured in terms of taxpayers' ability
to pay -itself a nuanced concept. It is generally assumed that
similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly, a requirement
termed "horizontal equity."'56 Stated more broadly, horizontal equity
can be viewed as creating a minimal benchmark for a distributively
just system by favoring tax provisions that do not add to inequality
among taxpayers. That concept of fairness is arguably weak, however,
since a tax system that merely collects its revenues by maintaining the
status quo between taxpayers can do little to further distributive
justice.
Progressive measures (such as the progressive rate structure in the
federal income tax) that are intended to tax more heavily those who
have a greater ability to pay (and likely receive a disproportionately
155 See, e.g., MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY
xxxiv-xxxix (2003) (discussing fairness, efficiency, and simplicity as "three principal
criteria for evaluating a tax system").
116 See id. at xxxv-xxxvi (discussing horizontal and vertical equity).
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larger share of the benefits created by governmental institutions) 157
serve distributive justice by achieving some level of redistribution that
reduces inequality, thus enhancing fairness through what is generally
termed "vertical equity.""' This redistributive principle underlying
concepts of fairness is, in my view, of utmost importance, since tax is
the primary means by which government can redistribute resources.
Redistribution, in turn, is essential in a democracy, where unequal
distributions of wealth lead to accumulation of status and power that
make consensus decision-making unlikely or impossible and create
second-class citizens without equal access to opportunity or a fair
share of tangible and intangible resources. 9 Thus, tax provisions
157 A thorough discussion of the "benefits received" concept of fairness is beyond
the scope of this Article. Academic scholars have, however, returned to the concept
as an important way to justify the need for a progressively redistributive tax system.
See, e.g., Deborah Geier, Time to Bring Back the "Benefit" Norm?, 102 TAX NoTEs
1155 (Mar. 1, 2004) (responding to Herwig Schlunk's defense of the corporate tax by
endorsing the concept of benefit received as an aspect of tax fairness); Herwig J.
Schlunk, Double Taxation: The Unappreciated Ideal, 102 TAX NOTES 893 (Feb. 16,
2004) (discussing taxpayer-funded benefits received by corporations as a justification
for the corporate tax); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and
Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990) (discussing benefits received as one of the
prime concepts of tax fairness).
I58 An in-depth discussion of these issues is available in the dialogue between
Louis Kaplow and Richard A. Musgrave on horizontal and vertical equity, as well as
in more contemporary commentary on the need for an external moral anchor for
understanding tax fairness. See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income
Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44 (Nov. 1967) (arguing that horizontal and vertical equity
are aspects of a single fairness measure); Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures
in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989) (arguing that vertical equity is the
appropriate fairness measure because focus on horizontal equity merely preserves the
status quo); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J.
113 (1990) (reconsidering his conclusion that horizontal equity is derivative of vertical
equity); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992)
(disputing the independent importance of horizontal equity); Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993) (restating the case for
horizontal equity); Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) (concluding
that normative content can only be derived from economic or philosophical (justice)
theories); Strnad, supra note 157 (suggesting that four primary norms support
accretion taxation: reducing disparities in wealth (a fairness norm), taxing intangible
benefits from holding wealth (a fairness norm), conforming to the Haig-Simons ideal
income tax base (a fairness and efficiency norm), and structuring a "neutral" tax
system that does not favor one type of investment over another (an efficiency norm)).
159 Reuven Avi-Yonah is perhaps the strongest proponent of this role of
redistribution in protecting the well-being of society and in possibly preventing social
unrest and potential revolution. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Stories and Tax
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should generally not be permitted to undercut equity concerns, and
any that do should be based on an explicit substantive rationale that
has been overtly found to override the fairness criteria.
In contrast, economists tend to emphasize efficiency, which
measures economic reasonableness, as the appropriate goal of tax. As
a normative standard, efficiency generally asks whether a proposed
tax distorts allocative decisions, compared to a hypothetical tax-free
market, by favoring one form of investment over another.'w Given a
particular tax base (e.g., a Haig-Simons income tax),16 1 an efficiency
analysis considers whether a particular tax provision taxes income
neutrally. Under this criterion, the exclusion for meals and lodging
provided for the convenience of an employer under section 119 is
distortive, since it draws a line between types of employment that
permit such exclusions and those that do not. As a result, it likely
encourages potential employees to accept hotel employment over
other employment. In spite of the apparent clarity of such examples,
efficiency determinations are not absolute, both because of the hybrid
nature of the overall tax structure (realization with accretion
subregimes; modified Haig-Simons income tax with consumption tax
subregimes) and because of the clearly different tax-expenditure
rationales for particular provisions.
Nor can we be sure ex ante of the efficiency results of a particular
tax provision. The incidence of tax may be shifted away from the
purported bearer, and tax measures may generate unforeseen pushes
and pulls on the economy. The other role for efficiency is therefore a
pragmatic one of evaluating particular tax-expenditure provisions that
are in fact intended to distort behavior to see if the actual incidence of
tax is as intended. For example, a subsidy for an extractive industry
may be intended to have a nonneutral effect of shifting the industry
towards discovery of new mineral beds. If the subsidy merely results
in taxpayers rearranging activity in which they are already engaged so
Histories: Is There a Role for History in Shaping Tax Law?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2227,
2237 (2003) (condemning "sterile fights about supposedly neutral terms like the social
welfare function or vertical equity" in favor of a politically and historically sensitive
defense of redistribution).
160 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX
L. REV. 95, 98-99 (1999) (discussing efficiency as a tax design criterion); JOSEPH M.
DODGE et al, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 127-31
(3d ed. 2004) (discussing the concept of economic efficiency).
161 See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects,
in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S.




as to satisfy the bright-line requirements for the subsidy, it is
inefficient because it results in a deadweight loss (less revenue for the
government, no new exploration activity by the industry). This is a
consequence of the way incentives play out pragmatically, where
other influences may counterbalance the particular provision, rather
than in an ideal laboratory. 62
The third criterion frequently mentioned by tax analysts is
163 164
simplicity. Simplicity is an essentially pragmatic concern. Given
the necessity for tax revenues to fund government activities, and the
reality of different taxpayers with varying levels of wealth and income
in different categories of productive activities, a considerable degree
of complexity in tax rules is inevitable. Simplicity comes into play
whenever there is a possibility of removing a categorization from the
tax laws, such as eliminating the current distinction between capital
and ordinary income. Reducing complexity at the cost of fairness or
efficiency, however, is less justifiable for rules that primarily affect
sophisticated taxpayers (generally, those taxpayers with greater
wealth and access to professional tax advisers). Simplicity should
therefore be most decisive as a criterion when there is a choice
between two alternatives for implementing a particular tax policy that
are roughly equivalent on fairness and efficiency grounds. Otherwise,
simplicity should be taken into consideration to remove complicating
particulars of a proposed tax provision only if there is a de minimis
negative impact on the fairness and efficiency of the provision or if the
tax provision is one that bears directly on the tax treatment of
ordinary, unsophisticated taxpayers.
This view is not likely to be a mainstream position at this time.
There has been a stream of commentary over the last decade decrying
the complexity of the Code and treating simplification as an important
goal that should be considered very high in priority. The best of
162 See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 160, at 131-34 (discussing tax subsidies and
incentives).
163 See LIVINGSTON, supra note 155, at xxxiv (discussing fairness, efficiency, and
simplicity as "three principal criteria for evaluating a tax system").
164 Some commentators treat simplicity issues that reflect questions of
administrability as subcomponents of efficiency concerns. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra
note 160, at 98.
1 See, e.g., Gordon D. Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis - the Most Important
"Law and..." 43 TAX LAW. 177 (1989) (noting approvingly Bayless Manning's view
of legal complexity as a significant problem); John A. Miller, Indeterminacy,
Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993) (claiming that "the proliferation of elaborate rules in federal
tax law has reached a point of extremely burdensome complexity" and asserting that
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these commentaries correlates tax complexity with the economic costs
from compliance with complex rules, such as additional recordkeeping
burdens, enhanced need to become sufficiently informed about tax
rules to be aware when professional advice is necessary, and, of
course, expenses of retaining third-party advisers such as lawyers,
accountants, software experts, and financial planners.) Even so,
simplicity may be treated as a per se good that should be placed in the
forefront in all planning, without recognition of the interaction of
simplification (which will tend to reduce the fine tuning of provisions)
with fairness goals.
In essence, I am suggesting a hierarchy of principles for deciding
among tax alternatives, with fairness at the top, efficiency in the
middle, and simplicity at the bottom (at least in respect of provisions
applicable to sophisticated taxpayers). Clearly, there will be conflicts
between fairness and efficiency, and those will ultimately be decided
in the political process based on current views of the merits. I argue
that simplicity should not weigh against fairness in this debate, except
in the case of provisions that apply to less sophisticated taxpayers.
A. Normative Standards
In evaluating a potential conformity provision, the two most
important characteristics of the tax system that reflect these joint
goals of fairness and efficiency are the structural coherence of the tax
system itself and the system's self-assessment feature.
1. Structural Coherence
Structural coherence focuses on the integrity of tax structure as a
system established by the tax rules taken in the aggregate."' The
no proof of the claim is required).
, See, e.g., JOSEPH BANKMAN, WHO SHOULD BEAR TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS?
(Stanford Law & Economics Olin, Working Paper No. 279, 2004) (noting that tax
compliance costs for individuals and business may reach as much as $250 billion
annually), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=519783 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
167 The concept of integrity is frequently cited as critical to the rule of law and
forms the core of Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudential theory. See RONALD DwORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Oxford
Univ. Press 1996) (describing a constitutional theory based on integrity whereby
principles that are discerned to underlie a particular right must be given full sway to
uphold other rights not previously understood to exist). I argue that integrity is also
critical within particular domains of law, such as the tax law, and forms the necessary
basis for any theory of statutory interpretation. In particular, modifications of the
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system determines the items within it: like the tax concepts of
"ownership" or "obligation," both "taxable income" and "clear
reflection of income" are tax concepts that take their meaning from
the full body of tax law (Code, regulations, administrative
interpretations, and case law) and are necessarily distinct from
financial accounting concepts of income or accurate accounting."'
The context of the tax rules as an entire system provides additional
meaning to a particular tax rule. Thus, both textualist interpretations
of tax rules that focus on plain meaning without regard to the place of
a provision in the overall tax structure and freewheeling
interpretations based on a particular judge's approach disregard
structural coherence. Structural coherence requires that the tax rules
applicable to a particular taxpayer in a particular context take into
consideration the overall structure of the tax system. Said another
way, interpretation of a tax rule in a specific context must be
consistent with the overarching principles that can be abstracted from
the system of rules and cannot disregard that overall structure to yield
an interpretation that contradicts the structure, unless the provision
unambiguously requires such an interpretation. Thus, when
commentators analyze a particular tax rule and conclude that one
possible interpretation of the rule simply "makes no sense,"'6 9 they are
existing tax structure should be interpreted whenever possible to be coherent with the
pre-existing tax law. A clear statement of intent to cause a paradigm shift should be
required before an ambiguous provision is interpreted as causing such a shift. That is,
only a provision that is clearly stated in a way that requires it to be unambiguously
interpreted to be contrary to the overall structure should be interpreted against the
norm created by the overall structure.
168 Other commentators have emphasized the importance of understanding that
the Code creates a structure that must be considered in interpreting any single
provision. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMPLE L. REV.
445, 459-60 (1993) ("'Structural' issues are those involving the fundamental definition
of the tax base; they are those that implicate the very notion of 'income' under an
income tax. In a very real sense, the theoretical construct that we call 'income'
emerges as the end result of the entire collection of sections contained in the Internal
Revenue Code.... The underlying definition of 'income' provides a structure within
which interpretation must occur.").
169 See, e.g., DAVID SCHIZER, SCRUBBING THE WASH SALE RULES 35 (Columbia
Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 242, 2004) (discussing an overinclusive
application of the wash sales rules in section 1091(a) to short sales when a person
closes a short sale at a loss and then decides to purchase additional stock as a long),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=494323 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
Incoherent results such as these are often interpreted out of the statute by tax
practitioners, as Schizer notes, in reliance on sometimes stretched interpretations of
relevant statutory language. That is, as the front line of statutory interpretation,
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in essence coming to a conclusion about the structural coherence of
the system.
This concept of structural coherence draws support from the
burgeoning research on the role of legal institutions in shaping the
operation of economies.17 This area of scholarship considers both the
effects of individual choices on institutions and the role that
institutions play in the performance of political and economic systems.
Douglass North defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction" - i.e., the "rules of the game." '' A
system of taxation is clearly a formal institution, in that it is comprised
of formal rules that constrain taxpayers by requiring them to track
their economic activity in order to pay over certain amounts to the
government and by providing incentives and disincentives for
engaging in various economic and personal activities.
What are the principles revealed by a structurally coherent
analysis of the federal tax system? One such overarching principle
defines the base of the federal income tax. Deborah Geier refers to it
as the "income tax value.' ' 7 2 In brief, the income tax value recognizes
that income, rather than consumption or savings, forms the base of the
current federal tax system. Full taxation of income is therefore a
fundamental characteristic, applicable except in those cases when the
tax rules explicitly provide for consumption (or other) tax treatment.
In this context the growing understanding of the time value of money
has led to a better rationale for certain income tax provisions. The
income tax value is implemented in a tax structure that is also
constructed with a realization principle, at least in part because of
liquidity and valuation concerns for ordinary, generally
practitioners inadvertently encounter the potential effects of such a rule on a
transaction, realize it "makes no sense" and seek an explanation, such as exclusive
application of the wash sales rules to short sales under section 1091(e), that retains
coherence. Commentators who propose the tightening (or loosening) of rules so that
they better fit a doctrinal model suggested to make sense out of them are following a
coherence objective as well.
Po See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Cambridge U. Press 1990) (developing a theory of
institutions and institutional change to explain the different performances of
economies).
171 Id. at 3.
'72 See Geier, supra note 104, at 26 (stating that "[t]he income-tax value stands
for the proposition that consumption-tax treatment should not be allowed absent a
clear indication by Congress that such treatment was intended or unless the income-




unsophisticated, individual taxpayers. But in order to tax income and
not just consumption, the tax rules tied to realization must take into
account the time value of money. Realization (resulting in deferral of
gains until disposition) is therefore accompanied by capitalization
(deferral of related deductions until disposition), to ensure that
premature deductions do not result in nontaxation of investment
gains. "'73 Prepayments are included in income, to ensure that earnings
in respect of the prepayment do not go untaxed. Accordingly, in
situations for which full accretion accounting is permitted (i.e., mark-
to-market accounting under section 475, discussed in Part IV.A.2.,
below), only the present value of reasonably certain expected future
expenditures should offset related current income inclusions.
Although structural coherence as I have presented it entails
acceptance of an income base with explicit exceptions for tax
expenditures, it is clearly not the case that the Code fully incorporates
a particular economic concept of income such as Haig-Simons. The
sum total of the Code provisions amounts to a concept of taxable
income that is similar to Haig-Simons income in various ways but yet
ultimately a unique, Code-determined concept, the particulars of
which evolve in small ways as provisions are changed and in large
ways (that might be termed paradigm shifts) when major reforms of
113 See, e.g., Evans, Growing Trend, supra note 54, at 826 (noting that
"[c]apitalization rules are traditionally understood in terms of 'matching' income with
expense, and thereby avoiding the deferral of tax that occurs when the costs of
producing income are deducted in advance of the recognition of such income"); E.
Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300
(1948) (providing the seminal discussion of the yield exemption theory that holds
under certain conditions that current deduction of an investment is exactly equivalent
to exemption of the return from the investment); Robert A. Green, Justice
Blackmun's Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 109, 124-40 (1998)
(providing a detailed discussion of the logic of capitalization in a realization system).
Recently finalized regulations on intangibles capitalization appear to be mistakes in
this light in the name of simplification: they reverse the ordinary expectation of
capitalization for expenditures having any long-lasting benefit by identifying an
exclusive subset of categories of intangibles for which capitalization is required (in
contrast to the Code's treatment of expenditures as capitalizable unless deductions
are permitted), permitting deductions under a twelve-month rule, and permitting
current deduction of overhead and employee compensation costs in connection with
acquisitions. See T.D. 9107, 2004-7 I.R.B. 447, 448 (stating that "an amount paid to
acquire or create an intangible not otherwise required to be capitalized by the
regulations is not required to be capitalized on the ground that it produces significant
future benefits for the taxpayer, unless the IRS publishes guidance requiring
capitalization of the expenditure").
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the Code are instituted. Difficulty with this particularization of the
concept of "income as characterized by the tax system" causes some
commentators to question the validity of "tax logic" based on
legislative purpose. 74  Ultimately, the notion of case-by-case legal
reasoning is not incompatible with the concept of structural coherence
that I have set forth here. To express this concept existentially,
coherence exists to the extent that legal authorities are successful in
discovering it by weaving together the various texts and sub-texts of
the Code to express a logical whole.
A tax system cannot be structurally coherent if the subsystems
within it can be gamed or combined in unintended ways to avoid tax
liability. Thus, a corollary of structural coherence is the need for rules
that prevent taxpayers from taking advantage of specific provisions in
order to capture a gain at the expense of the government.176 A rule
disallows a deduction for interest expense incurred to purchase or
carry municipal bonds, because the interest on the bond is excluded
from income. Without the interest expense disallowance rule, a
taxpayer could derive an arbitrage gain from the deduction and
exclusion that turns a before-tax loser into an after-tax winner.
7
Similarly, a tax matching principle (not to be confused with financial
accounting's matching principle) applies between taxpayers when
timing differences would otherwise distort income and deductions:
payments from an accrual taxpayer to a related cash-based taxpayer
cannot be deducted until the recipient includes the payment in
174 See, e.g., Green, supra note 173, at 146-51 (arguing that the Code itself cannot
be the source of tax scholars' "tax logic" for determining the meaning of particular
Code provisions but rather the (itself ambiguous) Haig-Simons economic definition of
income is an "external yardstick against which the provisions of the Code can be
evaluated and criticized" in a process of "practical reasoning").
175 See Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity
Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 162 (1997) (suggesting
coherence as a criterion for evaluating tax regimes and noting the possibility of either
"global" or "local" coherence, where "particular portions of the regime reflect a
consistent framework and purpose").
"' Deborah Geier refers to this corollary of coherence as an "anti-tax-arbitrage
value" that is reflected in the structure of the tax system. See Geier, supra note 104,
at 25.
177 Cf. KEITH C. BROWN & DONALD J. SMITH, INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY
SWAPS: A TUTORIAL 131 (Research Found. of the Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts
1995) (defining "arbitrage" in the financial market context as "[t]he opportunity to
exploit price differentials on two otherwise identical sets of cash flows" and noting
that "[in arbitrage-free financial markets, any two transactions with the same risks
and expected cash flows should have the same price") (emphasis added). In the tax




What particular concerns does structural coherence excite in
considering accounting conformity requirements? Applying a
structural coherence perspective demonstrates that conformity will
never be reasonable in areas where financial accounting rules have
results that run directly counter to tax values. For example, tax rules
do not permit deductions for additions to reserves in respect of bad
debts, except for the politically necessary grandfathering of small
banks when the bad debt reserve rule was generally eliminated for
larger institutions.' Elimination of bad debt reserve deductions
maintains the income tax value in the context of a realization
regime."8 Financial accounting, however, reduces earnings for such
reserves across the board as part of the broader matching of income
and expenses to determine net income. The rule makes sense for
financial accounting, because it satisfies the goal of presenting a
prudent view of an entity's financial status and hence tends to
discourage businesses from increasing issuance of credit to low-quality
borrowers in order to puff book income for shareholders."'
Conformity provisions should also be rejected under the income
tax value if they result in across-the-board application of financial
accounting matching principles so as to result in nontaxation of
investment earnings. In retrospect, this structural coherence
requirement should be seen as the underlying rationale for the repeal
178 I.R.C. § 267(a)(2). See generally Roin, supra note 104 (discussing this tax
matching principle).
179 See Evans, Growing Trend, supra note 54, at 840-41 (noting that the
deduction for bad debt reserves "violated mark-to-market principles by prematurely
reflecting losses that had not yet occurred, and by accounting for assets (net of
reserves) at values that were less than their true market value" while disregarding the
ability of the taxpayer to compensate for any projected losses at the time of entering
into the loan through regulation of the interest rate on the loan); see also infra note
376 (regarding section 166(c) repeal); John Hull, Miorela Predescu, & Alan White,
Bond Prices, Default Probabilities and Risk Premiums (2004) (noting that the large
difference between historical default probabilities and default probabilities implied
from bond prices is due to the "extra return [bond traders build into their prices] to
compensate for the market risks and liquidity risks they are bearing").
180 An upfront deduction effectively exempts related earnings from tax. These
principles are explained in an excellent article by Noel Cunningham. See Noel B.
Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tar Treatment of Future Costs, 40 TAX L.
REV. 577, 584 (1985).
181 See, e.g., David Lenter et al., Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return
Information: Accounting, Economics, and Legal Perspectives, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 803
(Dec. 2003) (noting difficulty of imposing conformity in areas such as bad debt
reserves where tax and financial accounting are clearly different).
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of sections 452 and 462 in 1955: those provisions inappropriately
incorporated the financial accounting matching principle with
resultant changes to the income tax value.
Furthermore, any conformity proposal that creates arbitrage
options should be rejected, unless the arbitrage opportunity can be
extinguished by concurrent changes to other provisions or the
conformity requirement itself is subject to an anti-abuse safeguard.
Arbitrage opportunities are especially likely in areas where a hybrid
system operates - e.g., where two separate tax sub-regimes coexist
among parties to a single transaction. For example, the enactment in
1993 of the section 475 mark-to-market accounting provision for
•• 183
securities dealers created such an arbitrage option. It permitted
dealers to function as accommodation parties to end users in
transactions where the accommodating party must include a gain.
Since securities dealers are required to mark to market in any event,
gain recognition in the transaction is not a burden, and they can
accommodate with ease.18  Congress is left in a quandary - repeal
the mark-to-market rules that have now been in use for a decade or
overhaul the various special rules for nondealer treatment of notional
principal contracts and other financial instruments so that end users
and dealers are not treated under separate tax rules.85 Given the
12 Such an anti-abuse safeguard would have to be made a part of the conformity
requirement itself, or else the courts would likely interpret the conformity
requirement as specifically authorizing the abusive taxpayer's practice and find no
room for exercise of the tax administrator's clear reflection of income authority under
section 446(b). See, e.g., Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and "Clear
Reflection of Income": What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
445 (1999).
13 See David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing
Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1357-69 (2000) (noting this
arbitrage problem for section 475).
184 See id. Schizer gives an example related to the "second best" move towards
partial adoption (for specified taxpayers in certain situations) of full accretion
taxation. A corporate taxpayer who is not a securities dealer (termed an "end user")
enters into a forward contract with a counterparty. If the counterparty does not mark
to market and the end user wants to realize a loss by terminating the position, the end
user must pay the counterparty a termination fee that reflects any tax the
counterparty has to pay on the termination gain. When the counterparty is a
securities dealer who marks to market, however, it must recognize any gain in the
position whether or not there is an early termination. As a result, the dealer is
indifferent to acting as an accommodation party in such transactions, and the end user
should be able to realize the desired loss at a lower transaction cost. Id. at 1368.
185 See id. at 1373-77 (suggesting that Congress could alternatively provide an
anti-abuse rule to undo the benefit of accommodation transactions, forego such
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general consensus that mark-to-market accounting more clearly
reflects taxable income, it appears it would be preferable to overhaul
the rules for financial instruments. Until some such change is
accomplished, the tax system remains irresolvably incoherent at this
interface.
2. Self-Assessment
A second characteristic of the tax system that is especially
significant in considering accounting conformity provisions is the self-
116assessment requirement. The public fisc depends in the first
"reforms," or modify the scope of the reform by, for example, requiring end users
who enter into derivatives with a mark-to-market counterparty also to use mark-to-
market accounting for the derivative, with valuation information provided by the
counterparty).
"" Self-assessment by wage earners (or in respect of certain dividends and other
U.S.-source fixed or determinable, annual or periodic income of foreign taxpayers not
excluded from the withholding regime) is of course less demanding because they are
generally subject to withholding of taxes at the source. This distinctive treatment of
wage earners compared to wealthy individuals and corporations reinforces the rate
advantage enjoyed by those with income from capital rather than labor and,
combined with a number of recent developments exempting specific types of
investment earnings from tax, suggests that there is (or is developing) a fundamental
distinction in the tax system between ordinary middle- and lower-income individual
taxpayers and sophisticated wealthy and corporate taxpayers. It may be that most
scholarly commentary, particularly in the area of book-tax conformity, is addressed
primarily to issues that affect sophisticated taxpayers. It is they who hold
considerable stock and bond investments and engage in tax avoidance transactions
designed by their accountants, tax advisers, or bankers. Fairness and efficiency issues
are different for ordinary taxpayers who are unlikely to have the flexibility to shift
their consumption patterns in order to avoid tax or invest in exotic derivatives in
order to shift the timing or character of their tax liability. Ordinary Americans in the
middle and lower classes of income are also the ones for whom a theoretically sound
Haig-Simons tax on imputed income and/or a full accretion tax would be most
difficult to understand or to bear because of liquidity and valuation issues. Those
issues are of much less importance to sophisticated taxpayers. It may be, therefore,
that structural coherence should be viewed as an abstraction of the tax system that
should be understood in detail only by looking at its two different contextual
variants - the structurally coherent system of rules that predominantly affects
ordinary taxpayers and the sub-domain of rules governing complex financial
transactions of most interest to sophisticated taxpayers. Section 475 clearly belongs in
the latter set of rules. Most of the time-value-of-money rules are of primary interest
to sophisticated taxpayers. As evidence, REMIC issuers generally issue "retail"
classes of interests without original issue discount (OID) in increments of $1000 for
ordinary taxpayers, whereas sophisticated buyers purchase interest-only and
principal-only interests that require complex OID calculations.
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instance on the compliance of taxpayers with the rules for determining
and reporting taxable income and paying the related tax liabilities.
We rely on taxpayers to come clean about their taxable income, not to
hide or understate it.
It is reasonable to assume that taxpayers can generally be
expected to comply when they believe that the tax system itself is fair
and/or they believe that their chances of being caught in
noncompliance are fairly high. When audit rates are as low as they
now are, the importance of taxpayers' fears of being caught as a
restraint on cheating is lessened and the importance of taxpayers'
perceptions that the system is fair is heightened. Ordinary taxpayers
will likely judge the system fair if they believe that they will not be
required to pay too much tax in comparison to other taxpayers.
Generally, this condition will be satisfied so long as taxpayers with
about the same income are required to pay about the same tax, and
taxpayers generally do not believe that taxpayers with more income
can easily evade their fair (and larger) share of taxes.8 7 In other
words, taxpayers contemplating whether to comply with the tax rules
or to take a chance on being caught on audit in failing to follow an
applicable rule are more likely to comply if they believe that the tax
system is fairly and consistently applied across taxpayers. For that to
hold true, taxpayers must comply without being able to manipulate
their tax liabilities to avoid or evade their fair share of the tax burden.
The more the tax rules permit manipulation of reported tax items
to result in a desired tax liability for a particular taxpayer, the less fair
the tax system in general will appear to taxpayers. The less fair the
system seems, the less confidence there can be that most taxpayers
will comply with the requirements of the self-assessment system.
Concepts of tax fairness in a self-assessment system therefore require
that tax rules should respect an "anti-manipulation value" that helps
to ensure that taxpayers pay taxes according to their ability to pay for
the annual reporting period.
This anti-manipulation value is similar to, but distinct from, the
anti-tax-arbitrage value posited by Geier'8 as a corollary of structural
coherence. It is similar, in that taxpayers who can avail themselves of
arbitrage opportunities can reduce their overall tax liabilities, just as
taxpayers who can "massage" the numbers reported on a return can
reduce their overall tax liabilities. The anti-tax arbitrage value,
"r This text is a very general statement of the "ability to pay" concept of fairness.
See supra notes 156- 159 and accompanying text.
I See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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however, guards against a taxpayer's ability to game the interface
between two categories of rules: the section 265 disallowance for
interest deductions on debt used to purchase or carry qualifying
municipal bonds prevents taxpayers from gaming the system to get
interest expense deductions related to interest income exclusions.
The anti-manipulation value is in some sense a less nuanced concept.
It guards against opportunities to manipulate numbers reflected on a
tax return in self-help reduction of income tax liabilities.
One feature that provides a significant opportunity for
manipulation is subjectivity. A tax rule that permits subjective
determinations requires considerable tax administrator resources and
time to validate the reasonableness of the determination. Even if
administrative enforcement resources are available, there is no single
right answer, and the taxpayer will more than likely prevail in most
instances so long as there is any basis for the taxpayer's particular
conclusion under the rule. Accordingly, in its 1985 proposals for tax
accounting reforms, the Joint Committee on Taxation noted its
concern that accounting methods may be easily manipulated by
taxpayers and stated that clear reflection of income does not permit "a
subjective 'best guess' of what might happen in a later period."'89
This anti-manipulation disrespect for subjectivity is the basis for
the current tax system's rejection of value added by a taxpayer's
psychological attachment to a expensive artwork or other in-kind item
donated to charity. Such donations require an objective appraisal of
the item's fair market value to hypothetical buyers and not a
subjective report of a taxpayer's sentimental view of value.19° The
189 JCT ACCOUNTING REPORT, supra note 34, at 6, 7.
190 Section 170(a)(1) imposes a general requirement that a charitable
contribution deduction be "verified under regulations." I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). In
connection with the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress required
Treasury to promulgate regulations establishing appraisal requirements for
deductions in respect of in-kind contributions in excess of $5000 for individuals,
closely held corporations, and personal service corporations. See Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369 § 155 (July 18, 1984), reprinted in 1984-2 C.B. Vol. 1-199-
203; H.R. Conf. Rep. 98-861, 98th Cong. (June 23, 1984), at 995-997, reprinted in 1984-
3 C.B. Vol. 2, at 249-251 (indicating that "the conference agreement requires (by
statutory provision outside the Code) that the Treasury Department must issue
temporary or final regulations under section 170... incorporating the substantiation
requirements as set forth in this section of the conference agreement" and
establishing qualified appraisal rules); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c) (setting forth
requirements for appraisals); DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF
DONATED PROPERTY (2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p561.pdf (last
visited Nov. 13, 2004) ("The appraisal must give all the facts on which to base an
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constraint against subjectivity also figures into the tax system's
aversion to taxation of human capital or imputed income from leisure,
where valuation is inextricably tied to the particular taxpayer's
inherent capabilities, personality, and subjective determination of
needs.
There are several examples of the anti-manipulation value in the
history of tax accounting outlined in Part II. The Supreme Court in
Thor Power found no room under the LCM inventory accounting
rules for a merchant's subjective estimates of the reduction in value of
its "excess" inventory, stating that "[i]f a taxpayer could write down
its inventories on the basis of management's subjective estimates of
the goods' ultimate salability, the taxpayer would be able... 'to
determine how much tax it wanted to pay for a given year." '9 1
Another example is Congress's response to the sharp uptick in
deductions for reserves in the brief time during the mid-1950s that
sections 452 and 462 were applicable. Taxpayers were using the
provisions to deduct subjectively estimated reserves that were far
larger than had been expected - raising the tax cost of the provision
to $1 billion a year instead of a few hundred million."9 Congress
promptly repealed the provisions to end the abuse. 93
intelligent judgment of the value of the property). Compare American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (stipulating that the charitable
deduction in respect of a car donated after December 31, 2004 is equal to the price
that the donee actually sells it for at auction).
191 See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 536 (1978) (citation
omitted). Thor Power's president had justified one of the company's aging formulae
based on his own personal experience of twenty years in manufacturing. Id. at 528
n.5. An imprecise alternative formula with arbitrary percentage writedowns was
justified on the basis that "the company 'felt some adjustment of this nature was in
order."' Id. at 529. The Court found generally that
[flinancial accounting... is hospitable to estimates, probabilities, and
reasonable certainties; the tax law, with its mandate to preserve the
revenue, can give no quarter to uncertainty.... Reasonable estimates may
be useful, even essential, in giving shareholders and creditors an accurate
picture of a firm's overall financial health; but the accountant's
conservatism cannot bind the Commissioner in his efforts to collect taxes.
Id. at 543.
192 See, e.g., Letter from G.M. Humphrey, Secretary of Treasury, to Jere Cooper,
Chair of House Ways and Means Committee (Mar. 7, 1955), reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 293, at 3 (1955); Johnson, Comment, supra note 140.
193 See, e.g., Knott & Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1056 (noting that Congress was
concerned about revenue loss stemming from taxpayers' subjective determinations
exaggerating reserve deductions as well as the negation of income tax values).
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Like other aspects of the tax system, there are exceptions to the
anti-manipulation value. Most obviously, tax rules that permit
taxpayer elections that can have significant impact on tax liabilities
are explicit exceptions to the anti-manipulation value. One result of
the existence of elections is a corollary preference for overtaxation
rather than undertaxation. That is, because a taxpayer can in some
cases select the appropriate tax treatment, either by choosing the
structure of the transaction to conform to the desired treatment or by
electing among alternative tax treatments, the tax rules should tend to
overtax rather than undertax.' 94
Although some subjectivity in the tax system is unavoidable, the
"anti-manipulation value" guards against provisions that grant broad
discretionary power to taxpayers to make significant determinations
based on their personal preferences or estimations without substantial
objective supporting evidence.19 This is most obvious in the system's
many requirements for objective support for a taxpayer position
rather than merely subjective determinations. The tax system's
reliance on independent appraisers to determine the value of a
charitable deduction under section 170 demonstrates the irrelevance
of self-serving, subjective estimation of values when taxpayers make
contributions of in-kind items to charities.i Similarly, a real estate
mortgage investment conduit (REMIC) cannot use a funds-available
cap on interest rates as a device to avoid complying with the definition
of a permitted variable rate for bonds issued by the REMIC. Whether
a cap is such a device does not depend on the REMIC sponsor's
subjective intent but rests on a facts-and-circumstances analysis that
looks to objective evidence of the relation of the rate to the rate
payable on mortgages held by the REMIC and historic trends in
'94 Cf Evans, Multi-Period Projects, supra note 104, at 1195 (suggesting that tax
systems that may in some cases result in over-taxation are preferable to those that
result in under-taxation, because of the ability of firms to minimize taxation by
choosing the structure of their transactions).
195 This is not to say that the tax system has no room for taxpayer judgments
based on objective facts, and these may also be subject to abuse from taxpayers that
push the boundaries too far. Some tax provisions inevitably include evaluative terms
that require a taxpayer (and hence the Service or the courts on audit or litigation) to
make a facts-and-circumstances determination as to whether the item or transaction
falls within the provision. The nondeductibility of salaries that are not "reasonable"
is one example. Reasonableness does not permit subjective determinations based on
an idiosyncratic view of what is desirable. Yet salaried owners of closely held
corporations have still managed to manipulate their salary figures to reduce the
aggregate corporate and individual taxes.




The anti-manipulation value is of special importance in
considering conformity requirements. Tax accounting should be
flexible enough to permit variation that corresponds to significant
differences among industries,98 but it should not be so flexible as to
provide multiple ways of accounting for a particular item within an
industry, if those different methods result in significant differences in
tax liability.99 Yet GAAP accounting generally permits considerable
flexibility to businesses within a particular industry in deciding how to
account for various items.20 GAAP accounting may have its own
197 Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-l(a)(3)(v) (as amended in 1995); see JAMES M. PEASLEE
& DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF SECURITIZATION
TRANSACTIONS 471-73 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing funds-available caps).
198 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(b) (as amended in 1973) ("inventory rules
cannot be uniform but must give effect to trade customs which come within the scope
of the best accounting practice in the particular trade or business"); Rockwell Int'l
Corp. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 780, 808 (1981) (expressing the same principle), affd,
694 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982). The emphasis on "best accounting practice" can be read as
an implicit acknowledgement that accounting may permit a variety of methods, but
tax should respect only that practice that best suits tax accounting.
199 Current administrative guidance promulgated under various Code provisions
often fails to fully satisfy this anti-manipulation value, in that there are a number of
regulations that explicitly permit a variety of methods of accounting by taxpayers who
are otherwise similarly situated as participants in a particular industry. See, e.g.,
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(6) (as amended in 2004) (permitting economic performance
in the provision of property to be determined when the property is delivered or
accepted or when title passes). These situations are prime targets for reform to
enhance structural coherence at the same time as eliminating self-help manipulability.
Note that the existence of alternatives in the regulations has been a vulnerability
when the Service has challenged taxpayers' subjective judgments. Tax administrators
are not permitted to require uniform results in the face of regulations that fail to
prescribe uniform methods. See, e.g., Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 2319 (1996) (rejecting the Service's challenge to a "hybrid" method
used by the petitioner and attempt to force the hospital to use accrual accounting for
hospital inventories), affd, 348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS
5570 (2004).
200 See, e.g., DISCLOSURES ABOUT FAIR VALUE OF FIN. INSTRUMENTS, Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 107, 53 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
1991) (acknowledging that the generality of the guidance provided for computing fair
values likely reduces comparability of those values across entities); id. 56
(acknowledging the variance in estimating fair values across entities); id. [ 59-60
(acknowledging that fair value estimations "require considerable judgment" and
"sophisticated assumptions"); USING CASH FLow INFO. AND PRESENT VALUE IN
ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7,
73-74 (Financial Accounting Statements Bd. 2000) (acknowledging that estimated
measurements are "inherently imprecise" and require decisions about relevance and
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ambiguities that make application to a particular context much less
certain. GAAP accounting is admittedly not an exact science.
Comparability of results from firm to firm is ultimately less important
than consistency from year to year for a particular firm. GAAP
accounting "tolerate[s] a range of 'reasonable' treatments, leaving the
choice among alternatives to management."' 0'°  This leeway for
managerial discretion is, in fact, "viewed as a virtue of the system."'202
The tax system's tendency to rely on bright-line rules rather than the
flexibility of managerial discretion has been categorized as a
formalistic and unsatisfactory solution by tax practitioners who favor
• 203
the easing of compliance burdens offered by conformity. In other
words, GAAP requires auditors to use subjective judgments to
determine the best method to portray a particular firm's financial
condition. Materiality, probability, and reliability of numbers are
ultimately based on management and auditor judgments, within broad
guidelines that stress conservatism in order to defeat management
puffery. 2°4 Lenter, Shackelford, and Slemrod use pension accounting
to illustrate the "considerable discretion" permitted under GAAP
accounting compared to tax, for which a deduction is permitted at the
reliability that will vary among accountants and situations); see also Arnett, supra
note 82, at 492-93 (noting that accounting permits a "wide range of alternative
practices" and that the term "'principle' has no operational content" because it must
remain "flexible" and "change as economic conditions demand"); Clear Reflection,
supra note 30, at 380-81, 390 (noting that GAAP tolerates considerable estimation
and subjectivity, and that its principles are "essentially judgmental in nature").
201 Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979),
202 Gil B. Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial and
Tax Reporting Measures of Income, 55 TAX L. REv. 175, 179 (2002). But see Johnson,
Earned, supra note 101, at 390 (noting that discretion also ill serves GAAP's objective
of providing useful information to shareholders and creditors, and suggesting that
GAAP should not permit deductions that "exceed historical experience or other
objectively verifiable measures").
203 See, e.g., Memorandum from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, The
Lessons of Bank One (May 6, 2003) (general informative memorandum to clients and
others in which the authors label the Tax Court's approach as a "normative" one and
contrast it with their preferred "commercial imperative" approach), available at
http://www.cgsh.com/files/ tbl-s5096AlertMemoranda/FileUpload5741/14/40-2003.pdf
(last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
204 See, e.g., Thor Power, 439 U.S. at 542 (contrasting financial accounting's
conservatism with tax); Knott & Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 873 (quoting the
Financial Accounting Standards Board's Standards of Financial Accounting Concepts
No. 5, 9 81, regarding "skepticism" of revenue prospects and a conservative approach
that recognizes expenses and losses more easily than revenues and gains).
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point that cash is contributed to the pension fund. They note that
using GAAP accounting to compute taxable income in this instance
would "greatly increase firms' ability to manipulate their tax
payments."2°6
In addition, GAAP accounting often permits a choice among a
number of alternative calculations designed to address the same
issue.' ° For example, GAAP currently permits securities dealers to
value their inventory of physical securities using any one of theS 208
following methods: average of bid and ask prices; bid price for long
positions and ask price for short posittons; average of price
quotations for the security; or a valuation based on a range of bid and
ask prices considered to best represent the value of the security."O
Lenter et al., supra note 181, at 819 (noting that GAAP accounting for
pensions assesses factors that are subject to considerable discretion, whereas cash
pension contributions are tax deductible).
206 Id.
" See, e.g., USING CASH FLOW INFO. AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING
MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7, 5-7
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) (discussing the earlier Concepts
Statement No. 5 that established five measurement attributes - historical cost,
current cost, current market value, net realizable (settlement) value, and present (or
discounted) value of future cash flows - but noting that the Board has concluded in
recent years that fair value is the valuation premise for most measurements, which
may be represented in some contexts by historical cost, current cost, or current
market value, but not by the latter two attributes earlier set forth); MARTIN MAYER,
THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION 283-313 (1997) (discussing swaps and the
power of banks to manipulate values, based on the alternative methods that they may
use to value swaps, so that the instruments are more clearly "marked to model" than
"marked to market").
208 The bid price of a security is the price a dealer would pay to purchase that
security. The ask price of a security is the price a dealer would ask from
counterparties to which it hopes to sell the security. Ask prices are higher than bid
prices, except in the unusual case when a dealer lowers its ask price in order to
develop a customer relationship or for some similar reason.
A dealer is said to be "long" a security when it owns the security and "short" a
security when it does not own the security.
210 NYSBA RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 4 & n.8; AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE: BROKERS AND DEALERS IN
SECURITIES 7.02 & 7.08 (2003) [hereinafter BROKER-DEALER GUIDE] (requiring
fair value measurement for physical securities and permitting the various alternatives
listed in the text). Note that the one alternative that is not included in the list is using
ask prices for long positions and bid prices for short positions. That alternative is
taboo under the accounting profession's rules, because it would accelerate income
and violate the basic principle of conservatism. The FASB has a current project on
fair value measurement, for which it issued an exposure draft in June 2004. The
Board has tentatively concluded that, when valuing assets and liabilities that are
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Since ask prices are generally higher than bid prices, this means that
dealers can exercise considerable control over the valuations
• 211
presented. Furthermore, when there are no listed prices, dealers
can determine a fair value through a number of pricing methods, using
a wide range of evidence to support the determination. This is
especially problematic when those physical securities are hedges of
dealer positions in derivatives: most dealers value those hedge
securities using the bid/ask method even though the positions hedged
must be valued under the MTM method, resulting in a mismatch and
213probable deferral of income.
Both of these discretionary elements - subjective judgments in
respect of amounts to be reported and a range of clearly distinct
alternatives for determining income in particular contexts - make
GAAP accounting particularly susceptible to the kind of scandals that
have rocked the accounting world in recent years, from Rite Aid to
Enron and from WorldCom to Parmalat. Enron's accounting
traded in active dealer markets, long positions must be valued at bid price, and short
positions at ask, rather than permitting use of the midmarket valuation that it had
earlier determined to adopt. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Proposed
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards: Fair Value Measurements TT 15-17
(Jun. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Fair Value Exposure Draft]; see Financial Accounting
Standards Board, Minutes of the November 19, 2003 FVM Board Meeting 2-3 (Nov.
24, 2003) (indicating that the Board has reconsidered an earlier decision to require
midmarket valuations and decided that financial instruments traded in active markets
in terms of bid and asked prices should be valued by using bid prices for long
positions (assets) and asked prices for short positions (liabilities)), available at
http://www.fasb.orgfboard-meeting-minutes/11-19-03-fvm.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2004). However, the Board has also tentatively concluded that offsetting positions
should be valued at mid-market prices. Fair Value Exposure Draft 17.
211 See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 34 (noting that the AICPA guidelines
"provide[] a certain degree of.flexibility in determining fair value"); see also Leslie
Rahl, ABA Panel on Financial Instrument Valuation, American Bar Association
Joint Fall CLE Meeting, Oct. 1, 2004, at 13-14 (indicating considerable variability of
valuation methodology).
212 See, e.g., BROKER-DEALER GUIDE, supra note 210, TT 7.10-14 (noting the
need for estimates based on management's good faith and taking into account various
factors such as volatility, anticipated future interest rates, and term). As noted by the
SIA in their response to the ANPRM, "[tihese methods include pricing by analogy to
reliable quotations of similar financial instruments, pricing models, matrix pricing,
and other formula-based pricing methods," though for derivatives the recommended
approach is the "mid-market levels less specific adjustments" method approved by the
Group of Thirty. SIA Response, supra note 65, at 35.
113 See NYSBA RESPONSE, supra notel7, at 26-27.
114 See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Developments May Lead SEC to Ban Certain Tax
Services Under Sarbanes-Oxley Independence Rules, 16 J. TAX'N OF FIN. INST. 5 (2003)
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scandal involved a number of different problems (including abusive
tax transactions), among which was its tendency to "assign[]
unrealistic values to the ultimate transaction, which in turn inflated
current period profits."''  Although management's interest in
inflating income to impress shareholders and attract other investors
may restrain to some extent the use of accounting flexibility to reduce
tax liabilities, it is not clear that this tension between inflating book
income and reducing tax income is sufficiently strong to police a
conformity proposal. In the context of conformity, managers and
shareholders alike may be willing to accept lower financial values to
achieve significant tax savings. Managers can develop other means to
signal the profitability of the firm, especially if the conformity
proposal does not take the form of a mandatory booking requirement.
In the case of the accounting scandal at Freddie Mac, the giant real
estate mortgage quasi-governmental financial institution, similar
manipulation of accounting rules was used to defer recognition of
billions of dollars of income in order to present a less volatile earnings
116picture for shareholders.
These recent accounting scandals, and the increasing evidence of
tax shelter advice that pushes the boundaries of abusive tax
transactions based on a low risk of losing in the audit lottery game,
raise red flags for any book-tax conformity proposal, in particular
because accountants would be pressured to rationalize use of
accounting principles that permit the greatest tax advantage."' They
suggest considerable room for doubt that the tension between the
desire to puff income for book purposes and the desire to lower
income for tax purposes would be an adequate constraint on taxpayer
manipulation of resulting income, especially in extraordinarily
[hereinafter Independence]; Tax Risks, supra note 4 (discussing scandals); Parma
Splat - Europe's Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2004 (discussing the
Parmalat scandal).
215 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 622-
23 (S.D. Tex. 2002). According to a former Enron trader, such manipulation of
accounting "was very simple. You just tweaked the assumptions on different
variables, which were changed to make the return higher." Id. at 623 n.58.
"' See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, 'Swap' Deals Shifted Profit to Later Years,
WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at E01 (discussing the use of linked swaps by Freddie
Mac's derivatives traders to push more than $400 million of profits from 2001 into
later years). For a discussion of the link between accounting and tax problems, see
Independence, supra note 214, and Tax Risks, supra note 4.
217 See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying




sophisticated areas in which only an expert few are fully
knowledgeable about potential profits and costs related to a particular
product. These scandals are of particular concern, therefore, to
conformity proposals aimed at financial institutions, because of the
role of such institutions in the recent scandals and because of the
ready availability of financial expertise in those institutions.
Because of the anti-manipulation value, conformity with GAAP
accounting should not be considered where GAAP rules permit
widely divergent net income determinations depending on the
taxpayer's subjective judgments about the best way to account for an
item or its choice among equally viable alternative methods. At the
least, the flexibility and discretion generally permitted under GAAP
must be cabined by objective benchmarks, either because the
particular GAAP provision has detailed requirements that provide
sufficient safeguards or because the tax system imposes additional
safeguards through adjustments to the GAAP method.
B. Pragmatic Concerns
There are a number of pragmatic reasons for extending
conformity requirements to new areas of tax. If a tax rule can be
made entirely synonymous with an accounting rule, without any
adjustments at all, then the set of tax rules becomes extraordinarily
simple for any taxpayer with a sophisticated accounting department to
follow. The tax rule is merely "determine your tax liability by looking
at your financial statement income and multiplying by the appropriate
tax rate." The taxpayer would need to maintain only one set of
financial records, and income determinations would apply for tax as
well as financial accounting. The taxpayer could save any costs that
would otherwise be associated with making separate tax
determinations in the area of the conformity requirement in
preparation for filing a tax return.
Conformity has similar practical benefits for the tax
administrator. The role of the tax administrator during the audit
process would be considerably simplified. The only check remaining
for the tax administrator to perform on audit would be to determine
whether the tax values reconcile with the values reported on the
specified financial statement. If the answer were yes, and there were
no reason to suspect fraud in preparation of the financial statement,
then the tax query would end. Although current tax return
information supporting this reconciliation is limited, the problem is
remedied to some extent, at least for the largest corporate taxpayers,
[Vol. 24:301
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through a new and more detailed Schedule M-3 .2 " Assuming the
expanded Schedule M-3 is sufficiently informative, audits of areas
where conformity is the rule could verify the reconciliation.
These practical benefits of conformity, however, may apply only
on a theoretical level. Real world conformity requirements are
seldom, if ever, so simple, as illustrated by the extensive LIFO
regulations."9 One of the most important pragmatic considerations
that creates complications for conformity provisions is the choice of
financial statement with which to conform and the specification of
other business uses of the information that must be demonstrated
before conformity is satisfied. In the short-lived AMT book income
preference provision, there were extensive regulations specifying the
selection of the "applicable financial statement., 210  A similar
provision would likely be necessary for the potential section 475 safe
harbor.2" The Treasury Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) regarding section 475 valuations suggests that the
statement must be one that provides an "incentive to report
values ... fairly" and that there must be a "significant use" of those
222
values in business. In the case of public reporting companies, the
statement filed with the SEC is the most obvious candidate; yet the
preceding discussion suggests that even companies with a single SEC
statement may find it possible to please shareholders about
profitability while understating income in their SEC reports.
Where public reporting companies are also regulated by another
federal or state agency, the determination of the appropriate
document is even more difficult. A regulatory filing is likely to be
different in significant ways from a reporting company financial
statement. Regulators are often interested in different information.
In the case of banks, regulators are particularly interested in ensuring
that banks have adequate capital to support their lending activity.
2 3
218 See supra note 6.
219 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
220 See Treas. Reg. § 1.56-1(c) (1990) (providing a prioritized list of financial
statements to be considered as the "applicable" statement for purposes of the AMT
provisions).
"' See, e.g., SIA Response, supra note 65, at 12-13, 53 (discussing the reference to
the AMT applicable financial statement provision in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4, 56
Fed. Reg. 31,350 (July 20, 1991) (withdrawn), and suggesting that a similar hierarchy
of documentation would likely be necessary under the proposed safe harbor).
222 See ANPRM, supra note 11, at 23,633.
223 See, e.g., LEONID V. PHILOSOPHOv, BAYESIAN MULTI-PERIOD MODEL FOR
ASSESSING CREDIT LOSS DISTRIBUTIONS vs. BASEL I1 MODEL 2-3 (Dec. 11, 2003)
2004]
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In the case of utilities, regulators oversee the rates charged by the
utilities to their customers, and information about a utility's income
and loss is relevant to whether regulators will approve a rate increase,
among other things. These concerns are significantly different from
tax concerns of collecting revenues from taxpayers who are able to
pay while they are able to pay. Accurate income determinations for
regulatory purposes therefore likely do not correspond to accurate
taxable income determinations.
For closely held companies that are neither required to file a
report with the SEC nor required to produce audited financial
statements to lenders, conformity with an unaudited financial
statement may be the only choice. If that statement is not even filed
with a regulator nor subjected to an independent audit, there is little
reason to suppose that such a taxpayer has adequate incentive to
report numbers fairly for any purpose, much less for tax purposes. On
the other hand, for companies that are subject to overlapping
regulation (e.g., federal and state, multiple state, or federal and
foreign regulators), there may be multiple financial statements with
varying information for which the taxpayer has at least some incentive
to present numbers accurately, for the particular purpose at stake.
Allowing taxpayers to choose which statement is the benchmark for
tax, as suggested by the New York State Bar Association Tax Section
224in its report on section 475, appears to directly violate the anti-
manipulation value. Even if it were possible to establish a hierarchy
of statements, it appears that the greatest thrust of the conformity
incentive (the idea that the number reported is reliable or fair in some
universal sense simply because it is subject to the check and balance of
(discussing Basel II procedures for assessing credit risk and capital adequacy based on
maturity, loss given default, exposure at default, and probability of a client's default
within one year and developing an alternative model), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=478161 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). For banks, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency favors "valuation methodologies and income
reporting that result[] in a bank's taking significant reserves, deferring income
recognition, and using conservative carrying values for swaps" because of its role in
"oversee[ing] the risk management systems" which reflects a "cautious bias." Bank
One, supra note 12, c 122, 123. See generally http://www.bis.org (last visited Oct. 2,
2004) (providing information on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
the New Basel Capital Accord).
224 See, e.g., NYSBA RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 11 (suggesting that there should
be a conclusive presumption that any statement filed with the SEC or another
similarly tasked federal, foreign, or state government agency will represent fair value,
and that taxpayers should be able to choose which statement applies when there are
different valuations on different statements).
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being reported to, and monitored by, others) is removed by the
existence of multiple and different statements. If anything, the
existence of multiple valuations for various regulatory purposes
merely demonstrates the ability of quantitative finance to tweak
assumptions underlying valuations and derive valuations that suit
particular purposes and are therefore fair for those purposes. Rather
than giving credence to such valuations for taxable income purposes,
the ability to manipulate numbers depending on the purpose for
which they are used suggests a need for a separate taxable income
determination. Indeed, if many taxpayers already regularly prepare
more than one financial statement reflecting valuations determined
using different methodologies, it must be asked why the need to
perform a further separate calculation to determine the taxable
income valuation should be viewed as an unreasonable exercise in
duplication. The fact is that every industry operates at the crossroads
of multiple systems and may be required to monitor its activities and
report them for any or all of those systems.
What rationales, if any, support adjustments to the numbers
reported on the financial statement when they are used for tax? If a
conformity requirement means absolute conformity between tax and
accounting, life is indeed simple. But there are significant
consequences to absolute conformity, including the ability of financial
accounting standard-setters to determine what counts as taxable
income in that area of the tax law, not only for the present but also for
the foreseeable future. Even if Congress or tax administrators are of
the view that current financial accounting rules adequately address the
issues that are relevant for determining taxable income such that
conformity provides an acceptable result for tax purposes, they may
begin to disagree when financial accounting rules develop beyond (or
simply away from) their status at the time of adoption of the
conformity requirement. None of the alternatives for handling
conformity in that context are satisfying.
If tax rules simply incorporate whatever changes are made in
financial accounting rules, there will likely be strong pressure on
accounting standard-setters to adopt accounting rules that result in
more favorable tax treatment. For example, deferral opportunities
might be increased by undue emphasis on the financial accounting
matching principle or the demand for substantial objective evidence
before a taxpayer could take into account an anticipated profit
margin. We are already at that stage in respect of exotic derivatives.
As noted by the SIA in its response to the ANPRM, financial
accounting rules do not currently permit dealers to take into account
20041
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their expected profit margin on exotic derivatives for which there is no
objective evidence beyond the transaction itself.2  Similarly, the
FASB's current fair value project proposes that items that are not
offset should be valued conservatively, at the bid price. Applied to
swaps, that would eliminate all current income until such time as the
dealer enters into an offsetting swap. Again, while this is arguably the
right answer for financial accounting purposes, it is clearly not the
result intended when Congress passed the MTM measure to
accelerate income recognition from swaps for tax purposes.
Conformity in spite of changes in the accounting rules is therefore the
wrong answer for tax purposes: its adoption for tax would merely
encourage dealers to focus activities so that they can derive more of
their profits from exotic products that are taxed more favorably than
the more common derivatives. The tail would indeed wag the dog.
If, instead, the conformity requirement "freezes" the financial
accounting rules (for tax purposes only) as they are at the time the
conformity rule is adopted,"' all semblance of simplicity - and of
conformity - disappears the first time that any change is made in the
accounting rule. In that case, taxpayers would be required to perform
the "old" financial accounting analysis for tax purposes, and the
"new" analysis for financial accounting purposes. There would likely
be concurrent changes in the corollary requirements - i.e., the "tax-
financial accounting result" would need only be used in some
particularized position in a specific financial statement, and the "new"
financial accounting number could be used otherwise. These, in fact,
are the results that were observed with the LIFO mandatory booking
requirement.
Furthermore, even if the accounting rule is not changed,
taxpayers will inevitably continue to lobby the SEC and the Service
for more beneficial, tax-reducing changes in the rules. For example,
companies might argue to the Service for exceptions to the standard
accounting rules to permit companies to determine present values of
future cash flows using worst-case scenario determinations rather than
probability-weighted expected value analyses or to permit them to
225 See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 41 (noting that "a dealer that enters into
an exotic OTC derivative contract and that cannot satisfy the evidentiary standards of
EITF 02-3 cannot book an immediate profit equal to its anticipated dealer spread").
226 Freezing the financial accounting rules as of adoption resembles the Puerto
Rican "mirror" tax code, which adopts the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, with
adjustments as enacted after that date by the Puerto Rican legislature. Obviously, the
resulting tax code is neither beast nor fowl, but a unique artifact with some
characteristics of the 1954 Code.
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exclude income for tax purposes as an economic incentive, even
though the income is included for financial accounting purposes.
They might ask the FASB to consider further types of deductible
future costs that are currently not considered in determining financial
accounting income. These are typical lobbying positions, and as likely
to occur as not. Any such adjustments enacted into law would write
complications back into the law in spite of the conformity
requirement.
These pragmatic concerns may sometimes favor and sometimes
disfavor conformity proposals. For example, stability of a tax or
financial accounting rule generally makes the system easier to
administer and both easier to understand and simpler for businesses
to report. An area of financial accounting that has been stable and
well understood over a long period of time, without significant
innovation, appears to be a better candidate for conformity than one
with significant current development of rules. If the financial
accounting area is highly unstable, the underlying hypothesis for
conformity is thrown into doubt. Changes could lead to a basic
inconsistency of financial accounting in that area with tax principles.
Once conformity is in place, however, habitual acceptance may make
it difficult for tax policymakers to recognize that such a change has
occurred (arguably the case with the extended life of LCM and LIFO
accounting). In any case, industry pressure to retain the status quo
may make it politically impossible to replace an outdated conformity
proposal.
Pragmatic considerations suggest that conformity is also most
appropriate for entities that are not subject to overlapping regulatory
regimes. Even if answers to feasibility questions are relatively easy
(because there is only one financial statement and the financial
accounting rules have been relatively stable), the contribution to
genuine simplification for the taxpayer will be minimal if the taxpayer
does not use those same values for every significant non-tax business
purpose. Those business purposes include, where relevant,
compensation, bonuses, pricing, internal reports to managers and
directors, risk management, reports to shareholders, use of stock for
acquisitions, shareholder redemptions, and other business situations
where valuation is important. In the case of valuations, pricing,
internal profit analyses, and risk management are likely the most
significant non-tax uses that should be coordinated if coordination is
to provide credible support for the objective reliability of the ultimate
numbers entered on the return. Furthermore, if taxpayers use
inconsistent values for significant business purposes, it is likely that
2004]
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permitting taxpayers to utilize values for tax merely because they
conform with a financial statement filed with the SEC would violate
the anti-manipulation value.
These pragmatic considerations appear just as readily to weigh
against conformity as to favor it. But the larger question is what
should be the role of pragmatic concerns, whether pro or con, in
making an initial policy decision in respect of a conformity proposal. I
argue that the structural coherence and self-assessment values should
form the basis for the decision, because they focus on essential values.
Pragmatic concerns of administrative and taxpayer convenience
should only be allowed to tilt the balance in those cases where
conformity itself has a de mninimis impact on structural coherence or
self-assessment or where the taxpayers most affected by a particular
provision are ordinary taxpayers who generally do not have the advice
227
and assistance of sophisticated tax counsel . That will generally be
true only for financial accounting systems that are well established,
transparent, and not directly in conflict with general tax accounting
principles. Any other resolution places simplification of the tax
system at undeservedly high focus.
The next Part explores these conclusions further in considering
the advisability of a book-tax conformity safe harbor for dealer
valuations of derivatives under section 475.
IV. EVALUATION OF SECTION 475 CONFORMITY PROPOSAL
Treasury's consideration of a proposal to conform the tax
valuation of swaps under section 475 to the valuation used for
financial accounting purposes is at least in part a response to vigorous
lobbying on this issue. Securities dealers have been strong proponents
of conformity. When Congress enacted the MTM method for
securities dealers without a conformity provision, the SIA pressured
Treasury to adopt a broad book-tax conformity provision through
regulations.22  Conformity arguments also underlie, directly and by
227 By ordinary taxpayers I mean those individuals at the middle income or lower
wage scale who do not have large accumulations of wealth. Most sophisticated
taxpayers are not troubled by complexity, in spite of the tax bar's perpetual whine to
the contrary. Corporations and wealthy taxpayers simply hire tax advisers to figure
out the best approach, and tax advisers are paid by the hour (at least) to take on the
challenge of finding ways to take advantage of a complex set of rules.
228 The influential SIA has written the government at least twice to propose a
book-tax conformity methodology for swap valuations. See SIA Urges IRS to Give
Priority to Guidance on Mark-to-Market Requirements, 2002 TAx NOTES TODAY 78-
18 (Apr. 23, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 78-18)
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implication, the positions taken in briefs filed in the Bank One case by
the bank29 and by various industry groups as friends of the court.m
The industry's response to the ANPRM also strongly supports book-
231
tax conformity.
[hereinafter SIA Proposal] (reprinting SIA letter to the Service urging that the
Service adopt an attached proposal developed by the SIA for book-tax conformity for
swap valuations); SIA Seeks Guidance on Valuing Securities Under Mark-to-Market
Rules, 2001 TAX NoTEs TODAY 96-27 (May 17, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2001 TNT 96-27) (same); see also supra note 68. The SIA has also urged
the government to undertake a test project using the industry resolution program to
develop appropriate verification procedures for the book-tax conformity proposal.
See Letter from Saul M. Rosen, Chair, Committee on Federal Taxation of the
Securities Industry, to Alex Shojay, Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 29, 2002),
http://www.sia.com/2002-comment-letters/pdffMTMLtr.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2004) (asserting that book-tax conformity as verified under an issue resolution
program would provide a "bias-free" valuation because there is "remarkable
consistency... in the fundamental design" since derivatives dealers "apply the same
accounting methodology to their OTC Dollar Derivative books" and "implement that
accounting method in a consistent manner" even though each dealer has a proprietary
valuation model with "its own unique details and inputs"). Note that this claim,
winnowed to its essence, is essentially a statement that all swaps dealers start with
some version of a midmarket valuation (i.e., the "same accounting methodology" that
provides a "consistent" "fundamental design") in a climate where the bid-ask spread
is very small due to strong competition. After releasing the ANPRM, Treasury did
arrange to work closely in an advance issue resolution (AIR) project with a small
group of industry participants. As of the writing of this Article, Treasury had
indicated that it was pleased with the results and expected to release proposed
regulations soon.
229 Brief for Petitioner, Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner 919 63-65, 120 T.C. 174
(2000) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97), reprinted in Bank Argues Derivative Swap Valuations
Were Reasonable, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 3, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit, 2001 TNT 64-38) [hereinafter referred to as Bank One Brief, with
citations to the relevant item number or paragraph of the Lexis version]; Post-Trial
Brief for Petitioner, Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 174 (2001) (Nos.
5759-95, 5956-97) (available from the United States Tax Court Clerk's Office)
[hereinafter, Bank One Post-Trial Brief]; Reply Brief for Petitioner, Bank One Corp.
v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 174 (2001) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97) (available from the U.S.
Tax Court Clerk's Office).
230 See supra note 66.
211 See, e.g., SIA Response, supra note 65, at 2-3 (calling the conformity safe
harbor "the best means of establishing a streamlined, effective, and accurate process
for auditing compliance with section 475" and "see[ing] no other workable
alternative"); Letter from International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., to
the Internal Revenue Service, Re: Proposed Sec. 475 Book-Tax Conformity Safe
Harbor 3 (Aug. 4, 2003) [hereinafter ISDA Response] (arguing that there are
"compelling policy reasons" supporting a book-tax conformity requirement and that
there is "no practical alternative"), available at http://www.isda.org (last visited Oct. 2,
2004]
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This Part addresses these issues in light of the analysis of the key
normative and pragmatic criteria for evaluation of conformity
proposals. Subpart A addresses the issues involved in valuations of
swaps and the typical practices in the security industry revealed in
considerable detail through industry responses to the ANPRM.
Subpart B provides a brief overview of the Bank One holdings on
these issues. Subpart C assesses the book-tax conformity safe harbor
proposal for valuations of swaps and concludes that it should be
rejected. As an alternative, Subpart D proposes that Treasury
prepare comprehensive valuation regulations and presents some
preliminary suggestions for issues the regulations should address.
A. Valuation of Swaps
1. The Swaps Market
A swap is a contract between two counterparties in which the
parties agree to an exchange of payments at specified intervals, where
the amount of each counterparty's payment is determined according
232to the terms of the contract. By far the most common and least
complex type of swap (termed a "plain vanilla" swap) is a fixed-to-
float interest rate swap by which counterparties agree to
simultaneously exchange payments on set payment dates based on a
specified notional principal amount that does not change over the
term of the contract.233 The amount of each party's payment is
determined by a rate specified in the swap: one counterparty is
2004).
232 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1994) (defining a
notional principal contract as "a financial instrument that provides for the payment of
amounts by one party to another at specified intervals calculated by reference to a
specified index upon a notional principal amount in exchange for specified
consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts"); Bank One, supra note 12, 12
("A swap is a bilateral agreement obligating the parties... to exchange at specified
intervals... cashflows ascertained from applying specified financial prices (e.g.,
interest rates, currency rates) to a specified underlying amount."). Because a swap
counterparty may have an obligation to pay amounts under the swap on one or more
exchange dates and at other times be entitled to receive swap payments, swaps cannot
be classified permanently as either assets or obligations of a counterparty.
233 See, e.g., DAVID L. Scorr, WALL STREET WORDS: AN ESSENTIAL A TO Z
GuIDE FOR TODAY'S INVESTOR 374 (rev. ed., 1997). Vanilla swaps (at least those
without collateral) are economically equivalent to a package of cash settled forward
contracts. See New York State Bar Association, Notional Principal Contract




obligated to make a payment determined by a fixed rate, and the
other counterparty is obligated to make a payment determined by a
floating rate (typically, the London Interbank Offering Rate or
LIBOR).2 34 The rates in a market swap are generally set so that the
net present value of the expected cashflows on each leg of the swap is
zero upon initiation, assuming no defaults by either counterparty and
of course disregarding the dealer's bid-asked spread.235
Benefits and detriments under a swap due to interest rate
volatility (i.e., aside from any default losses) are symmetrical on any
payment date. If interest rates have risen on that date relative to the
market rates prevailing at the time the counterparties entered into the
swap, the counterparty paying fixed payments under the swap
benefits; that is, the fixed rate payor will be entitled to receive a
floating rate payment that is larger than the floating rate payment it
would have been entitled to receive on the date that the parties
entered into the swap. Similarly, if interest rates have fallen, the
floating rate payor will benefit; that is, the floating rate payor will be
entitled to receive the same fixed rate payment it would have received
in a rising market, but it will owe a smaller floating rate payment than
it would have been required to pay on the date the parties entered
into the swap. Swap agreements therefore typically provide for
payments to be made on a net settlement basis whereby the party
benefiting receives a net payment of the difference between the two
236payment amounts.
234 See, e.g., AYSBA Swap Report, supra note 233, at 1305-06 (describing plain
vanilla interest rate swaps).
235 See DAVID A.DUBOFSKY & THOMAS W. MILLER, JR., DERIVATIVES:
VALUATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 318 (2003) (indicating that "swaps are priced to
be zero net present value transactions for both parties, except for a (typically) small
profit for the swap dealer, created by the bid-asked spread"); ELIZABETH UNGAR,
SwAP LITERACY: A COMPREHENSIBLE GUIDE 52 (1998). More exotic swaps, or off-
market swaps, may have terms considerably different from these, including upfront
payments or other nonperiodic payments. Most exotic instruments can be bifurcated
and treated as some grouping of debt instruments and options. Further discussion of
exotic swaps is beyond the scope of this Article.
36 See FRANK J. FABOZZI, VALUATION OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES 248-49 (3d ed. 1998). Netting is an important aspect of the valuation of
swaps, because of the frequency with which a single securities dealer may hold
multiple swaps positions opposite the same counterparty. Without netting, a dealer
paying float under a plain interest rate swap that is required to make a payment
during a rising market to a defaulting fixed rate counterparty would lose the entire
amount of the floating payment. With netting, such a dealer would lose only the net
amount paid (i.e., the excess of the floating payment over the fixed payment).
"Close-out netting" of the various swaps under a master agreement permits a
20041
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There is no denying the commercial importance of swaps. A
corporation or other end user may enter into an interest rate swap to
lower its risk from interest rate changes when it issues floating rate
bonds in the market by entering into an offsetting float-to-fixed swap
with a dealer. The corporation effectively has created a fixed rate
debt that protects it from interest rate changes." 7 In addition, the
fixed rate is likely a lower rate than the corporation could have issued
in the market directly, thus lowering its funding costs. 2 8 Assuming
that the corporate end user does not use mark-to-market accounting
and that the swap has the same term as the debt, it can integrate the
two for tax purposes and be taxed as though it had issued fixed rate
debt as well.2 9 End users also use interest rate swaps to speculate on
movements of interest rates over the term of the swap.24° Because the
float and fixed legs of a swap both have net present values of zero at
inception (again, disregarding risk premia and other elements of
dealer profits), a floating rate payor will benefit as net recipient of
payments when interest rates decline, and a fixed rate payor will
benefit as net recipient of payments when interest rates increase. 24 '
Securities dealers, on the other hand, do not primarily use swaps
to reduce funding costs, protect themselves from interest rate changes,
or speculate on interest rate changes, although they may enter into
swaps for such reasons on occasion (such as to hedge their positions).
They generally serve as middlemen who stand ready to enter into a
242
swap with an appropriate end user at any time. They take either
position in a swap, and in fact they often enter into offsetting float and
fixed positions in matching swaps with different counterparties. In
other words, they are like other merchants who profit from buying
nondefaulting party to benefit from netting in respect of all of the relevant positions
with a single counterparty upon that counterparty's default. This significantly reduces
the nondefaulting party's loss.
237 See, e.g., UNGAR, supra note 235, at 24-29 (explaining use of swaps to lower
borrowing rate and to hedge interest rate risk).
238 This is particularly true of corporations with inferior debt ratings - they can
issue floating rate bonds on the market more readily than fixed rate bonds that would
lose value if interest rates increased. Id. at 24-25.
239 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-6 (1996) (permitting integration of qualifying debt
instruments with hedges when the combined cash flows mimic a fixed or variable rate
debt instrument).
240 See UNGAR, supra note 235, at 31-32.
2A1 Id.
242 "Notional principal contract dealers provide liquidity for the market by
standing ready to enter into these contracts with any qualified party at any time."
1991 NPRM, supra note 68, at 31,350.
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and selling goods in the market, except that they profit from the
services they provide in facilitating transactions. They act as credit
intermediaries and liquidity providers for end users and for other
dealers who need to enter into a particular swap position to balance
their swaps portfolio. 3
The interest rate swap market has grown exponentially over the
last decade, with over $24 trillion of U.S. dollar-denominated swaps
outstanding in the second half of 2002.44 A recent International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) survey indicates that
there were interest rate and currency swaps outstanding at the end of
the first half of 2004 with notional amounts totaling more than $164.49
trillion.2 45 More than a decade ago in 1993, the final year in question
in the Bank One case, FNBC was the sixteenth largest swap dealer in
the world, with $114.9 billion notional principal amount of swaps
outstanding and a return on equity for its global derivatives products
of 33.9 percent. Needless to say, tax valuations for those swaps
under mark-to-market accounting is a significant area that has
garnered considerable attention. 47
243 See, e.g., SIA Response, supra note 65, at 7 (noting that derivatives dealers do
not hold derivatives positions primarily for resale, but they "perform the same
economic functions of merchandising and providing liquidity as do traditional dealers,
by standing ready to enter into either side of a new derivatives contract with
customers... [and] provide credit intermediation services"). Large dealers enter into
a high volume of swaps and do not match each position with an equal offsetting
position, as they did more routinely in the first years of interest rate swaps. They
generally enter into positions in response to customer demand and maintain dynamic
hedging of their overall portfolio.
244 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET
ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2002 (2003), available at
http:/fwww.bis.org/publ/otc-hy0305.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
245 INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., MARKET
SURVEY (2004), available at http:I/www.isda.orglstatistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-
historical-data. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
246 See Bank One, supra note 12, 171.
247 Anyone who doubts this statement need only consider the various
associations that joined in filing the Amicus Brief in the Bank One case (including the
SIA, the ISDA, and the Institute of International Bankers). See supra note 66. Also
revealing is the lively exchange in TAX NOTES between Lee Sheppard and Edward
Kleinbard. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis- The Bank One Case:
Marketing to No Market, 91 TAx NOTES 28 (Apr. 2, 2001) (comparing FNBC's lack of
substantiation of its swap valuations to that of the performer George Cohan in an
earlier day); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis - Bank One: The Battle of the Expert
Witnesses, 91 TAx NOTES 720 (Apr. 30, 2001) (discussing the expert witnesses'
testimony about credit risk and administrative cost adjustments for mark-to-market
purposes); Edward D. Kleinbard, Some Thoughts on Market Valuation of Derivatives,
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2. Valuation for a MTM Regime
The acceleration of recognition of income (or loss) under mark-
to-market accounting compared to a realization regime in respect of a
swap for which payments are expected over a period of years is
illustrated in a simplified example in Diagram 1, assuming an income
approach to valuation based on discounted future returns from
participation in the swap (without many of the refinements of
quantitative finance involving probability-weighted future cash
flows).' 48  Assume that an off-market swap is entered into in one
91 TAx NOTES 1173 (May 14, 2001) [hereinafter Some Thoughts] (indicating that the
"abstruse" issues of swap valuation can be understood as a simple exercise of applying
the midmarket valuation method to determine the present value of gross income from
a swap portfolio and then reducing that gross income stream to net income by
subtracting "absolutely predictable costs"); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis - Bank
One: The Court's Experts Testify, 92 TAx NOTES 163 (July 9, 2001) (explaining
testimony in detail); Edward D. Kleinbard, A Short Course in Valuing Derivatives, 94
TAx NOTES 380 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Short Course] (reiterating the claim that
valuing a swaps portfolio is similar to valuing an ongoing business, except for
goodwill); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis - Bank One: Judge Laro's Third Way
Accounting Method, 99 TAX NOTES 786 (May 12,2003) [hereinafter Third Way].
248 For further description of expected value accretion taxation, see, for example,
Fred B. Brown, Complete Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559 (1996)
(discussing three possible valuation methods for MTM taxation, including a market
approach based on comparable sales, a cost approach based on replacement cost, and
an income approach based on discounted future returns from ownership). This
simplified example assumes an income approach with a zero discount rate. In actual
practice, the discount rate should reflect the upward sloping term structure of interest
that represents current uncertainty as to the direction and magnitude of future
changes, as well as expectations of payment based on the creditworthiness of the
counterparty. See Joseph Bankman & William Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-
Term Debt: Taking Into Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAx L. REv. 335,
344-45 (1989). Quantitative financial analysis has refined the approaches for
determining expected values of cash flows and in fact financial standard-setters have
stated as a general concept that a projection of a "best estimate" is generally less
appropriate than a probability weighted analysis. See, e.g., USING CASH FLOW INFO.
AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Financial
Accounting Concepts No. 7, 32-38, 42-45 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
2000) (indicating a current conceptual preference for probability-weighted expected
cash flow approaches to fair value over the "traditional" approach using a best
estimate of most likely payment amounts and a single interest rate convention to
capture the appropriate risk premium). Where future cash flows are uncertain (both
as to timing and amount), an expected value approach would determine expected
cash flows based on probabilities, including credit risk related to a potential default
and market risk due to interest rate volatility, and discount those flows using a risk-
free interest rate. For a discussion of the development of discounted cash flow
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taxable year, so that there is a payment at inception of the contract.
The swap is then terminated during the third taxable year when it is in
the money, resulting in a termination payment to the counterparty
that made the payment at inception. Income under the realization
regime is recognized only in the third taxable year, upon termination
of the swap. In contrast, recognition of income under the mark-to-
market regime, based on the fair market value (determined as the
present value of expected payments and expenses under the swap), is
spread over the entire term of the swap.
DIAGRAM 1. COMPARISON OF MARK-TO-MARKET
AND REALIZATION REGIMES'
EVENT OR YEAR MTM REALIZATION
TI TI
Inception in Year 0 Cost at inception 10
End of Year 1 FMV 11
Change +1 +1 0
End of Year 2 FMV 12
Change +1 +1 0
Termination Termination 15 +5
payment
Change +3 +3
AGGREGATE TI +5 +5
FMV = fair market value; TI = taxable income
Annual income or expenses that figure into the fair market value
of the swap are taken into account under the ordinary accrual rules
that would otherwise apply.2 49 Done properly, this does not result in
analysis, see Edward W. Trott & Wayne S. Upton, Expected Cash Flows, 1
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 2-3 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. May 2001)
(describing the older "traditional approach" as a "single set of estimated cash flows
and a discount rate commensurate with the risk involved" in contrast with the
"expected cash flow approach" based on probability-weighted cash flows), available at
http://www.fasb.orglarticles&reportsfUlvollseriesl.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004);
Financial Standards Accounting Board, Minutes of the August 27, 2003 FVM Board
Meeting 2 (Aug. 27, 2003) (discussing the "expected present value technique" and the
"discount rate adjusted approach (present value technique)" in connection with the
fair value measurement project, and noting that probability-weighted cash flows may
either be adjusted for systematic risk and then discounted at a risk-free rate or
discounted using a rate that incorporates a risk premium), available at
http://www.fasb.orgfboard-meeting-minutes/08-27-03-fvm.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2004).
249 See, e.g., SIA Response, supra note 65, at 6-7 (noting that "a dealer's annual
net income from its dealer operations comprises (i) its mark-to-market gains or losses,
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double-counting of either income or deductions: the fair market value
of an item at the end of any taxable year reflects the expected stream
of income and expenses in respect of that item over its remaining
term. 25 The fair market value of a swap should decline after a
payment has been received, resulting in a negative adjustment to
income for economic depreciation for that year, all else being equal.25
The decline in value and the payment offset each other, so that
payment is effectively included in income at its present value in the
year when it is first reflected in the mark and not in the year that it is
actually received. A simplified example illustrating this relationship
between the annual mark of a swap providing for a stream of
payments and related expenses is set out in Diagram 2, below.
DIAGRAM 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MTM AND
INCOME/EXPENSE*
YEAR PAYMENTS EXPENSES FMV CHANGE TI
RECEIVED PAID IN FM V
Year 0 [+50 at +50
inception]
Year 1 +12 -2 +40 -10 0 (+12-2 -10)
Year 2 +12 -2 +30 -10 0 (+12-2 -10)
Year 3 +12 -2 +20 -10 0 (+12 -2 -10)
Year 4 +12 -2 +10 -10 0 (+12 -2 -10)
Year 5 +12 -2 0 -10 0 (+12 -2 -10)
AGGREGATE TI +50
FMV = fair market value; TI = taxable income
"Assume the swap is entered in year one at no cost to either party but the
taxpayer at acquisition expects net income of 50 from the swap over its term
(assuming a zero discount rate to present value). Also assume that payments received
under the swap and swap-related expenses are constant over the term.
This discussion has assumed that the value of the swap is readily
determinable at inception and at the end of each taxable year. In the
real world of securities dealers' mark-to-market accounting, however,
not all items that must be marked to market are created equal. In
plus (ii) net cash returns on its mark-to-market assets, less (iii) related costs and
expenses").
2_O See generally ROBERT A. JARROW, MODELING FIXED INCOME SECURITIES AND
INTEREST RATE OPTIONS 150-57 (1996) (describing discounted expected cashflow
method for determining value); Bank One, supra note 12, 1[ 82, 92-94 (discussing the
standard expected cashflows analysis of market value in the swaps market).




particular, derivative positions that a securities dealer enters into with
counterparties, such as swaps, options, or forwards, are considerably
different from inventory securities such as stocks and bonds. Values
of corporate shares, ownership interests in publicly traded
partnerships, or corporate debt included in inventory are generally
easily determined: they are assets of the holder that are intended to be
sold or traded rather than held to term, and they are, in fact,
frequently sold or traded on established markets at quoted prices. In
contrast, a position in a swap agreement is generally held to maturity,S•252
is not readily tradable on an established market, and may be either
an asset or a liability to its holder at any point during its term
depending on the volatility of interest rates and other factors and the
corresponding directionality of the net payment requirement between
counterparties.
a. Statutory and Administrative Guidance
Section 475 applies both to physical securities that are inventory
in the hands of a dealer and to derivatives held at the close of a
taxable year that are not inventory in the hands of the dealer. For the
former, the section merely indicates that physical securities should be
valued in inventory at their fair market value. The section applies a
constructive sale mechanism for valuing swaps and other derivatives
that are not inventory in the hands of a dealer, requiring a securities
dealer to recognize gain or loss on derivatives contracts that come
within the definition of "security" as though the security were sold for
its fair market value on the last business day of the taxable year.253
Interest rate and currency swaps are treated as securities for purposes
of this constructive sale rule, 4 as are any dealer hedges of those
25 In fact, an assignment of a swap documented under a standard ISDA form
agreement generally requires the consent of the counterparty. See, e.g.,
INTERNATIONAL SWAP DEALERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (N/KIA/ INTERNATIONAL SWAPS
AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC.), 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (LOCAL
CURRENCY - SINGLE JURISDICTION) 8 (1992), available at http://www.isda.org/
publications/1992masterlc.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
253 I.R.C. § 475(a)(2). But cf. I.R.C. § 475(a)(1) (for stocks and bonds held in a
dealer's inventory, requiring that those items be included in inventory at their fair
market values as of the end of the taxable year, with no need for a constructive sale
provision).
25 I.R.C. § 475(c)(2)(D) (defining "security" to include any "interest rate,
currency, or equity notional principal contract" but not swaps based on commodities
prices). The elective mark-to-market regime for commodities dealers includes





The statute provides little guidance, however, on the appropriate
method of determining a swap's fair market value for purposes of the
constructive sale. The section does not define "fair market value,"
nor does any other provision of the Code. Taxpayers have long relied
on Treasury regulations promulgated under the charitable
contribution provisions, which define the term as "the price at which
the [relevant] property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell
and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.,2 56 A string
of cases provide a judicial gloss on the term, including the recent
decision in Bank One, in which Judge Laro focused on various
elements of the fair market value definition as developed in
administrative and case authorities to conclude that fair market value
is the price at which an item, "valued at its highest and best use,"
would be exchanged between a hypothetical willing buyer and
hypothetical willing seller, neither under any compulsion to engage in
the exchange and both reasonably aware of all relevant
contemporaneous facts but unaware of future events that are not
reasonably foreseeable.5 7
Section 475 does provide some information that is relevant to
valuations of swaps. First, it makes clear that the capitalization rules
of sections 263(g) and 263A do not apply to swaps that are marked to
market.25 In the ordinary realization regime, those rules defer
traded commodities. See I.R.C. § 475(e)(2)(B).
25 I.R.C. § 475(c)(2)(F).
256 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1996); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-4(a)(3) (as amended in 1997) (partnership regulations); § 20.2031-1(b) (as
amended in 1965) (estate tax regulations); § 25.2512-1(b) (as amended in 1992) (gift
tax regulations); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (similar). In addition, rules
promulgated under section 471 explain the meaning of market for the "replacement
cost" market valuation used for inventory lower-of-cost-or-market accounting. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4(a)(1) (as amended in 1993). Speaking at a D.C. Bar Tax Section
meeting in late May, 2003, Bob Williams, special counsel to the associate chief
counsel (financial institutions and products), suggested that there was "no reason to
assume that the definition of fair market value for section 475 purposes means
anything other than fair market value as it has been used in the past .... citing the
standard of what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller." Sheryl Stratton, Dilating
Derivatives Guidance Requires Industry Input, IRS Says, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 28,
2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 102-2).
27 See Bank One, supra note 12, [ 354-59. See also Part IV.B., infra (discussing
the Tax Court's consideration of the differences between fair value and fair market
value components).
25 I.R.C. § 475(d)(1).
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otherwise accrued and allowable deductions by requiring
capitalization of costs having a sufficient nexus to the production of
tangible property and costs of acquisition of property acquired for
resale.25 9  The legislative history for section 475 explains that
capitalization is not necessary, since fair market value encompasses
those costs.2 This is consistent with the general understanding of
both capitalization rules and mark-to-market tax accounting as
providing an appropriate means of ensuring that expenses are not
taken into account in a way that results in illegitimate deferral of
taxes - i.e., a tax principle of matching of income and related
expenses."' Accordingly, when Congress enacted the uniform
capitalization rules, it similarly noted that they were not intended to
alter the then-current rules for valuation of inventories on a basis
other than cost (e.g., market value, in lower-of-cost-or-market
inventory accounting) . Treasury also addressed the interaction of
mark-to-market accounting and the capitalization rules for inventory
in the Preamble to the uniform capitalization rules. It indicated that
the capitalization rules apply for replacement cost determinations of
fair market value, but not for constructive sale determinations "where
211 See I.R.C. § 263(g)(1) (requiring that interest expense to purchase or carry a
straddle position be capitalized); § 263A(a)(2) (setting forth the so-called "uniform
capitalization rules" requiring that direct costs and the "proper share" of "allocable"
indirect costs, such as compensation and quality control, be included in cost of goods
sold for inventory property and capitalized as basis for noninventory property). The
regulations under section 263A provide extensive guidance in respect of which types
of indirect costs must be capitalized and how indirect costs are allocated to particular
property. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2000) (listing
indirect costs not capitalized, including selling and distribution costs, research and
experimental expenditures, section 165 losses, income taxes, unsuccessful bidding
expenses, and deductible service costs); § 1.263A-l(e)(4) (providing further
information about capitalizable and deductible service costs); § 1.263A-i(f)
(specifying cost allocation methods). See also supra note 173 (discussing recent
capitalization regulations).
26 H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 665 (1993).
261 See generally Evans, supra note 54, at 825-33 (discussing the rationale and
interaction of uniform capitalization rules with mark-to-market requirements and
noting that "[clapitalization rules are traditionally understood in terms of 'matching'
income with expenses, and thereby avoiding the deferral of tax that occurs when the
costs of producing income are deducted in advance of the recognition of such
income") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In other words, deferring deductions
through capitalization rules "approach[es] a mark-to-market result with respect to the
production of property" in a realization regime. Id. at 826. In contrast, a mark-to-
market regime calls for the opposite balancing - acceleration of dealer spreads and
related expenses (at present values).
262 See H.R. REP. No. 99-841, at 11-305 (1986).
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the market valuation used by the taxpayer generally equals the fair
market value at which the taxpayer would sell its inventories to its
customers less, if applicable, only the direct cost of disposition.
' 263
This authority may be relevant in considering the relevant market for
valuing swaps and what types of adjustments for expected future
expenses are reasonable in valuing swaps. It suggests that the
constructive sale mechanism is meant to require taxpayers to
determine values in the higher-value, retail market in which customers
or dealers might purchase items, without either blockage discounts or
control premia.2z6
Second, the literal terms of the statute mandate a single, specific
time for valuation- the last business day of the taxable year.265
Although Congress considered that there might be reasons for
requiring or allowing other valuation dates, it left it to tax
administrators to permit other valuation dates through regulations .2
Treasury has not yet promulgated regulations under section 475
providing guidance on valuation issues, with the result that all dealers
must value their noninvestment securities for tax purposes as of the
261last business day of the taxable year.
Finally, the mark-to-market requirement appears to apply by the
263 T.D. 8482, 58 F.R. 42,198, 42,201 (Aug. 9, 1993) (emphasis added). This
statement regarding replacement cost valuations comports with the regulations
promulgated under section 471. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4(a)(1) (as amended in 1993)
(defining market as the aggregate prices of the direct and indirect elements of cost
required to be included in inventory under the uniform capitalization rules, but
indicating that valuations in inactive markets should be derived from information the
taxpayer has about specific purchases, compensation paid for cancellation of
contracts, or lower offering sale prices minus costs of disposition (if they do not vary
materially from actual prices around the date of inventory)).
264 See, e.g., Post-Trial IRS Brief, infra note 355, Part III, at 442-611 (discussing
the Service's position that the fair market value requirement of section 475 requires
that swaps, like stocks and bonds, be valued using a mean-quotation method that
looks at the weighted average of bid and ask prices among the full range of potential
buyers and sellers, rather than confining the analysis to the interdealer market).
26 I.R.C. § 475(a)(2)(A).
266 I.R.C. § 475(a) (flush language, second sentence). The House Report made
clear that the language was intended to permit regulatory exceptions to the year-end
timing of the mark to market for noninventory securities. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at
661 (1993).
267 Judge Laro relied on this requirement, among others, to find that Bank One's
valuation method failed to satisfy section 475. Bank One, supra note 12, [ 377-79
(holding that section 475 requires valuation on the last business day of the taxable
year and finding that the bank failed to value its swaps appropriately by not valuing
them on that date).
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literal terms of the statute to each dealer position in a swap rather
than to a book or portfolio of swaps and hedges in the aggregate. The
statute requires valuation of "any" noninventory security as though a
sale of "such security" had taken place at the end of the taxable
year.2 The legislative history, however, treats this issue somewhat
ambiguously. The House included a provision to prevent blockage
discounts and explicitly stated in its report that "fair market value
generally is determined by valuing each security on an individual
security basis. ' 69  Although that language emphasizes case-by-case
valuation, the use of the term "generally" implies that Congress
thought there would be some circumstances in which aggregate
valuation might be more appropriate. Congress also clearly
understood that individual valuations of an entire portfolio of
positions might be burdensome in some circumstances. Accordingly,
the Conference agreement did not include a special provision
governing blockage discounts, and both the House and Conference
Reports stated Congress's expectation that Treasury regulations
would provide valuation methods to "alleviate unnecessary
compliance burdens., 27  In the case of the Conference Report, the
statement of expectation came immediately following a blunt
statement that Congress did not mandate any particular valuationmethdolgiesin he " " " 271
methodologies in the legislation itself. That statement undercuts the
security-by-security interpretation of the Code language. The Service
agrees, and in a 1999 private letter ruling explicitly states its position
that "[n]either Section 475 nor the regulations thereunder impose
such a requirement [to value each security on an individual basis]." 2
268 I.R.C. § 475(a)(2) ("[i]n the case of any security"); § 475(a)(2)(A) ("as if such
security"). This also comports with understanding under the lower-of-cost-or-market
system of section 471. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4(c) (requiring market and cost to be
determined for "each article on hand").
"9 H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 665 (1993).
270 Id.
271 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 616 (1993) ("The conference agreement does
not provide any explicit rules mandating valuation methods that are required to be
used for purposes of applying the mark-to-market rules. However, the conferees
expect that the Treasury Department will authorize the use of valuation methods that
will alleviate unnecessary compliance burdens for taxpayers and clearly reflect
income for Federal income tax purposes").
27 IRS FSA 199909005 (Nov. 17, 1998). A securities dealer working group, in
comments on FASB's fair value project, has expressed support for the FASB's view
that large positions in securities should be valued with block discounts. Letter from
the Bond Market Association, the ISDA and the SIA to Suzanne Q. Bielstein,
Director - Major Projects and Technical Activities, FASB (Sept. 2, 2004) at 5
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The legislative history statement of expectation that Treasury
would relieve compliance burdens should not be misread as a
congressional instruction to Treasury to adopt book-tax conformity
for swap valuations.273 The securities dealers urged Congress at the
time of the enactment of section 475 to incorporate book-tax
274
conformity into the statute. Congress could easily have written
section 475 to accommodate securities dealers' demands for a mark-
to-market conformity rule, but chose not to do so. It should not
therefore be treated as though it had done so when it merely stated its
expectation that regulations providing guidance would, to the extent
possible while clearly reflecting income, prevent unnecessary
compliance burdens.
In the decade since the enactment of section 475, Treasury has
failed to provide definitive guidance addressing valuation questions.
The ill-fated "Los Alamos Project" was an attempt to develop
valuation software that could be used by the Service in audits to test
taxpayer valuations; however, the project ultimately died from
underfunding (combined with critical industry barbs).'7 The Bank
[hereinafter, Fair Value Comment Letter], available at http://www.idsa.org (last
visited Nov. 30, 2004). This position illustrates the likelihood that tax valuations
based on a conformity safe harbor may result in valuations that differ markedly from
those contemplated by Congress upon enactment of the section 475 revenue raising
provision.
273 Securities dealers at times overstate the import of the legislative history by
treating it as revealing an intent to have Treasury adopt book-tax conformity. See,
e.g., ISDA Response, supra note 231 (stating that a book-tax conformity safe harbor
"would carry out Congressional intent in enacting section 475").
271 See Letter from Hal I. Gann, to the Internal Revenue Service (July 25, 1997)
(indicating that Congress considered and rejected the proposal to adopt legislatively a
book-tax conformity approach to mark-to-market accounting), reprinted in Attorney
Criticizes Mark-to-Market Software, TAX NoTEs TODAY (Aug. 21, 1997) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 162-27).
275 See Remarks by Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, International Fiscal Association U.S.A. Branch Annual Meeting, I.R.S. News
Release IR-95-19, 1995 I.R.B. LEXIS 90 (Mar. 2, 1995); John Jekel, IRS To Unveil
Pricing Model, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 20, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 97 TNT 54-6); Debra M. Aaron, Wall Street Group Airs Views on Valuing
Derivatives, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 10, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 97 TNT 69-63); IRS Seeks Comments on Mark-to-Market Software, 97 TNT
104-28 (May 30, 1997); Gann, supra note 274 ; Jeremy Holmes, Financial Products:
Lyons Says Los Alamos Code Sec. 475 Valuation Project 'Temporarily Suspended',
1997 DAILY TAX REPORT 240, at G-5 (Dec. 15, 1997); Lynne A. Brzezenski, An
Update on the Code Sec. 475 Mark-to-Market Rules for Affiliated Groups, 3 J. TAX'N
FIN. PROD. (Fall 2002) (noting complexity of the valuation issues and extensive
government resources devoted to the Bank One case).
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One litigation itself demanded a large investment of government
resources over an extended period of time to litigate complex issues
on the cusp of financial innovation that are subject to evolving
understanding by the very businesses that deal in them day to day.
Not unexpectedly, Treasury was under considerable pressure to
produce guidance. While waiting for the Tax Court's decision,
Treasury announced that guidance addressing valuation under section
176475 was a high priority. Perhaps concerned that the upcoming
decision was likely to muddle the question even more, Treasury
released its request for comments on a book-tax conformity proposalS• 277
just hours prior to the announcement of the decision.
b. Industry Practices
(1) Midmarket Valuation Methodology
Even prior to the release of the Bank One decision, it was clear
that there was no single industry standard for marking swaps to
market for tax purposes, in the sense of an easily documented and
replicable model that applies the same assumptions and produces
clearly verifiable and comparable results from the same underlying
278information throughout the industry. The financial industry freely
acknowledges the existence of - and indeed insists upon the
competitive importance in their broker-dealer businesses of the
distinctive computations resulting from - finely tuned proprietary
systems for determining "fair value" for financial accounting
276 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2002-2003 PRIORITIES FOR TAX REGULATIONS
AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE (July 10, 2002), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docslpgp.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
277 See supra note 11.
28 "There is no single, 'correct' methodology for arriving at fair market value."
Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 4, at Item 1; see also Bank One Post-Trial Brief,
supra note 229, at 101 (reviewing the legislative history of section 475 and concluding
that "Congress fully understood that there was no one correct methodology of mark-
to-market valuation in the case of instruments not actively traded on a secondary
market and that valuation in such cases could be extremely complex"); DISCLOSURES
ABOUT FAIR VALUES OF FIN. INSTRUMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 107, 1 53 & 68 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1991, as
amended) (acknowledging that "by providing general rather than detailed guidance
[on how to estimate fair value, the Board] has potentially reduced the comparability
of the fair value information among entities" and that "for assets with no quoted
prices, variations in the methods used to estimate the fair value of liabilities with no




purposes.2 " At the same time, dealers claim to use consistently the
same overall valuation methodology and assert that there is "no
practical alternative" to tax acceptance of the proprietary valuations
arrived at through their idiosyncratic applications of this general
methodology.280
What dealers' proprietary models clearly have in common is a
generally accepted procedural approach to valuation based on one or
another of the quantitative financial models for discounting expected
cash flows to present value. These models are used to determine the
"midmarket value" between the prevailing bid and ask prices for that
type of swap.2 1 In other words, a dealer essentially values its position
279
In recent years, financial institutions and others have developed and
implemented a variety of pricing tools designed to estimate the fair value of
assets and liabilities. It is not possible here to describe all of the many
(often proprietary) pricing models currently in use. However, those tools
often build on concepts similar to those outlined in this Statement as well as
other developments in modem finance, including option pricing and similar
models.... To the extent that a pricing model includes each of the
elements of fair value, its use is consistent with this Statement.
USING CASH FLOW I, o. AND PRESENT VALUE IN AccouNTING MEASUREMENTS,
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7, 54 (Financial Accounting
Standards Bd. 2000). The elements of fair value are (i) future cash flow estimates, (ii)
expectations related to variations in timing or amount of cash flows, (iii) time value of
money considerations, (iv) risk premia, and (v) other factors, such as illiquidity and
market imperfections. Id. 23; see also SIA Response, supra note 65, at 56 (indicating
that "[e]ach taxpayer has developed its own internal systems to facilitate its particular
operations and business model").
ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 3 (indicating that there is "no practical
alternative" to a book-tax conformity approach); see also infra notes 292-297 and
accompanying text (regarding the industry's description of its methodology as
"consistent" across the industry even though it requires extensive subjective
determinations).
281 See Amicus Brief, supra note 66, T 31 (quoting FASB as suggesting a
valuation "technique" that determines the "present value of estimated future cash
flows using a discount rate commensurate with the risks involved"); id. J 32 (quoting
the Group of Thirty's conclusion that marking to market "correctly reflects the
current value of derivatives cash flows to be managed"); id. 33 (quoting Treasury's
study of bank regulatory capital requirements as indicating that "some form of
discounted cash flow analysis would have to be employed to estimate fair market
values"); ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVES INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Financial Standards
Accounting Bd. 1998) (providing guidance on valuations of derivatives), as amended
by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 149. See generally FAsozzi,
supra note 236, at 248-49 (describing valuation of interest rate swaps purely in terms
of payments to be made or received under the instrument, and determining changes
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in a swap (reflecting the income it is permitted to record for financial
accounting purposes) at a rate that is between (a) the prevailing fixed
rate that dealers are generally willing to pay to other dealers to
receive a floating rate (the bid rate) and (b) the prevailing fixed rate
that dealers generally demand to receive from end users on a matched
swap in which the dealer pays a floating rate (the ask rate).2"
Accordingly, there has been an industry, regulatory, and accounting
consensus as to the relevance for non-tax business purposes of the
midmarket value: midmarket values are the base component of the
in value based on changes in market interest rates using forward rates to determine
the payments under the floating side). In essence, this valuation methodology treats
interest rate swaps as a "package of forward contracts" where the price of the swap is
the price of a package of forwards that have the same settlement dates and the
underlying for the forward is the same reference rate. Id. at 242. There is
considerable learning on the mathematical formulae that are used to price interest
rate swaps. See, e.g., Bernadette A. Minton, An Empirical Examination of Basic
Valuation Models for Plain Vanilla U.S. Interest Rate Swaps, 44 J. OF FIN. ECON. 251
(May 1997) (comparing valuation models based on replicating portfolios of futures
with those based on replicating portfolios of noncallable corporate par bonds and
considering the effect of differential counterparty risk); Sanjiv R. Das, Rangarajan K.
Sundaram & Suresh M. Sundaresan, A Simple Unified Model for Pricing Derivative
Securities with Equity, Interest-Rate, Default and Liquidity Risk, WORKING PAPER
SERIES, AFA 2004 SAN DIEGO MEETINGS (Jan. 2003) (providing a model for pricing
derivatives with equity, interest rate and default risk or for extracting probabilities of
default from market data), available at http://www.ssrn.cornabstract=472680 (last
visited Oct. 2,2004).
U2 See, e.g., Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 20 (defining "midmarket value" as
"the present value of the net interest payments that the parties had agreed to
exchange[j,] calculated on the basis of the market's CURRENT interest rate reference
point for each maturity"); see also id. % 70 (noting that John Parsons, an expert
witness, agreed that Devon software for determining midmarket value was "a
generally accepted methodology widely employed for calculating the market value of
a swap"); supra note 229 (noting the SIA's assertion that dealers consistently use
some form of midmarket valuation); Bank One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at
T 60 (noting that quoted ask and bid rates are obtained through broker surveys but
"[tihere is no public data on the end-user market or on the effective spread for actual
transactions in the dealer market"). The interest rate reference point for each
maturity used in determining midmarket valuations is based on the current yield
curve, sometimes called the "term structure of interest rates." BROWN & SMITH,
supra note 177, at 136 (defining "yield curve" as a "graphical depiction of the current
yields to maturity versus time for a set of financial instruments that are alike in all
respects (e.g., liquidity, taxation, default risk) except for maturity [that is ailso known
as the time structure of interest rates when referring to yields on zero-coupon,
default-free securities") (emphasis omitted). Valuing the long side of the swap at the
bid price at inception would result in zero current value, which clearly would not
reflect income nor satisfy the mark-to-market goal of accelerating income recognition
into the present compared to a realization method of accounting.
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reported market values of swaps and other OTC derivatives for most
dealers' non-tax business purposes.
This unadjusted midmarket valuation is substantially consistent
and precise, even across different dealers, because of the standard
mathematical formulas used and the availability of similar vendor-
provided computer software programs for this purpose."" As an
acceptable financial accounting estimate of the expected income
stream over the term of a swap or other derivative, however,
midmarket value entails a number of modeling assumptions about the
term structure of interest rates, market risk, pricing, and even dealer
profit margins. The midmarket value for any particular position will
vary depending on the discount rate used. Dealers use proprietary
techniques and judgments to determine appropriate discount rates.
The midmarket value will also vary depending on the pricing model
input to determine the prevailing bid-ask rates - including observed
exchange-traded prices, prevailing prices in over-the-counter trades,
. 284
or prices from pricing services.
Assuming appropriate discounting and pricing models, midmarket
valuation should accelerate the recognition of at least a part of the
spread that a dealer expects to earn over the term of a swap for acting
as a credit intermediary and liquidity provider into the year that the
contract is entered into, compared to valuing the swap at the bid price
(or ask price, in the case of a short swap). Note, however, that a
particular swap may be executed at a premium - the dealer may
negotiate a higher price than the quoted ask price. Dealers typically
"quote wider spread[s] ... for less creditworthy counterparties."' 281 In
283 See Bank One Brief, supra note 229, IT 26, 69-70 (discussing the Devon
software for determining midmarket value from inputs including interest rates and
contractual terms of swaps and noting the replicability of the values produced by it);
Bank One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at 29 (noting that because the bank relied
so heavily on its accuracy, the Devon software's output "was tested by traders, by the
back office, by FNBC's systems department, by its internal auditors, and by its outside
auditors"); DUBOFSKY AND MILLER, supra note 235, at 343-66 (discussing the
standard forward and bond analogies for valuation of swaps).
'8 See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 37.
285 See, e.g., Kleinbard & Evans, supra note 54, at 792 (discussing pricing);
JARROW, supra note 250, at 153 (assuming no default risk, a swap is priced at a fixed
rate that results in the swap having zero value at initiation); FABOZZI, supra note 236,
at 245 ("the swap rate is the interest rate that will make the present value of the
payments on the fixed-rate side equal to the payments on the floating-rate side").
Marking the swap to midmarket value therefore results in a positive present value,
causing the dealer to recognize income in that amount for the taxable year.
28 DUBOFSKY AND MILLER, supra note 235, at 312.
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Dubofsky's example, the regular bid-ask quote is 27/24 basis points,
resulting in a dealer spread of 3 basis points; but the bid-ask for less
creditworthy counterparties is 30/20, resulting in a 10-basis-point
dealer spread. 1 7  Assume that a dealer has offsetting positions in
swaps with less creditworthy counterparties. In that case, a
midmarket valuation based on quoted bid and ask prices would
appear to understate the dealer's profit from the offsetting positions
by eliminating the risk premium received.
(2) Adjustments to Midmarket Valuation
It is clear from the preceding description that midmarket values
should represent a fairly consistent determination of "contractual
future gross cash flows" from a financial accounting perspective,
although disregarding certain elements of a dealer's expected
profits. The unadjusted midmarket valuation of individual swaps is
therefore considered merely the first step in determining the financial
accounting fair value of a dealer's swaps portfolio. Bank regulators
early on pressed for adjustments to these midmarket valuations as a
way to ensure that banks did not overstate the value of their swaps
portfolios for bank regulatory purposes. 2 9 A task force of accounting
and broker-dealer representatives operating under the auspices of the
287 Id.
298 SIA Response, supra note 65, at 26. It is not clear, however, whether this
description is entirely accurate, since the midmarket valuation is based on quoted bid
and ask prices and not on the particular contract rates, which may reflect a premium
because of creditworthiness, funding requirements, or other issues. In addition, the
midmarket valuation will be higher or lower if the discount rate is decreased or
increased relative to the "neutral" current rate for AA or higher rated counterparties.
If either or both of these factors come into play, the midmarket valuation itself may
already reflect some reduction compared to the present value of expected future gross
cash flows determined in respect of the actual swap price.
'0 Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 62 (federal bank regulators at the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency recommend adjustment for future costs to avoid
overstatement of income for bank regulatory purposes); Bank One Post-Trial Brief,
supra note 229, at 24 (stating that one of the purposes behind the OCC's issuance of
Banking Circular 277 in 1993 "was to tell bank dealers that it would be wrong to
continue valuing their derivatives at midmarket without adjustments because they
would be overvaluing their portfolios and overstating their income"). Bank
regulators, of course, have a conservative focus of ensuring that there is no
overstatement of income, given the importance of capital adequacy for financial
businesses and the need to monitor future expectations of capital needs. This
unilateral concern with avoiding overstatement is not the same as the tax requirement
of clear reflection of income.
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so-called Group of Thirty (a private group comprised of
representatives of various financial, academic, and international
sectors) recommended that dealers should make adjustments to
midmarket valuations for unearned credit spread, close-out costs,
investing and funding costs, and administrative costs.9 In arriving at
swap fair values, dealers therefore perform one or more second-step
adjustments to the midmarket valuation, generally on a portfolio-wide
basis.29 '
The industry tends to describe the "'adjusted mid-market'
valuation methodology" as one that is "universally followed," but the
devil is in the details of what particular dealers do in particular
290 GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND
PRINCIPLES (1993) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY STUDY] (reporting the
recommendations of the task force established by the Group of Thirty and the results
of a dealer survey conducted in January and February of 1993), available at
http://www.group30.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2004); see also ISDA Response, supra note
231, at 6 (noting that the Group of Thirty, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Governors of the Federal Reserve, and GAAP all support an adjusted midmarket
method for valuing OTC derivatives). In the period covered by the Bank One
litigation, many dealers made no adjustments to midmarket valuation. See Bank One
Brief, supra note 229, [ 59, 61 (indicating no consensus prior to 1993 that adjusted
midmarket valuation was appropriate, and noting that the 1993 Group of Thirty
survey on derivatives practices found that "a number of dealers were valuing
derivatives for reporting purposes at the midmarket level WITHOUT adjustments");
GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES,
FOLLOW-UP SURVEYS OF INDUSTRY PRACTICE, at iii, 12 (1994) [hereinafter GROUP OF
THIRTY FOLLOW-UP SURVEY] (follow-up survey of dealers in late 1994, finding that,
out of 125 dealer respondents of 300 surveyed, 44 percent valued derivatives using
unadjusted midmarket values and a bare majority of 51 percent used adjusted
midmarket values). In its post-trial brief, however, Bank One argued that those
dealers who were using unadjusted mid-market values were "not claim[ing] that
unadjusted mid-market was the right approach; rather, they had not yet developed
the systems needed to measure the adjustments." Bank One Post-Trial Brief, supra
note 229, at 24.
291 See, e.g., SIA Response, supra note 65, at 26 (claiming that it would be
"inconsistent with the business model" to value each derivative individually, and
noting that "dealers do track unadjusted midmarket values on a contract-by-contract
basis, [but] contracts are broken into their constituent cash flows for purposes of
determining adjusted midmarket values"). According to the SIA, portfolio-wide
adjustments avoid the overstatement of credit risk that would result under a swap-by-
swap approach from disregarding close-out netting of multiple contracts with the
same counterparty. The SIA suggests this is a reasonable approach, much like valuing
the goodwill of a business, and not in conflict with the constructive sale terminology
of the statute, which should be understood to refer to hypothetical bids for a dealer's
portfolio in the interdealer market. Id. at 27-28.
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instances. 292  There is no industry agreement about the detailed
• 293
implementation of adjustments to reduce midmarket values. The
SIA acknowledged that the method itself "is in a continual state of
refinement and evolution" and that there is no uniform way in which
dealers implement it.294 Dealers use varying proprietary technologies
in their unique implementation of valuation adjustments and apply
"subjective judgments" for reducing the midmarket value by
additional carveouts .29  The dealers' proprietary systems differ "in
non-trivial respects" sanctioned by GAAP, which aims to incorporate
values used in the business, rather than to "sanction one specific
methodology." 296 Some dealers reduce the swap midmarket values for
certain types of credit risk, some for administrative costs, and some
for both or neither or other costs. 7 This Article generally will refer
to adjustments made to midmarket value for credit risk as "credit risk
carveouts" and adjustments for administrative costs as "administrative
carveouts." The following paragraphs describe a number of these
adjustments and the rationales supporting them.
292 SIA Response, supra note 65, at 23.
293 See, e.g., Amicus Brief, supra note 66, 21 (noting that there is "no single
means of implementing an adjusted midmarket mark-to-market valuation model, and
no single set of input data"); Munro & Keinan, supra note 63, at 13 (stating that
"[c]urrently, there is no standard practice in the market with regard to the type or
amount of specific adjustments taken by dealers").
"" SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 60; see also ISDA Response, supra
note 231, at 18 (claiming that variations in techniques are not different valuation
methods, but acknowledging that the "single method of valuation (the adjusted
midmarket method) ... is constantly evolving").
'9' See SlA Response, supra note 65, at 51 (demonstrating that the specifics of
implementation of midmarket valuation methodology varies); Bank One Brief, supra
note 229, 25-31 (FNBC used its "subjective judgments" that considered both
theory and practice to adjust the midmarket value produced by the Devon system
upon the initiation of a swap for (i) credit risks, based on the bank's own credit
analysis, and (ii) administrative costs, based on quarterly re-determinations of the
costs of administering existing swaps).
299 SIA Response, supra note 65, at 58.
297 See Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 22 (asserting that the "most commonly
made" adjustments to midmarket values were "for credit considerations and
administrative costs"); id. 61 (mentioning the 1993 Group of Thirty Study); id. % 63
(indicating that, by 1993, adjusted values were in use by "some of the industry's
largest dealers" and, by 1994, two-thirds of large dealers were either using or planning
to use some adjustments); Munro & Keinan, supra note 63, at 5.
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(a) Valuation Model Adjustments
Vendor software and mathematical valuation models, developed
to reflect up-to-date mathematical analysis of derivatives, are fairly
common to a number of dealers.2 98  Dealers nonetheless make
adjustments to the valuation model itself, based on their own internal
research, comparisons with other model outputs or to account for
their particular views on particular modeling questions on which there
299is a significant difference of opinion.
(b) Market-Risk Adjustments
Dealers also make portfolio-wide market-risk adjustments. 3M
Clearly, market risk is a major concern with interest rate swaps for
which the volatility of interest rates can change the relative value of a
dealer position overnight. If a dealer has entered into a swap under
which the dealer pays a floating rate of interest, a sharp increase in
interest rates could cause the contract to move from an asset to a net
obligation of the dealer. Dealers therefore typically make a market-
risk adjustment that takes into account their determination of the risk
of loss from changes in interest rates on temporarily unhedged
positions."1 This adjustment may in fact completely eliminate, at least
temporarily, the dealer spread that would otherwise be taken into
account under the midmarket valuation system (because it reduces the
fair market value by "up to half the bid/offer spread" - i.e., by the
portion of the actual spread taken into account under the midmarket
valuation system).3 0 Neither the ISDA nor the SIA indicates that
these adjustments are weighted in any way by the firms' historical
experience with these types of losses. 0 3 Rather it appears that all
298 See, e.g., Bank One, supra note 12, 85-88 (describing Devon software for
midmarket valuations); infra note 310 (noting various software models for credit risk).
299 See ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 12; SIA Response, supra note 65, app.
A at 60-61.
300 SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 61-62 (discussing bid-offer
adjustments for unhedged positions that reflect possibility that dealer may have to
close out an unhedged position at a lower price).
301 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 14.
... Id. at 13 (noting that these reductions do not ever exceed the entire bid/offer
spread because a dealer can always enter into an offsetting position rather than hedge
each type of risk inherent in a particular derivative); see also SIA Response, supra
note 65, app. A at 61-62 (same).
See ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 13-14; SIA Response, supra note 65,
app. A at 61-62.
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unhedged swap income is automatically deferred. When a dealer later
enters into an appropriate hedge, the deferred income is taken into
account by an adjustment that increases the swap's value to reflect the
hedge protection.
Some dealers also temporarily reduce the reported income on a
swap for "market risk valuation due diligence." This is a charge that
reduces the value of complex contracts for the period during which
due diligence has not yet been completed.3°4 Again, it appears that
such dealers may arbitrarily eliminate the entire dealer spread
otherwise taken into account under the midmarket method for the
period during which due diligence remains incomplete.
(c) Liquidity and Concentration Adjustments
Dealers may also reduce reported portfolio values for various
types of "liquidity" or "concentration" adjustments to take into
account the possibility that they may have to close out a particular
contract at unanticipated cost, especially for exotic derivatives and
large concentrations of a particular type of position.05  The
assumption is that a large block of positions will be costly to close
because of the saturation of the market and the likelihood that a
dealer would have to pay a premium to another dealer to take on the
positions. Such reductions in value are sometimes permitted under
financial accounting's conservatism.O Again, there is no indication
"4 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 16-17.
305 SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 62-63 (discussing liquidity adjustments
for "unhedgable risk[s]" and "concentration adjustments" for risks of incurring close-
out costs related to holding exceptionally large positions). Compare the dealers'
position in support of block discounts, see Fair Value Comment Letter, supra note 272,
with the original House provision explicitly denying consideration of block discounts,
see supra note 269 and accompanying text.
306 Note that Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 generally
precludes the taking into account of blockage factors. See Accounting for Derivative
Instruments and Hedging Activities, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
133: 315 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. June 1998, as amended) ("Consistent
with Statement 107, the definition of fair value in this Statement precludes an entity
from using a 'blockage' factor. .. in determining the fair value of a large block of
financial instruments."). However, as the exposure draft issued in the FASB's current
fair value measurements project indicates, the BROKER-DEALER GUIDE allows
broker-dealers to use blockage factors when estimating the fair value of large
positions of financial instruments in certain circumstances, based on an assessment of
factors such as the size of positions held and the liquidity of the market. Fair Value
Exposure Draft, supra note 210, at 6 n.5; see Broker-Dealer Guide, supra note 210,
7.11 (instructing management to "take into consideration all indications of value
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that historical experience of the percentage of derivatives that result
in such unanticipated close-out costs is used to establish a ceiling for
the amount of adjustments made.
(d) Credit Carveouts
Perhaps securities dealers' most ubiquitous and most flexible
adjustments (almost always reductions of the fair market value
otherwise determined based on expected income streams) are those
for credit risks - adjustments related to the basic concern that a
counterparty will default on its obligation to make payments under a
swap. Standard texts on swap pricing discuss the necessity of taking
the risk that a counterparty will default into account in determining
the price for a swap,' °7 and thus dealers make various credit risk
adjustments to midmarket valuations in order "to reflect the evolving
creditworthiness of a dealer's counterparties. '3 °8 That is, by entering
into an interest rate swap that requires it to pay a fixed rate for float, a
less creditworthy end-user counterparty can essentially borrow funds
at a lower fixed rate and over a longer term than it could if it raised
funds by issuing bonds in the capital markets.09 The swap spread (i.e.,
the amount in excess of the rate on comparable Treasury notes that it
will pay to the dealer that receives fixed payments on the swap),
however, will differ depending on its creditworthiness. All else being
equal, a less creditworthy counterparty will generally pay a larger
spread over Treasuries than a more creditworthy counterparty.
Significantly, a dealer's credit-risk adjustments to its swaps
valuations do not directly translate to a discounted value for
probability-weighted expected losses from counterparty defaults, the
most obvious candidate for permissible adjustments for tax purposes
and one for which there are increasingly sophisticated quantitative
finance computational models.1 In fact, there appears to be a wide
that are available in determining the fair value" of a financial instrument, including
the "[s]ize of position held and the liquidity of the market").
337 See, e.g., FABOZZI, supra note 236, at 241 ("In any agreement between two
parties that must perform according to the terms of a contract, counterparty risk is the
risk that the other party will default.").
"" SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 63.
311 See Chand Sooran, Interest Rate Swaps (2003), at http://www.finpipe.com/
intrateswaps.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
30 The advance in credit derivative markets has resulted in a number of
sophisticated mathematical models for measuring the amount and likelihood of a
credit default loss. See, e.g., Oren Cheyette & Tim Tomaich, Empirical Credit Risk
(July 1, 2003) (determining credit risk for corporate bonds based on empirically
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range of practices in respect of credit carveouts, demonstrating that
dealers have considerable flexibility under financial accounting rules
to use subjective judgments and internal estimates for these decisions.
From the dealer's perspective, the increased spread due to credit risk
described in the preceding paragraph will serve various functions: it
will make up, in part, for any actual loss because of counterparty
default (i.e., the current income stream from the swap with the risk
premium is more than sufficient to offset the payments the dealer
must make and the dealer's expected profit margin, with the excess
cash flows available to absorb some or all of any potential loss if the
counterparty defaults). Therefore, it will also compensate the dealer
for acting as a credit intermediary in respect of the counterparty -
i.e., for providing the service of assuming credit risk in respect of that
counterparty's ability to make payments under the swap."'
motivated model), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=415080 (last visited Oct.
2, 2004); Kay Giesecke, Credit Risk Modeling and Valuation: An Introduction, Cornell
University Working Paper Series (June 23, 2004) (providing an overview of modeling
for credit risk and credit-risky securities and discussing in particular the structural
approach to credit risk based on assessment of firm assets and the reduced form
approach based on stochastic operations), available at http://www.ssrn.coml
abstract=479323 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004); Robert A. Jarrow, David Lando & Fan Yu,
Default Risk and Diversification: Theory and Applications (June 2, 2003) (showing an
equivalence between two measures of default risk as a way to facilitate pricing and
management of credit risk), available at http:/fwww.DefaultRisk.com/pp-corr_13.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2004); Robert Jarrow & Yildiray Yildirim, A Simple Model for
Valuing Default Swaps when both Market and Credit Risk are Correlated (Dec. 10,
2001) (presenting a simple formula for valuing default swaps and using the model to
infer default probability parameters in data from 22 companies), available at
http://www.DefaultRisk.com/pp-crdrv_16.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004); Yoram
Landskroner & Alon Raviv, Credit Spread Implied by Convertible Bonds Prices (Oct.
2003) (deriving a model for credit risk from convertible bond data), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=461720 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). Vendor models, such
as Mark-to-Future, RiskMetrics, CreditMetrics, and CreditRisk+ are available. See,
e.g., Algorithmics, Inc., Mark-to-Future: A Framework for Measuring Risk and
Reward (referencing the various trademarked vendor software for measuring risk), at
http:/fwww.algorithmics.com/marktofuture/mtf-print.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
These models "in practice often yield quite different results when loss distributions of
a banking portfolio are forecast." Alfred Hamerle & Daniel Rosch, Parameterizing
Credit Risk Models, EFMA 2004 Basel Meetings Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=500304 (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). The authors suggest ways
to reduce model risk by deriving parameters from observed default data within a
unified framework. Id. at 5.
311 See DUBOFSKY AND MILLER, supra note 235, at 312 (describing change in bid-
ask spread based on credit risk); Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact, Bank One,
at 39-40 (describing a component of market price for bearing credit risk variously as
compensation for capital held in reserve, compensation for bearing credit risk, a
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One type of credit carveout reduces income for "unearned credit
spread," described by the SIA as "the risk that the dealer will not
receive payments because of anticipated defaults by the
counterparty. ',112  Unearned credit spread adjustments take into
consideration, in one way or another according to dealers' proprietary
systems, some measure of the risk of default due to concerns in
respect of the counterparty's creditworthiness. The creditworthiness
measure itself is not an objective factor readily available in the market
and used by all derivatives dealers. Instead, the creditworthiness of a
counterparty is generally determined by a dealer's internal
management practices and may have little correlation with third-party
ratings of the counterparty, such as those produced by the major
credit rating agencies.313 The SIA's statement on this issue is worth
quoting in some detail, as it reveals the dealers' strong sense of
entitlement to determine creditworthiness according to their own
idiosyncratic judgments.
It is not current market practice for our members to look
merely to a counterparty's rating from a major credit rating
agency in order to evaluate the counterparty's
creditworthiness. Instead, dealers develop their own
assessments based upon such factors as the price for hedging
against the counterparty's credit risk in the credit derivatives
market and the trading price of the counterparty's debt
relative to Treasury obligations.... In other cases, a dealer
may simply disagree with a rating agency's assessment of a
counterparty's credit quality. For these reasons, even though
a counterparty may have a rating of "AA" from Standard &
Poors, it nonetheless may be appropriate (and not redundant)
to make a downward credit adjustment in respect of that
counterparty, even where the relevant yield curve assumes a
hypothetical "AA" credit.
14
Treatment of a dealer's own creditworthiness is another clear example
residual risk component not captured by probabilistic models of expected losses, or a
risk premium).
312 SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 63.
313 For a general discussion of ratings and rating agencies, see U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (Jan. 2003)
(report completed in connection with Sarbanes-Oxley Act), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
314 SIA Response, supra note 65, at 50 (second emphasis added).
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of the flexibility allowed under the financial accounting rules. Those
rules currently permit dealers to choose whether or not to take
changes in their own creditworthiness into account in evaluating the
effect of credit risks on fair value, and most dealers do not do so."' To
its credit, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has
expanded its understanding of discounted cash flow determinations of
value and in that project has moved, at least in concept, to the view
that each counterparty's creditworthiness is relevant to fair value."'
As a statement of concepts, however, SFAC 7 only establishes the
FASB's position on the ideal accounting for an issue: it has no effect
on actual accounting rules until it is explicitly adopted as part of
specific guidance."'
315 See, e.g., NYSBA RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that the Bank One
court's decision requiring consideration of a dealer's own creditworthiness was
controversial and that many dealers adjust only for their counterparty's status); ISDA
Response, supra note 231, at 25 (noting that variations in dealer techniques, including
whether to take the dealer's own creditworthiness into account, are "all permissible
under GAAP" and "have no relevance under a safe harbor based on book-tax
conformity"); DISCLOSURES ABOUT FAIR VALUE OF FIN. INSTRUMENTS, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 107, T 68 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
1991), as amended (indicating that some entities estimate fair value by considering
changes in the entities' own credit risk while others do not and concluding that it
would be inappropriate to mandate one position at this time); see also ISDA
Response, supra note 231, at 16 (suggesting that netting offsetting positions, which is
generally done in portfolio-wide credit risk adjustments, reduces the understatement
of income caused by not taking the dealer's creditworthiness into account). The usual
rationale given by dealers for not adjusting for changes in their own creditworthiness
in the tax context is the exemption of a dealer's own debt from the mark-to-market
requirement under section 475. See, e.g., Short Course, supra note 247 (admitting that
taking a dealer's own creditworthiness into account would be more accurate
economically, but suggesting that the existence of the exemption from mark-to-
market accounting for dealer debt should be viewed as also applying to the liability
aspect of swaps). This argument is unconvincing. Although swaps may at times be
liabilities and at times assets during the term of the swap contract, they are not debt
instruments per se for tax purposes, and they are specifically required to be marked to
market under section 475. The rules that apply to debt obligations held outside the
mark-to-market system should not interfere with a dealer's appropriately marking to
market an item explicitly subject to the mark-to-market system.
316 See USING CASH FLOW INFO. AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING
MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7 (SFAC 7),
IT 78-88 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) (indicating that a dealer's
creditworthiness is relevant to fair value measurement).
317 In its current project on fair value measurements, the FASB is in the process
of elevating much of the guidance from SFAC 7 to top-level GAAP. Specifically, the
exposure draft for that project provides that an entity must incorporate the effect of
its own creditworthiness when estimating the fair value of its liabilities. Fair Value
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Furthermore, swaps dealers may already be substantially
protected from actually suffering any loss under a swap contract due
to various credit enhancement provisions. Single transaction netting
ensures that only the net payment due between parties need exchange
hands." 8 Multiple transaction close-out netting permits a dealer to
aggregate its swaps with a defaulting counterparty and refrain from
making any offsetting payments under those contracts that it might
otherwise owe to the defaulter, thus significantly reducing any
potential loss.3 19 Collateral is almost always required for interest rate
swaps with counterparties with inferior credit records, and that
collateral may be required to be adjusted if the counterparty's credit
rating declines below the level at the time that the contract is entered
* 320into. It is clear that collateral reduces risk of loss, perhaps to near
zero (considering transaction costs).32 ' Declines in creditworthiness
can also serve as triggers that require termination of a contract before
a default occurs. Yet in spite of the ubiquitous practice of reducing
income for very broad categories of credit risks, dealers are also given
flexibility under financial accounting rules to reduce fair value for
credit risk even though a transaction is supported by the presence of
collateral and other credit enhancement measures.3" The securities
Exposure Draft, supra note 210, at 5 n.4; see also id. at T A23-A27. Dealers have
criticized this approach, noting the Basel Committee's objection from the banking
regulatory perspective. See Fair Value Comment Letter, supra note 272, at 52.
318 See FABOZZI, supra note 236, at 248-49.
31 Darrell Duffie, the Tax Court's expert, testified that netting agreements
reduce credit exposure. Expert Report of Darrell Duffie, Bank One Corp. v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 174 (2003) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97), 18-19 [hereinafter Duffle
Report], available at http://www.stanford.edu/-duffie/bankone.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2004).
320 See GROUP OF THIRTY FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, supra note 290, at 76-77.
321 See, e.g., Michael Johannes & Suresh Sundaresan, Pricing Collateralized
Swaps, 8-11, (Columbia Working Paper Series, May 29, 2003) (noting that use of
collateral is "widespread" and "growing," with "nearly all" investment bank swaps
collateralized in 2001, and that market participants assume collateralized swaps are
default-free, freeing up capital for other purposes and expanding the list of potential
counterparties), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
412342 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). Collateral is clearly a significant facet of the
securities dealers' business: Goldman Sachs is reported to have held $6.6 billion of
collateral at the end of 1999. Id. at 11. The ISDA estimates that approximately $1.0
trillion Qf collateral was in use at the beginning of 2004, an increase of 40% from the
prior year. INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES AS'N, INC., ISDA Margin
Survey 2004, available at www.isda.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
322 SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 63. The SIA indicates, without
sufficient explanation, that "although various types of credit enhancements (such as
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dealers' organizations note that dealers' adjustments do "generally"
consider credit enhancement.323 The Group of Thirty Follow-Up
Survey indicates that as long ago as 1994 many dealers' derivatives
contracts had provisions that required credit enhancement when a
324
counterparty was downgraded.
The responses of the securities dealers' associations to the
ANPRM do not provide a detailed description of the manner in which
typical dealers determine the amount of the expected future cash
flows that will be deferred because of the dealer's assessment of the
counterparty's credit quality, nor do they state explicitly that the
appropriate measure of the amount of an unearned credit spread
adjustment for a particular swap is the expected default loss under a
swap as determined using reasonably bounded measures from
quantitative financial analysis. In fact, the financial accounting rules
for derivatives valuations do not require any particular objective,
historical evidence of default patterns on swaps (whether general
defaults, defaults by counterparties in a particular industry, or defaults
by the particular counterparty) or default information from the credit
default swaps industry to be taken into consideration in order for a
securities dealer to reduce income on account of expected default
losses.3 5
Moreover, in some cases, the input that a dealer uses in
implementing its credit carveouts may at best be tied to the bank's
historical experience with loan defaults and its institutional processes
for determining amounts at risk under loans, rather than to
the posting of collateral or netting arrangements) may reduce, or even eliminate, the
need for a downward credit adjustment, there are certainly circumstances in which a
credit adjustment is appropriate, even though a credit enhancement feature has
caused the counterparty risk to rise to the level of the credit rating used to determine
the yield curve." SIA Response, supra note 65, at 50.
323 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 15.
324 See GROUP OF THIRTY FOLLOW-UP SURVEY, supra note 290, at 76-77.
325 In its current project on fair value measurements, the FASB has expressed its
preference for the use of "market inputs" when estimating fair value, which "shall be
determined based on information that is timely, originated from sources independent
of the entity, and used by marketplace participants in making pricing decisions." Fair
Value Exposure Draft, supra note 210, at 9 & 12. The exposure draft stops well
short of requiring use of such market inputs in all cases: it states that "[vialuation
techniques used to estimate fair value shall emphasize market inputs" but then
acknowledges that "market inputs might not be available without undue cost and
effort, [thus] requiring the use of significant entity inputs derived from an entity's own




statistically significant historical evidence on swap defaults. One
traditional method of measuring the amount of potential default
losses on derivatives is to determine a "fractional exposure," which is
"calculated by measuring the mark-to-market exposure of a swap, cap,
or floor at every future settlement date using each of several projected
interest rate paths and then selecting the worst-case scenario. 3 27 The
particular measure depends on the dealers' requirements as to
number of interest rate paths projected and required degree of
confidence in the outcome. These may be set by some policy-making
group within management. The estimate of cash flows is then
discounted using a risk-adjusted rate. This general type of present
value determination is described by the FASB as the "traditional
approach" to present value analysis, one that is best suitable to
situations of considerable cash flow certainty - e.g., where both
timing and amount can be correlated with a readily tradable asset.'
21
326 See infra note 329 and accompanying text (describing FNBC's practices in this
regard in some detail).
327 BROWN & SMITH, supra note 177, at 133.
"'8 See Edward W. Trott & Wayne S. Upton, Expected Cash Flows, 1
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 2-3 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. May 2001)
(describing the "traditional approach to present value" and suggesting that it may be
less useful than the "expected cash flow approach" that uses probability-weighted
expected values), available at http://www.fasb.org/articles&reports/
UIvollseriesl.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). The FASB discussions of the fair value
measurement project have returned to these two concepts and the FASB has
tentatively concluded that both represent permissible discounted present value
approaches to valuation. See Fair Value Exposure Draft, supra note 210, A3 & n.10
(Jun. 23, 2004) (labeling the expected cash flow approach the "expected present value
technique" and the traditional approach the "discount rate adjustment technique").
In its discussions of present value techniques, the FASB acknowledged that the
discount rate adjustment technique is the one "more widely used in practice." See,
e.g., Financial Accounting Standards Board, Minutes of the August 27, 2003 FVM
Board Meeting 1, 2 (Aug. 27, 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/
board-meeting-minutes/08-27-03 fvm.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). The handout for
the August 27, 2003 FASB meeting indicated that "[t]he present value technique most
often used for estimating market prices is one of discounting expected cash flows
using a discount rate that incorporates a risk premium for the systematic risk inherent
in the expected cash flows." Financial Accounting Standards Board, Board Meeting
Handout (Aug. 27, 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/board-handouts/08-27-
03_fvm.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). The FASB describes the discount rate
adjustment technique as "us[ing] a single set of cash flows from the range of possible
estimated amounts.... The cash flow(s) are discounted at a rate commensurate with
the risk inherent in the cash flow(s) (risk-adjusted discount rate)." Fair Value
Exposure Draft, supra note 210, at T A9. Further, "because discount rates should
reflect assumptions about risk that are not otherwise considered in the cash flows, the
[Vol. 24:301
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A version of this traditional approach was used by FNBC, as revealed
in some detail in the Bank One litigation.329 In the case of FNBC,
expected loss percentages were assigned even to highly creditworthy
counterparties - including those whose publicly available credit
discount rate adjustment technique is based on the assumption that the discount rate
can fully incorporate the risk inherent in the cash flows." Id. A10.
'9 See Bank One Brief, supra note 229, I 76-89, 130-36; see also Bank One
Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at 29-32 (discussing FNBC's process for calculating
the credit adjustment). In short, the bank first determined a loan equivalent amount
as the aggregate sum of Monte Carlo simulations for future scenarios set to calculate
maximum potential exposures at an arbitrarily chosen 80% confidence level. This
maximum credit exposure did not take into account any loss-offsetting benefits of
cross-defaults or other credit triggers to terminations, arrangements for multiple-
transaction closeout netting, collateral, or other credit enhancements. Bank One
Brief, supra note 229, $ 81-84. FNBC argued that it should be allowed to take the
higher credit adjustment because it was neither administratively feasible to take close-
out netting into account nor clear that all countries would enforce netting. Id. 83,
136. FNBC then determined the portion of this maximum exposure that it would
treat as a credit carveout, using a formulaic table for loan credit risk that assigned
expected loss percentages based on internally generated debtor credit classifications
(treating the swap counterparty as debtor). Id. 1 85-87. For example, if a
counterparty to a swap were assigned to class 2, the table indicated that the
percentage of the loan equivalent amount for that swap that should be treated as an
expected loss was 0.10 percent. See Bank One, supra note 12, 264. The table was
changed during the period in question in ways that generally increased the amount of
loss expected in the earlier years of loans or swaps. The class assigned to a
counterparty was not necessarily derived from the publicly available credit ratings of
counterparties published by credit rating agencies or from other objective
information. Cf. STANDARD & POOR'S CREDIT MARKET SERVICES, CORPORATE
RATINGS CRITERIA 61 (July 30, 2003) (discussing Standard & Poor's issuer or
counterparty credit ratings that provide "a current opinion on an issuer's overall
capacity to pay its financial obligations"), periodically updated versions available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/CorpCrit2004.pdf. The table
did not reflect the swaps business or actual swap default loss histories. See Bank One
Brief, supra note 229, 85 (noting that a credit strategy committee assigned the loss
factor for each risk classification "based on historical experience and judgment"); id.
87 (defending use of same loss factors used for loans, on the basis that a default in
one obligation would be likely to cause a swap to be terminated, with balances due
treated as a receivable, and claiming that there was insufficient history to determine
swap default data); see also Respondent's Trial Memorandum, Bank One Corp. v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 174 (2000) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97) (presenting table of
classifications and percentages used by the bank), reprinted in IRS Outlines:
Arguments and Preparations for Trial on Derivative Swaps, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr.
3, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit, 2001 TNT 64-41), 89
[hereinafter referred to as IRS Trial Memo, with citations to the relevant item
number or paragraph of the Lexis version].
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ratings were higher than the bank's own credit rating.33° The income
that the bank recognized in the year a swap was initiated was
sometimes adjusted downward by a credit carveout even in respect of
the most creditworthy counterparties for which the bank had no
default experience, to reflect the potential that any counterparty's
creditworthiness could decline. 33 In one case, the carveout was 137
312percent of the midmarket value of the swap.
Securities dealers also generally reduce their swaps' valuations for
another type of carveout related to credit risk - a "capital charge for
unanticipated credit losses., 33  According to the securities dealer
organizations, this charge represents "the cost of the return that must
be paid to capital held to absorb the risk that credit losses will exceed
the highest anticipated level. ''334  The SIA claims that these
adjustments should be allowed because risks of lower capital returns
330 See Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 134-35. In its post-trial brief, FNBC
strongly defended its practice of assigning expected loss percentages even to those
counterparties with higher credit ratings than FNBC's credit rating. First, it noted
Duffie's testimony that he had never stated that a downward credit adjustment was
always inappropriate when a counterparty's rating was higher; rather, he stated that a
downward adjustment might or might not be proper. Bank One Post-Trial Brief,
supra note 229, at 67-68. Second, it argued that the Service had failed to prove that
FNBC actually had a significant number of swaps with higher-rated counterparties or
that the amount of credit adjustments related to higher-rated counterparties was
significant. Id. at 68.
331 See id. 134. In marking a swap to market, FNBC did not routinely
redetermine a new mark-to-market value taking into account any adjustment to the
credit carveout as income; instead, it took the deferred income represented by credit
carveout into income ratably over the term of the swap. In other words, the credit
carveout was not re-determined annually to account for any increase (or decline) in
the counterparty's credit risk that might have required the bank to take into account
in the valuation of the swap a positive (or negative) "catch-up" amount reflecting the
change in credit risk. Id. 11 88-89, 130-32. To reflect the increase in value of the
swap for each period without default, the bank ratably amortized the credit carveout
into income. See id. 88, 132 (also noting that in 1992 the bank began amortizing
the credit carveouts for all swaps booked in a quarter into income in the aggregate
over the weighted average life of those swaps). Even if a particular swap was
terminated (possibly resulting in a termination payment in the bank's favor or
recognition of a mark-to-market loss), the bank apparently did not include the
remaining unamortized credit carveout in income at that time but rather continued to
defer recognition according to its pre-determined amortization schedule.
332 Post-Trial IRS Brief, infra note 355, at 87--88 (discussing the credit risk
adjustment on a Daewoo Securities Europe swap).
311 SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 64,
34 Id.; ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 16.
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than anticipated are "inherent" in swap
(e) Administrative Costs Adjustments
A second type of carveout for future administrative costs is likely
used at least for some types of costs and some business purposes by all
securities dealers. According to the ISDA, administrative charges
typically include maintenance costs for monitoring contracts and
processing payments (including both systems and operational costs) as
well as legal and other costs of documenting swaps agreements.
336
Because dealers do not generally have access to average market data
for administrative costs, dealers simply apply their own internally
generated projections of their future administrative costs as a
reduction to the current market value of their swaps portfolios.
According to the SIA, administrative adjustments are now only made
for a dealer's marginal costs, not for the fully allocated share of direct
and indirect costs of the dealer's business. 37
(f) Investing and Funding Costs Adjustments
A further downward adjustment to the value of a swaps portfolio
supported by the Group of Thirty covers investing and funding costs
for swaps. 3s These adjustments in effect permit a current deduction
for the estimated future costs of borrowing funds to support a
derivative position. In particular, this carveout covers costs of
potential borrowings to cover cash flow mismatches over the life of
335 SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 64.
336 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 16.
337 See SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 64 n.92. FNBC's practices,
however, illustrate the range that has been permitted. The bank determined its
administrative carveouts dynamically. Based on surveys of its various departments,
the bank fully allocated budgeted costs to its existing swaps according to its judgment
of costs required to manage the portfolio of swaps to maturity. See Bank One Brief,
supra note 229, 91-92, 138; Bank One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at 32-33
(describing FNBC's process for calculating its administrative carveouts and
acknowledging that the allocation of certain budgeted costs to swaps "called for a
degree of judgment" and that "a potential for bias" existed, but arguing that any such
bias would cause an understatement of the administrative carveout (and,
consequently, an overstatement of swap value) because the personnel who
determined the carveouts preferred smaller adjustments so that higher profits
resulted); Bank One, supra note 12, $ 216-18 (describing FNBC's administrative
cost carveouts in greater detail).




the swap - e.g., the possibility that a bank may need to borrow to
cover cash payments under the swap because it may not have
sufficient liquid assets to make required payments, at a point in the
future when the swap may have become a liability.339
(3) Business Uses of Valuations
Dealers continue to insist that book-tax conformity would provide
a form of financial accounting "discipline" to tax valuations through
use of consistent numbers for both tax and certain business purposes
and that this discipline would serve the tax system well by ensuring
"accurate" valuations.340 The fact is, however, that dealers vary as
much in how they use GAAP valuations for non-tax business
purposes as they do in how they implement credit adjustments. The
Bank One case likely reflects an outlying case (and the least
supportable practice) in this regard: FNBC used the unadjusted
midmarket value for most significant business purposes - pricing
swaps, making presentations to management, managing risks,
reporting to regulators, and reporting profit information to
shareholders in some contexts. It apparently only used an adjusted
midmarket valuation for its tax returns and on its financial
341
statement. Yet is it clear that banks today currently use adjusted
midmarket valuations for non-tax business purposes that are both
sufficiently correlated with tax purposes to support the use of the
same value for tax purposes and sufficiently removed from additional
layers of subjective decision-making as to be indicative of an incentive
to report numbers fairly that supports the use of the same value for
tax purposes? A priori, it would appear that the two most important
functions most likely to be correlated to taxable income concepts and
fairness incentives are pricing and risk hedging. That is, if the
valuation reported to tax administrators is determined by the same
procedure that determines how a dealer will price the derivative to a
counterparty, that reinforces the likelihood that the tax value is not
tweaked in some way to get an appropriate result. Similarly, if the
339 See SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 65.
SIA Response, supra note 65 at 57 (stating that "in cases where the valuation
of a position involves a non-trivial level of complexity or judgment, the discipline of
book-tax conformity serves both the IRS and taxpayers well in ensuring that the
valuations are accurate"); ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 6 (reporting views that
adjusted midmarket method is "the best available method" and "will be applied
accurately by dealers") (emphasis added).
341 See Bank One, supra note 12, T 388 (Tax Court findings in this regard).
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valuation reported to tax administrators is the same as the value that
is used for risk management purposes, to determine what hedges to
purchase and when, then that practice would provide some support
for the fairness of the credit and market risk adjustments to tax value.
The conformity safe harbor proposal asked for comments on this
issue.14' The SIA states that "[mlark-to-market valuation models are
used to determine a firm's profitability" but notes that these models
"do not directly determine the prices charged to a customer."' 343 In
discussing which financial statement would be appropriate for the
booking requirement, the SIA Response notes that reports filed with
all federal agents "employ the same mark-to-market valuation
process,"3" leaving it unclear whether the value reported in each case
is the same adjusted midmarket value, since the "process"
encompasses the unadjusted midmarket valuation as well as any
number of adjusted values .
Similarly, the ISDA asserts that the requirement that dealers
determine values for financial reporting and regulatory purposes
provides "strong incentives not to undervalue" swaps. 34' The ISDA
states that dealers use the values for any one or more of a number of
non-tax purposes, including "(a) to manage market and credit risk, (b)
compensate key personnel, (c) evaluate lines of business, and (d) to
determine which transactions to enter into (or hold) and which
transactions to avoid (or terminate), and the prices at which such
transactions are entered into or terminated."' 7 The ISDA indicates,
however, that specific valuations are not directly traceable to many of
these business uses; that is, dealers take valuations into account in
making compensation and pricing decisions, but they also take other
factors into account. As a result, those business decisions cannot be
directly linked to the same valuations underlying MTM income
reported on tax returns. Furthermore, securities dealers determine
342 See ANPRM, supra note 11.
33 SIA Response, supra note 65, at 52 (emphasis added).
344 Id.
35 I understand from Edward Kleinbard (the principal author of the SIA
Response), however, that this ambiguity was not intended and that the SIA believes
that dealers do use the same values for all the business purposes discussed in the
report.
346 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 18-19.
347 Id. at 30-31.
348 The ISDA qualifies its statement about business use of valuations for pricing
by noting that valuations "are taken into account" but "actual prices arc necessarily
affected by other factors as well." Id. at 31 (emphasis added). A similar qualification
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the unadjusted midmarket value on a swap-by-swap basis (and record
that number for each swap in their books), but determine portfolio
adjustments and gain or loss from a derivatives book on an aggregate
basis, making it difficult to assess any direct business use of the
valuations used in tax returns.49
B. The Bank One Decision
Although the Bank One case cannot be considered illustrative of
current practice more than a decade after the years at issue in the
litigation, it is worth considering in at least some detail in order to
understand the relation between the bank's business and tax
valuations and the extent of control that the bank exercised over its
valuations. It is not surprising that tax litigation in this context of
highly innovative financial instruments, subject to changing but very
flexible financial accounting standards, would necessarily be complex
and weighted with expert judgments. The Bank One litigation 50
fulfilled that expectation. The primary question in the case is the
validity of the bank's "adjusted midmarket method" of valuing its
swaps portfolio. 5 ' Rejecting the bank's arguments for a "business
judgment" standard that would essentially require tax administrators
regarding "other factors" applies to the statement about use to determine
compensation bonuses. Id. It is not clear how such indirect impacts of valuations can
be shown to be reflected in pricing, if the pricing decisions are as discretionary in
relation to the value determinations as this statement would suggest. The ISDA goes
on to argue that a conformity safe harbor need only require that a dealer "take[] the
profit and loss.., effects of the adjusted mid-market values into account in making
decisions with respect to one or more of the four non-tax business uses identified in
the preceding paragraph." Id. Note that this does not even explicitly require that the
same values be used for at least one of these nonbusiness uses as for tax.
39 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 34.
350 See Bank One, supra note 12.
351 As a litigation strategy, the Bank One and Amicus Briefs carefully use the
"adjusted midmarket method" terminology to refer to customary practice among
swap dealers, even though for the tax years in question there were more dealers who
determined midmarket values without adjustments than ones that used adjustments.
See GROUP OF THIRTY STUDY, supra note 290, at 50 (Group of Thirty 1993 survey
data indicating that 48 percent used midmarket values without adjustments and 37
percent used midmarket values with adjustments, while 24 percent used gross or net
bid prices (or offer, for applicable short positions)). It appears that it would be more
appropriate to refer to the industry-wide valuation approach, at least in the 1993-1994
time period, as the "midmarket method" and then to discuss the many specific
manners of implementation, including various adjusted midmarket methods according




to accept the results of internal valuation processes, the Tax Court
held that the case raised a method of accounting question subject to
the section 446 clear-reflection-of-income requirement.
The tax administrator has "broad discretion" under section 446(b)
to determine whether a taxpayer's method of accounting clearly
reflects income; therefore, decisions of the tax administrator are
entitled to considerable deference at trial under the "abuse of
discretion" standard of review.353 Similarly, when a court determines
that the Commissioner had adequate basis to conclude that the
taxpayer's method of accounting failed to clearly reflect income,
considerable deference is due the Commissioner's decision as to the
352 See Bank One, supra note 12, [ 311-14 (relying on regulations to find that
issues of proper timing of particular items of income or expense are questions of
method of accounting as well as issues relating to the choice of overall accounting
method and inventory cases under section 481 regarding changes from improper to
proper methods of valuing inventory), citing Hitachi Sales Corp. of Am. v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 2659 (1994).
353 Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 370 (1995)
("Section 446(b) vests the Commissioner with broad discretion in determining
whether a particular method of accounting clearly reflects income."); Prabel v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1101, 1112 (1988) ("Under section 446(b), [the Commissioner]
has 'broad powers of determining whether accounting methods used by a taxpayer
clearly reflect income."'), affd, 882 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1989). The taxpayer has a
"heavy burden" of proof to show that the Commissioner's decision is plainly wrong -
i.e., that the Commissioner had no rational basis for asserting that the taxpayer's
method failed to clearly reflect income. See, e.g., Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co., 104
T.C. at 371 ("to prevail, a taxpayer must prove that the Commissioner's
determination [that the taxpayer's method does not clearly reflect income] is arbitrary
and capricious and without sound basis in fact or law"); Prabel, 91 T.C. at 1112
(indicating that a taxpayer has a "heavy burden" to establish that the Commissioner
abused his discretion in requiring a change in method). In the seminal Supreme
Court case interpreting the appropriate standard for review of the Commissioner's
decision as to a method of accounting, the Court held that the government's
"interpretation of the statute's clear-reflection standard 'should not be interfered with
unless clearly unlawful."' Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532
(1979) (quoting Lucas v. Am. Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930)) (emphasis added).
A court reviewing the Commissioner's discretionary decision "is not to determine
whether in its own opinion [the taxpayer's] method of accounting... 'clearly
reflect[ed] income,' but to determine whether there is an adequate basis in law for the
Commissioner's conclusion that it did not." RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d
881, 886 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing the Tax Court's finding of abuse of discretion). If
the taxpayer's method does reflect income clearly, however, the Commissioner may
not override that method. See, e.g., Molsen v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 485, 498 (1985)
(upholding taxpayer's method of accounting for on-call purchases by marking them to
market as clearly reflecting income). See generally Prabel, 91 T.C. at 1112
(summarizing the case law on deference to the Commissioner).
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method that the taxpayer should have employed to clearly reflect
income.
The government acknowledged that the bank's purported goal of
taking into account appropriately allocable expected costs, so that the
net present value of its swaps book represents its net profits, can in
theory lead to an appropriate market value and hence clear reflection
of income.355 The court found, however, that FNBC did not carry its
"4 Prabel v. Commissioner, 882 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1989) (attributing "broad
discretion" to the Commissioner "to determine whether an accounting method clearly
reflects income and to choose an accounting method which does clearly reflect
income"), affg 91 T.C. 1101 (1988); Am. Fletcher Corp. v. United States, 832 F.2d
436, 442 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (where the taxpayer had kept sloppy
records, noting that taxpayers cannot protest if the Commissioner's proposed
accounting method is "workable"); Bank One, supra note 12, 320 (quoting Judge
Cudahy's statement in the context of discussing the bank's failure to substantiate its
records, but not adhering to the American Fletcher approach). Generally, a court
upholds the Commissioner's decision to impose another method, so long as that
method does not further distort income. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner,
71 F.3d 209, 217 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming the Tax Court in upholding the method
imposed by the Commissioner, even though the taxpayer could not have adopted that
method on its own and even though another alternative "might have been... more
logical"). affg 102 T.C. 87 (1994). If the Commissioner's method is found to be
wanting, most courts return a decision for the taxpayer. See, e.g., Harden v.
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 418, 421 (10th Cir. 1955) (refusing to uphold the
government's requirement that a mausoleum owner change its method of accounting
to segregate separate construction phases when the government continued to
acquiesce in the owner's failure to capitalize the cost of mausoleum construction, and
therefore permitting the taxpayer to continue to use his admittedly inappropriate
accounting method), revising and remanding 21 T.C. 781 (1954).
... See, e.g., Pre-Trial Brief for Respondent, Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner,
120 T.C. 174 (2000) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97) (Oct. 13, 2000) ("Respondent does not
dispute that, in theory, a midmarket value computation of swaps might legitimately be
adjusted for credit risk in order to clearly reflect income."), reprinted in IRS Argues
Bank's Accounting for Derivative Swaps Do Not Clearly Reflect Income, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Apr. 3, 2001) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit, 2001 TNT 64-39),
$ 10 [hereinafter referred to as IRS Brief]; see also id. 105 ("Respondent has never
denied that, for methodologies that assume all swap parties have the same credit
worthiness, adjustments for credit risk might be appropriate to reflect the probability
that payments will not be received if one of the counterparties has a lower credit
rating than that assumed by the methodology."); Post-Trial Brief for Respondent,
Bank One Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 174 (2001) (Nos. 5759-95, 5956-97)
(September 7, 2001) (available from the United States Tax Court Clerk's Office), at
124 ("Respondent again reiterates that he does not dispute that, in theory, a mid-
market value computation of swaps might legitimately be adjusted for credit risk in
order to clearly reflect income when the counterparty has a lower credit rating and
there are no credit enhancements.") [hereinafter, Post-Trial IRS Brief]; id. at 444
("For swaps between counterparties with different credit ratings, theoretically, the
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burden of showing that its methodology clearly reflected income,
because (among other reasons) it consistently valued derivative
positions on a date other than the one prescribed in the statute,
possibly resulting in significant distortions due to changes in values in
the stub period after the bank made its determinations. 356
Accordingly, the Tax Court could have simply deferred to the
government's decision that the bank should have used unadjusted
midmarket valuations for its swaps, based on its finding that (i) there
was no consensus in the industry on required adjustments, (ii)
important aspects of the bank's swaps business (including pricing and
bonus determinations) were conducted based on unadjusted
midmarket values, and (iii) the taxpayer failed to substantiate its tax
reporting position."' Instead, the court decided a "naked question of
substantive law," 58 prescribing normative guidance for determining
359the fair market value of a swap.
The first question the court addressed was the definition of fair
market value under section 475(a)(2). Concluding formalistically that
the tax term is more precise than the similar "fair value" term used in
financial accounting, the court found that fair market value is
determined for a hypothetical transaction between willing buyer and
willing seller in respect of the highest and best use, where neither is
under compulsion of any sort and both have reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. Based on the importance of a hypothetical
fair market value of some swaps might be less than mid-market value (suggesting a
negative adjustment to mid-market value) .... ").
356 See, e.g., Bank One, supra note 12, 210 n.36 (evidence of significant swing in
value for a swap between the date of actual valuation and the end of the taxable year,
from $104,233 as of Dec. 20, 1991 to $97,721 on Dec. 31, 1991).
357 Further support for the government's position was provided by the weak
justification for credit adjustments for a majority of the bank's swaps because of credit
enhancements and/or higher-rated counterparties and the reasonable assumption that
failure to take an adjustment for the balance of the portfolio would not be distortive,
given the diversity of the portfolio and the fact that the bank took positions on either
side of swaps. There was also some objective evidence that other adjustments were
likely to be de minimis based on the thin secondary market evidence of a midmarket
benchmark for the bank's actual swap buyouts.
358 RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881, 886 (2d Cir. 1981).
359 Bank One, supra note 12, 427 (indicating that it would be "far better... to
have an acceptable valuation method as to these products, even though checkered by
occasional variance, than to remain in the gray twilight of uncertainty").
'6' See, e.g., id. 1$ 351-72 (exploration of judicially developed components of fair
market value definition). Interestingly, in the still tentative fair value measurement
project, the FASB has moved towards incorporation of the broader definition of fair
value used by the Bank One court. See Fair Value Exposure Draft, supra note 210,
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transaction that permits a dealer to get the best price, the court
concluded that the relevant market for determining fair market value
is not the interdealer market in which a dealer hedges its transactions
but the end-user market in which a dealer interacts with customers.6 1
Comparing this tax definition with the applicable accounting
definition of fair value, the court concluded that the accounting
definition was sufficiently different to reject book-tax conformity.
The court focused on the tax definition's emphasis on willing parties
under no compulsion to make the deal, whereas the applicable
accounting statement appears to eliminate for consideration only the
compulsion that results from forced sales or liquidations. This
suggests that the accounting concept of fair value may be more
susceptible to discounting for liquidity, asset concentrations, and
market saturation or similar effects that operate to reduce the price a
seller might get in a hypothetical market. Similarly, the court
concluded that the tax valuation required a dealer to take into account
the "best use" price. That implies, in the case of swaps, the customer-
oriented (end-user) market with its wider spreads rather than a
dealer-oriented market with its more-restricted bid-offer spreads.
Based on this analysis of the proper concept of fair market value
and the market in which to assess it, the court outlined the following
normative requirements of an acceptable method of valuation that
FNBC's valuation methodology failed to satisfy (set out by opinion
paragraph number).
Regarding credit carveouts:
392-394 carveouts reflect changes in value due to changes in
creditworthiness required;
q 4-5 (defining fair value as "the price at which an asset or liability could be
exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable, unrelated willing parties"
and stating that "[flair value presumes the absence of compulsion (duress)").
361 Bank One, supra note 12, 1$ 373-83 (developing a hypothetical model of the
property (bonds), valuation date (end of taxable year), and market (end users) for
testing fair market value). The Service had argued strongly for the importance of the
hypothetical seller/hypothetical buyer concept in understanding section 475's
constructive sale concept and suggested a strong analogy between the method for
determining fair market value for swaps and the mean-quotation method for valuing
stocks and bonds. See Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 445 (describing a three-
step process and drawing the analogy with stocks and bonds). Securities dealers, in
responding to the FASB's fair value project, have recently noted a concern regarding
which transaction costs associated with entering into the "most advantageous market"
can be taken into account in determining fair value for different types of instruments.
See Fair Value Comment Letter, supra note 272, at 4 (comparing paragraphs B9 and
23(f) of the Fair Value Exposure Draft).
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395 no time lags occur between carveouts and taxable year
of income;
396 carveouts consider both parties' creditworthiness;
400 counterparties of AA or higher credit rating require no
carveout;
1 401-402 netting, collateral, and other credit enhancements
modify carveouts;
406 carveouts are dynamic (i.e., adjusted each year for
changes);
409 carveouts cannot be based on overstated loss exposure
estimates;
410-411 carveouts must consider mirror and offsetting swaps;
412 carveouts are made on a swap-by-swap basis; and
Regarding administrative carveouts:
91 414 administrative carveouts are required;
1415 carveouts are only for incremental costs;
91 417 carveouts may reflect taxpayer-specific costs; market
data not required;
1424 carveouts are made on a swap-by-swap basis.
The importance of the Bank One decision is difficult to assess. It
relates to a particular taxpayer, in respect of accounting practices that
are in some ways outdated now (e.g., the static treatment of credit
risk) and that in other ways do not conform to the norms of the
accounting industry, according to the industry's reports of its practices
(e.g., the limited use of adjusted midmarket values for business
purposes beyond inclusion in financial statements for reporting to the
SEC). To the extent the practices that the decision addresses are no
longer used, the normative standards are little more than a rule not to
do something that is not being done.
On another level, however, the decision appears clearly relevant
to the current inquiry. The practices of FNBC, and the defenses it
made to those practices, shed light on the extent to which at least
some banks have taken advantage of whatever idiosyncrasies exist in
the accounting rules to adjust reportable income for federal income
tax purposes. The lack of any apparent financial accounting limitation
on the amount of the credit risk adjustment to fair value, for example,
permitted the bank to claim an adjustment that resulted in negative
value for swaps that it had entered into with an expectation of making
a profit. Furthermore, the ability of the bank to tweak its results
according to its idiosyncratic determinations about relative risks (for
20041
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example, by changing the percentages used for determining maximum
loss) demonstrates that financial institutions have considerable
flexibility under the accounting rules to incorporate their own internal
proprietary evaluation systems into the statements presented to
shareholders. When these numbers are also incorporated "verbatim"
into the tax return as the measure of taxable income, this amounts to
an ability (whether currently used with this intent or not) to use the
mark-to-market system to defer taxation and control the bank's tax
liability. Nothing in the decision, therefore, supports a conclusion that
dealers' proprietary computational methods for determining fair value
of derivatives, based on their own internal, subjective assumptions
about market and counterparty risks, should generally be presumed to
reflect income clearly for tax purposes.
C. Assessment of the ANPRM Safe Harbor
Given the outcome in Bank One, the industry was likely
heartened by the release, on the same day as the Tax Court's decision,
of the ANPRM suggesting that Treasury was finally considering
granting a business judgment method to determine taxable income in
respect of securities dealers' swaps portfolios - i.e., through grant of
a book-tax conformity safe harbor for derivatives valuations."' The
objective of this Part is to assess the proposed conformity safe harbor.
This Part will consider the valuation methodology described in
Subpart A, aided by the Tax Court's normative guidance in Subpart B
and with particular attention to the adjustments made to midmarket
value. The goal is to determine whether the financial accounting
valuation methodology based on various types of present value
computations violates either the income tax or anti-manipulation
value (or both) and whether the pragmatic concerns weigh on the
positive side sufficiently to overcome any minor problems for the
income tax and anti-manipulation values.
In issuing the ANPRM, the Service and Treasury asked for
industry comments to guide them in their exploration of a safe harbor,
especially in areas of substantial uncertainty. The ANPRM proposes
three basic principles that the conformity proposal should satisfy and
discusses a number of questions relevant to each of the principles.
Those questions indicate that the government retains significant
doubts that financial accounting valuation methodologies will produce
362 See ANPRM, supra note 11.
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consistently appropriate tax valuations.
The three principles set forth in the ANPRM as necessary
conditions for a conformity safe harbor are: (1) consistency with
section 475, (2) appropriate incentives to report values fairly on
applicable financial statements, and (3) suitable means of
substantiation and reconciliation of book and tax numbers.3 64 It is
worth considering how these principles relate to the criteria set out in
Part III of this Article as important in evaluating conformity
proposals.
First, the ANPRM gives some indication of the depth of the
consistency requirement from the Treasury's perspective. The
ANPRM explains that consistency with section 475 requires the
following: that evaluations be determined on the last day of the
taxable year as required by the Code; that taxpayers recognize annual
gains and losses from changes in value; and that taxpayers take into
account disposition gains and losses (computed by reference to prior
year-end values)'65 The first requirement stems directly from the text
of the Code provision, imposing a bright-line rule of end-of-year
valuation unless modified by regulation. The latter two requirements
derive directly from the requirements for full accretion taxation in an
income tax system. These three requirements are clearly necessary to
satisfy structural coherence, and the consistency principle can
therefore be viewed as Treasury's attempt to ensure that a conformity
safe harbor would not violate the structural coherence requirement.
The question, however, is whether these minimal requirements
are sufficient to satisfy the demands of structural coherence. It could
be said that consistency with a particular provision is structurally
coherent at a micro level defined by the particular Code provision.
But there are a number of other requirements of structural coherence
that are not specifically mentioned in the ANPRM and may not be
reflected in the proposed safe harbor. A provision (such as the
conformity safe harbor) could therefore be only superficially
consistent with a particular Code provision and ultimately fail to
satisfy the overall criterion of structural coherence.
Second, the requirement that a taxpayer have incentives to report
valuations fairly in non-tax contexts appears to be an attempt by
363 Following the issuance of the ANPRM, the government initiated an AIR
program with a number of securities dealers. Comments from Treasury officials
suggest that a proposed regulation incorporating a safe harbor election may be





Treasury to set a standard for evaluating the conformity safe harbor in
terms of the anti-manipulation value set out in Part III. As in the case
of the structural coherence requirement, however, the Treasury has
left too much unsaid about the essential characteristics of the anti-
manipulation standard and has focused on possible means of satisfying
the standard that simply fall short in this context. The requirement
that taxpayers have incentives to report financial statements fairly is
on the surface a vague standard without necessary roots in the tax
system. The ANPRM contemplates that this standard will be satisfied
if taxpayers merely (1) report the valuations used on tax returns on a
single approved financial statement (perhaps one out of a number of
different financial statements with different valuations used for
different purposes) and (2) also make "significant" non-tax business
use of those valuations. This incentives principle appears not to
demand enough of the financial accounting measure.
For example, one could imagine a regulatory regime applicable to
banks that required banks to maintain an actual cash reserve,
determined as a percentage of all assets, solely for liquidity purposes.
The regulator's model could require consistency across all banks by
setting forth a particular methodology for determining the amount of
a bank's cash reserve. To reflect banks' ability to borrow on short
notice, the regulator might require the percentage to be based on each
bank's credit rating, as established by taking the average of the
published ratings of the bank by nationally recognized credit rating
organizations. Asset values might be required to be determined by
using a particular expected cash flow valuation model constructed by
the regulatory regime and not subject to proprietary modifications. In
response to industry concerns that high reserves would restrict
earnings possibilities, however, the regulator might adopt an explicitly
conservative approach to value that limited input assumptions in such
a way as to ensure that values of assets will be understated compared
to the banks' internal valuations based on their own profit analyses
and/or compared to independent credit rating agency analyses. A
bank employing such a system to arrive at low valuations of its
derivatives could honestly affirm that it had an incentive to report
values fairly for the liquidity reserve system - i.e., as reflecting fair
values as understood for that specific purpose. Those reported values
might also comport with the measurement of fair value for financial
accounting purposes (and be reported on the entity's financial




industry- and firm-specific proprietary judgments about appropriate
assumptions in making fair value determinations. As a result, the
hypothetical financial statement would reflect intentionally
conservative (low) valuations as required for liquidity determinations,
and the conformity safe harbor would permit those low valuations to
be treated as appropriate measures for taxable income purposes. In
spite of the taxpayer's incentive to report the numbers fairly for these
financial statement purposes and in spite of the evidence that the
financial statement and evaluative standard would satisfy both the
banking regulators and the SEC, the incentive to report fairly under
this standard would do little to reassure us that the values as reported
are appropriately determined for taxable income purposes. In fact,
this hypothetical clearly demonstrates that values that are fairly
reported for other regulatory purposes may simply be wrong for tax
purposes.
Finally, the requirement of adequate substantiation also derives
from the anti-manipulation value. This requirement is by no means
unique to conformity proposals or indeed to tax accounting issues but
goes to the heart of tax compliance needs. If tax administrators do
not have the ability to verify valuations used on a tax return by
confirming that they are indeed the basis for the financial statement
and business uses claimed (or whatever other requirements are
imposed by the safe harbor), a taxpayer could simply manipulate the
numbers at will to lower its tax liability while still puffing its book
income.
1. Income Tax Value
As noted in the preceding section, dealers insist that book-tax
conformity makes sense for MTM valuations, because the financial
reports and other internal business uses of the values ensure that they
are "as accurate as dealers can make them."367 The problem with this
argument from accuracy is that it assumes part of the question. Does
financial accounting measure values in the same way that tax
accounting should measure values? If large swaps dealers have not
been marking their swaps to market correctly for tax purposes
because of excessive carveouts permitted under applicable financial
accounting and regulatory rules, they may have consistently
understated their federal income taxes. This is true even when the
amount of understatement of income in respect of any one swap is
'67 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 29.
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relatively small compared to the size of the transaction, as may
ordinarily be the case. Furthermore, any assertion that comparatively
small excess carveouts and rapid turnover reduces tax inaccuracy to
an immaterial level disregards the fact that any deferral of tax on
swaps through the carveout methodology is reiterated with the
addition of each new swap. Deferrals of excessive carveouts across
time over a large swaps portfolio would amount to an interest-free
loan of indefinite duration from the government, providing a
substantial benefit to swaps dealers9
In fact, the information provided by the dealers makes it clear
that the fair value measurement for swaps does not satisfy the income
tax value requirement for tax purposes. While the Tax Court's
approach to this issue is formalistic, in terms of specific factors that
are treated as components of the fair value determination for financial
accounting and the fair market value determination for tax purposes,
the conclusions reached by the court ultimately have merit. Fair
market value is a tax-specific term that is intended to reflect the
income tax value in which it is grounded. That is, the MTM rule
explicitly jettisons any consumption tax treatment that is otherwise
permitted in our hybrid system, including the realization requirement
that defers taxation on unrealized gain. Since Congress clearly
evidenced its intent here to treat unrealized gain under income tax
principles, it is inconsistent with income tax values to continue to
allow effective deferral of unrealized gain by allowing financial
accounting norms to control the permissibility of various carveouts.
Hence, constructive sale determinations of fair market value require
consideration of a hypothetical sale between willing and
knowledgeable parties under no compulsion to enter into a
transaction. Discounts to value due to illiquidity of a seller that holds
a concentrated position or an exotic and hard-to-place derivative
would be inappropriate, since those discounts suggest a degree of
compulsion to accept less than fair market value in the exchange.
Reductions in value due to extraordinarily high administrative costs of
the exiting party similarly would be inappropriate, because a
hypothetical counterparty in the market would have only the average
administrative costs of market participants. Disregard of the
hypothetical seller's creditworthiness in comparison to the current
counterparty would lead to an incorrect price, since the hypothetical
368 The Bank One expert, Professor Duffie, calculated that the credit and
administrative cost carveouts, even if all dealers claimed carveouts in the relatively
small amounts at stake in the Bank One case, would aggregate about one billion
dollars annually for the industry. See Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 379.
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seller will seek out a buyer that will be of equal or lower credit rating,
in order to achieve the highest market price. Furthermore, several of
the specific adjustments permitted for fair value accounting and in
harmony with the fundamental principles of prudent accounting are in
conflict with the income tax value of a structurally coherent tax
system. Least supportable are credit carveouts that serve to defer
services income until "earned" for accounting purposes. The
following sections further consider these adjustments.
a. Market Risk Adjustments for Unhedged Positions
Systematic market risk adjustments for unhedged positions369 may
not have any merit in determining taxable income under a MTM
accounting system. The sole result of a market-risk adjustment
appears to be to defer income recognition in respect of the spread that
the dealer anticipates earning, until a hedge is in place. This is the
very income for which MTM accounting was intended to accelerate
recognition. Even if some expected loss amount would be reasonable
in determining fair market value, that amount should be related to the
objective evidence and historical experience about market-risk losses
during unhedged periods. In contrast, the dealers' discussion suggests
that the amount of the market risk adjustment is generally the full
amount of the spread between prevailing bid and ask rates, rather
than a loss percentage determined from historical experience of
market losses during initial periods when positions are unhedged.
Overstating the deduction from gross income by treating the entire
spread on every unhedged swap as an expected loss until a hedge is in
place will understate income under a full accretion accounting system
if the lack of a hedge extends over year-end. That understatement
clearly violates the income tax value. A market risk adjustment on
swaps entered into at fiscal year-end and intentionally left unhedged
until after the beginning of the next taxable year in order to take
advantage of this understatement in income for the year also would
violate the anti-manipulation value.
b. Concentration Adjustments
A similar observation applies for concentration adjustments (i.e.,
additional costs for unanticipated close-outs of especially large
positions). There are two potential problems with concentration
adjustments. First, if they are not based on historical, objective
369 See supra notes 300-303 and accompanying text.
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evidence of losses actually incurred in respect of similar positions,
they may merely defer the inclusion of spread income rather than
accelerate appropriate deductions. That deferral is a direct violation
of the income tax value. Second, concentration adjustments directly
contravene legislative intent, in that Congress did not intend for
blockage discounts to be considered in applying section 475.370 The
SIA's effort to distinguish the dealers' practice of discounting for
concentration from Congress's concern with blockage discounts is
unconvincing. The discount due to unloading an aggregate large,
unhedged position appears in fact equivalent to the price-depressing
effect of offering a large number of a particular item for sale at one
time. There would likely be few dealers, much less end users, who
could or would wish to take on the aggregate concentration. The fact
that a large number of such positions was suddenly available would
likely deflate the value of positions taken on by any one dealer or end
user. Third, it is likely that any dealer entering into a position in an
exotic derivative contract or a concentrated position in respect of a
particular counterparty regularly charges a correspondingly higher
premium than it would charge for positions in more customary
contracts. If the pricing model for determining midmarket value does
not take such premia into account, the midmarket value would
already represent a downward adjustment. Any further downward
adjustment in respect of concentration risk would be at least partially
duplicative.
c. Funding Cost Adjustments
The adjustment for funding costs is particularly troubling. Recall
that this adjustment is made to take into account the possibility that
the market will turn against the dealer, with the result that the dealer
will be required to make an exceptionally large payment at a time
when it is relatively illiquid. 7 In that case, the dealer might find that
its cost of borrowing would be higher than ordinary, due to its
inability to defer borrowing until it could line up a more advantageous
line of credit. The problem is that a bank's liquidity is not determined
370 See H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 613 (1993).
371 See SIA Response, supra note 65, app. A at 63 (asserting that concentration
adjustments are different because they relate to the total amount of a particular type
of risk without regard to the number of different items subject to that risk, whereas
blockage discounts typically refer to the price-depressing effect of concurrent
offerings of a large block of the same item).
37 See discussion supra note 339 and accompanying text.
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solely by its dealer subsidiary but by its overall loan portfolio and
investment strategy. Current deduction of these speculative future
costs in respect of a securities dealer unit would permit a bank to
maintain more of its assets in illiquid (invested) form than would
otherwise be possible. In other words, the availability of a current
deduction (in the form of lower fair value determinations) for a
potential future liquidity crisis of this nature may have the effect of
shifting resources that would otherwise be held to provide liquidity to
illiquid investments, in violation of the income tax value. These
adjustments have the effect of permitting banks a deduction for a
liquidity reserve for their overall business, through the back door of
funding cost adjustments for their swaps portfolios.
The market-risk adjustments, concentration adjustments, and
funding costs adj ustments may be reasonable from the perspective of
financial reporting. By adjusting the value of a swap for every
possible adverse future event that could result in a dealer's failing to
earn its expected profit, the financial accounting rules ensure that
dealers are not able to puff their earnings statements with speculative
assumptions about future cash flows. For the income tax value,
however, such broad and speculative reductions of the "ability to pay"
amount appear unjustifiable, especially if dealers generally terminate
positions to avoid worst-case scenarios. It could be argued that the
mark-to-market method was not meant to take account of any losses
other than a dealer's best estimates (using today's sophisticated
quantitative financial tools) of the negative cash flows in respect of the
instrument itself based on assumptions about the volatility of interest
rates. Even if these broader categories of potential losses are
appropriately included in the present value analysis, the amount
should be bounded by objective evidence of past historical experience.
d. Credit Risk Adjustments Deferring Credit Intermediary Fees
Several related questions arise in connection with dealers' credit
carveouts. What, if any, correlation should there be between a
dealer's determination of potential exposure to default loss under a
swap and its determination of anticipated gross income under the
swap (assuming arguendo that the midmarket valuation appropriately
measures gross income)? To what extent should a dealer be required
to determine its credit carveout on the basis of its own or publicly
available information about swaps default losses rather than by using
measures of creditworthiness and default probabilities developed in
its loan business? Assuming that in almost all cases the functional
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role of a swaps dealer is to serve as a liquidity provider and credit
intermediary, is it ever appropriate for tax purposes for a swaps dealer
to defer its entire unearned credit spread based on Monte Carlo
projections of payment flows due to market changes? To what extent
is the repeal of the bad debt reserve deduction in former section
166(c) relevant to whether a dealer can take a credit carveout for
losses that may never materialize?
The Bank One court concluded that a credit carveout is
mandatory, based on economic experts' testimony regarding the
various components of midmarket valuation of a swap. 3  It may be
worth stepping back to consider the possible rationales in a mark-to-
market system for a credit carveout that defers a portion of a dealer's
income for reasons related in some way to credit risk and whether
some of those rationales are more appropriate to a mark-to-market
regime than others. There are at least two possible reasons for
deferring dealer income related to credit risk: (1) to avoid treating as
income the portion of the apparent value of a swap that is expected
(using stochastic methods to determine expectations) not to be
realized because of default losses, and (2) to spread the inclusion of
income from serving as a credit intermediary over the period that the
dealer provides the credit intermediation function by accepting
exposure to a counterparty's credit risk.
The first rationale assumes that mathematical projections can
predict at an appropriate level of certainty what portion of a swap
contract's income stream will be lost because of a swap default and
therefore should be taken into account as a reduction in the fair
market value of the swap at each year end. Applying the Tax Court's
approach, a hypothetical buyer would base the price that he would
pay for the dealer's position on objective information such as contract
terms, current interest rates, and creditworthiness. If the available
information indicates a potential for a default loss on the swap, the
price would be discounted appropriately. 4 Discounting the value of
373 See Bank One, supra note 12, 424, 426 (noting that experts agree that
credit and administrative costs must be deducted from midmarket value to determine
fair market value and holding that such adjustments must be made to clearly reflect
income).
374 In the case of a buyer that is a dealer rather than an end-user who is entering
into the transaction as a market maker and not as a market taker, the discount would
have to be sufficient to provide the new dealer an expected profit in spite of the
potential for a default loss, or the dealer would not do the deal. Dealers, however,
might also be interested in purchasing the position as a hedge for other dealer
positions and thus not expect to make a dealer spread on the deal.
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the swap for its potential for default losses at taxable year end during
the term of the swap may therefore be necessary to arrive at its true
fair market value. This suggests, however, that no deduction in value
for credit risk is appropriate at initiation of a swap, since the dealer's
price will take into account the counterparty's creditworthiness (much
as the interest rate on a loan compensates for future default losses).
Applying the expected cash flows analysis of value leads to the same
conclusion. Positing that the assumptions underlying the
determinations of default loss probabilities and amounts are correct,
the credit carveout merely accelerates reasonably expected swap
default losses into the present to reduce the swap's gross income
stream, which is also accelerated into the present."5 A credit carveout
for reasonably expected default losses therefore appears appropriate
in a mark-to-market regime, even though not permitted for taxpayers
in a realization regime.376
Various documents suggest that the credit risk adjustment taken
by dealers is broader in scope than expected default losses and hence
also implements the second rationale of deferring service
compensation. For example, in the years subject to litigation, FNBC
explicitly described its credit carveouts in its annual report as
375 Bear in mind that this section is considering the viability of credit carveouts
only from a functional perspective in order to answer the question why a credit
carveout should be permitted in the mark-to-market context. This does not end the
inquiry, since the mechanism for determining the amount of the carveout must also be
considered in order to be sure that the carveout merely provides for a reasonable
expected swap default loss. In other words, a proper inquiry must also ask what
assumptions should determine how much of a credit carveout to permit in the mark-
to-market context. See infra Part IV.D. for discussion suggesting that the amount of
the carveout should be based on objective, historical data of swap default loss
experience (or credit default swap pricing) and no carveout should be permitted for
swaps with de minimis default risk or adequate collateral.
376 Congress repealed the deduction for additions to bad debt reserves for all but
small banks as part of the 1986 reforms. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 805, 100 Stat. 2085 (repealing Code sections 166(c) and (f)). Prior law
permitted taxpayers to deduct reasonable additions to reserve accounts to offset their
estimate of the uncollectible portion because of debtor defaults. A formula based on
a six-year rolling-loss experience was typically used to determine the reasonableness
of additions to reserves. See Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940),
aff'd on other issues, 125 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1942), acq. 1940-1 C.B. 1. Since neither
the Code nor the legislative history of the passage of section 475 states that the
prohibition against deduction of bad debt reserves is suspended for the MTM regime,
it could be argued that there is no basis for any credit carveout. See supra note 179
and accompanying text (suggesting that a deduction for bad debt reserves may violate
mark-to-market principles by reducing asset values below their true market values).
20041
Virginia Tax Review
deferring its compensation for accepting exposure to credit risk:
"Derivative financial instruments used in trading and venture capital
activities are valued at prevailing market rates on a present value
basis.... Where appropriate, compensation for credit risk and
ongoing servicing is deferred and taken into income over the term of
the derivatives.,
377
The Group of Thirty's discussion of credit carveouts similarly
suggests that the financial accounting concept of carveouts
attributable to credit risk is not synonymous with, and in fact is
considerably broader than, the tax concept of reasonably expected
default losses:
Two adjustments to mid-market are necessary even for a
perfectly matched portfolio: the "unearned credit spread
adjustment" to reflect the credit risk in the portfolio; and the
"administrative costs adjustment" for costs that will be
incurred to administer the portfolio. The unearned credit
spread adjustment represents amounts set aside to cover
expected credit losses and to provide compensation for credit
378
exposure.
These statements demonstrate that a credit carveout is viewed for
regulatory and financial accounting purposes as deferring
compensation for assuming credit exposure so that it can be taken into
account periodically over the term of the swap - i.e., as a risk
premium that a dealer earns in addition to the amount necessary to
cover expected default losses."9 In other words, the credit carveout as
M Bank One, supra note 12, T 199 (quoting FNBC's 1993 annual report). The
Service noted this deferral function when it looked at the fact "that credit and
administrative carve-out adjustments played little or no part in any of [FNBC]'s
activities, other than possibly reporting to bank regulatory agencies whose concerns
tended toward conservatism and in its income deferrals for financial statement
purposes." Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 472; see also id. at 498-500
(discussing the deferral of servicing and credit intermediary income when credit
carveouts are not based on realistic market assessments of expected losses due to
credit risks).
378 Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 60 (emphasis added) (quoting GROUP OF
THIRTY STUDY, supra note 290, at 9-10); Bank One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229,
at 24 (same).
"9 The Bank One court also noted the bank's description of the use of credit risk
adjustments to achieve financial accounting matching:
The compensation that results from the bid/offer rate differential should
neither be all currently recognized in income at the inception of a swap, nor
[Vol. 24:301
Book-Tax Conformity
described in these documents comprises (at least) two parts (justified
for financial accounting purposes by the two rationales set out in the
second paragraph of this subsection): (1) an amount equivalent to a
bad debt reserve for reasonably expected future swap default losses
and (2) a fee deferral mechanism for the portion of the bid-to-mid
spread on the swap that corresponds to the fee earned by the swaps
dealer in respect of its function as a credit . 38
The fee deferral is not structurally coherent with section 475's
mark-to-market regime, under either an expected cashflow
understanding of accretion taxation or the constructive sale
mechanism set out in the Code section. Under an expected cashflow
analysis of mark-to-market value, the compensation paid to a dealer
for acting as a credit intermediary should form part of the stream of
payments that are discounted to present value. There is no
corresponding credit-related cost, other than a potential loss upon a
default of the counterparty, that must be accelerated into the
present."" While a credit carveout functioning as a fee deferral
mechanism may satisfy financial accounting's matching principle by
deferring income until "earned," it does not satisfy the income
all deferred over the life of a swap. Instead swap compensation should be
allocated between current and deferred income recognition based on when
it is earned (i.e., a portion up front and a portion over time). Based on an
analysis of what the bid/offer rate differential represents, the Bank values
its swap contracts using the mid-point between market bid and offer rates.
The difference between this valuation and a bid or offer price paid or
received by the Bank is treated as deferred income designed to provide
compensation for inherent credit risk and periodic administrative costs
related to the swaps.
... The per annum credit deferral is recognized in income on a straight line
basis over the life of the swap agreement. The rationale for the income
deferral for the inherent credit risk is to defer an appropriate amount of
income to match compensation paid to assume credit risk over the period
of the risk.
Bank One, supra note 12, T9 286 (quoting from the bank's petition).
38D See, e.g., Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 218 (pointing out FNBC's
reliance, in its proposed findings of fact, on the need to reduce midmarket values for
the dealer's expected profit margin at swap inception). Of course, any additional risk
premium reflected in a particular swap rate in excess of the prevailing quoted rate is
also deferred until received, since it is not included in the midmarket valuation
number.
381 See also Third Way, supra note 247, at 789 (suggesting that the unearned
credit spread covers both losses and a capital charge for opportunity costs).
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acceleration goal of section 475 .382 Deferral of compensation for the
credit intermediation function thus appears to undo the intended
mark-to-market acceleration of that portion of income into the
present and fails to satisfy the structural coherence value.
Similarly, applying the Tax Court's approach to the constructive
sale of section 475(a)(2), a hypothetical buyer would base the price
that he would pay for the dealer's position on objective information
such as the terms of the contract and current interest rates. The
hypothetical buyer would also consider the creditworthiness of the
counterparty in order to reduce the price offered to account for
expected default losses. As an end user (the applicable market for
considering the constructive sale under the Bank One case),383 the
buyer would not expect to earn income as a credit intermediary but
would enter into the swap to combat interest rate changes, reduce its
costs of funding, or speculate on market trends.38 Consequently, the
buyer would not discount the price by an amount to ensure an
expected profit as compensation for assuming a credit intermediary
function. Again, the deferral of compensation income for credit
intermediation is not appropriate in a mark-to-market system under
this analysis.
385
382 Recall that section 475 was enacted as a revenue raiser. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
383 See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 238-241 and accompanying text; see also Bank One, supra
note 12, 9l 36-39 (discussing reasons for end-user participation in swaps market);
Schuyler K. Henderson, Swap Credit Risk: A Multi-Perspective Analysis, 44 BUS.
LAW. 365 (1989) (same).
3W See, e.g., Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 208 (asserting that the
midmarket method without adjustment values swaps properly based on the analogy
with the market for stocks and bonds where credit risk adjustments are reflected in
price); id. at 211 (asserting that valuation at reduced values is not a market-based
approach). The Service stressed the importance of considering the various reasons a
dealer may enter into a transaction.
Valuation at... bid price ignores half of the relevant transactions. Some
dealers will enter into the fixed leg of a swap and receive their bid price.
Other dealers enter into the fixed leg of the same kind of swap and pay
another dealer's ask price. Valuation at the bid price counts only the first
kind of transactions. There is no reason to believe that the second kind of
transactions are less indicative of value. A market comparables approach
would take both kinds of transactions into account. A true mid-market
value takes both kinds of transactions into account.
Id. at 212. The Post-Trial IRS Brief also sets out a negotiation scenario to illustrate
how hypothetical sellers will arrive at a midmarket price as the typical resolution. See
Book- Tax Conformity
Another potential problem with credit carveouts is the
mechanism used by dealers to determine the expected default loss.
Current quantitative finance literature provides a wide variety of tools
for assessing credit risk, each subject to assumptions of the user about
relevant parameters, such as creditworthiness of counterparties,
concentrations, and volatility of markets.3M Use of these models
leaves considerable leeway to a dealer to give excess weight to
parameters that may overstate the amounts determined for expected
default losses. Accepted financial accounting and bank regulatory
mechanisms for determining a dealer's charges for credit risk
adjustments may calculate swap default losses through processes that
are also used for loan default losses."' Because historical data on
defaults on loans demonstrates a substantially higher default rate than
the rate for swaps, this use of loan loss mechanisms in swap
determinations would likely overstate expected swap default losses
and the effect of credit risk exposure on swaps pricing. In both cases,
there would also be an excess credit risk adjustment representing an
impermissible deferral of a dealer's service compensation for acting as
a credit intermediary - exactly the income that is intended to be
accelerated under the mark-to-market rules.3 8
The second type of credit risk adjustment made by some dealers,
a capital charge for unanticipated credit losses,"' also violates the
income tax value. This carveout amounts to an indefinite deferral of
swap spreads, with the amount determined in the aggregate in respect
of a dealer's entire swaps portfolio. The charge reduces fair values for
financial accounting purposes to reflect foregone investment returns
for capital held in reserve. Put another way, the charge effectively
lowers the income recognized on a swap to account for this additional
return to capital that is expected to be paid in respect of capital held
id. at 222. See also supra note 374 (contrasting buying dealers who demand a spread
with hedging dealers who do not).
See supra note 310.
See e.g., Bank One, supra note 12, 147 (noting that dealers' determinations
of loss factors were "generally derived from the bank's experience with loans to
borrowers"); supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing use of bank loan
processes to determine amount of expected swap loss).
.. In Bank One, the Service considered FNBC to be "using its carve-outs as a tax
shelter" by which it sought to defer profits and accelerate losses based on its use of
credit carveouts on swaps where it was the net payor, on nonexistent swaps, and in
amounts exceeding the dealer spread on the swap, such as a carveout amount to 137
percent of the swap value. Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 601,601-02.
389 See supra note 334 and accompanying text (regarding credit carveouts for
capital charges for unanticipated credit losses).
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in reserve. It effectively treats the equity return demanded by
shareholders on a bank's capital reserves as a cost allocable to swaps.
That is equivalent to allowing a corporation a deduction for dividends
paid, which is a violation of basic principles of the income tax.
2. Anti-Manipulation Value
Even if book accounting methods did not raise structural
coherence questions of lack of consistency with section 475's basic
requirements, there would still remain a strong concern that book
valuations permit too much flexibility to satisfy the anti-manipulation
value. The securities dealers argue for flexibility, claiming that their
book determinations should be acceptable as accurate for tax
purposes merely because they are reasonably determined under a
generally accepted methodology that is consistently applied by each
dealer. Assuming arguendo that most dealers generally make
substantially similar types of adjustments to midmarket valuation,
however, it is not clear (1) that there is any consistency in the
determinations different dealers make regarding what types of
adjustments to apply for business purposes other than tax valuations
or (2) how the existence of a general methodology with considerable
subjective judgments and idiosyncratic proprietary systems provides
any measure of "accurate" valuation. Reasonableness for financial
accounting purposes may be the epitome of unreasonableness for tax
purposes - witness the improper deferral of services income that
occurs under the financial accounting matching principle in respect of
prepayments. The arguments from consistency within a particular
dealer's business do little to assuage concerns about manipulative
potential. A dealer can be consistent in overstating the discount rate
used in determining midmarket values and consistent in overstating
adjustments made to those midmarket values, resulting in too low a
tax liability.
Subsection a. considers the anti-manipulation concerns underlying
the dealers' main argument for conformity based on the consistency
and reasonableness of their valuations. Subsection b. considers the
broad range of flexibility permitted under the financial accounting
rules, and the tendency of recent financial accounting rule-setting in
the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals to reinforce financial
accounting's conservative focus on delaying recognition of income
unless there is little possibility of any intervening event that may
reduce the amount of income that should be recognized.
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a. Securities Dealers' Arguments for Conformity
The heart of the securities dealers' case for conformity relates to
the ANPRM's second proposed principle: that valuations derived for
business and accounting uses should result in fair and accurate
valuations for tax purposes and that use of the valuation in an
appropriate financial statement and in significant non-tax business
uses would satisfy that requirement. They have compared derivatives
accounting to inventory accounting, with its historic (and, I have
argued, inappropriate) layers of permissible methods, to urge that tax
rules for MTM valuations be "flexible and pragmatic" with room for
considerable variation even among businesses within a particular
industry.39° The question at stake here is whether tax values should
permit the kind of individuated and subjective taxable income
determinations that would follow from granting permission to each
dealer to use its own proprietary subjective judgments in determining
swap values, without any limitations other than those imposed by
financial accounting fair value measurement rules.
Dealers argue that consistency of methodology across tax and one
or more non-tax uses is essentially all that matters. FNBC's litigation
strategy, for example, rested on a claim for respect for its
particularistic determinations of swap mark-to-market values for tax
purposes, essentially without substantiation, on the grounds that its
methodology (1) was "a consistent methodology applied consistently
over time" within its own operations and (2) provided a "reasonable"
valuation, from a business judgment perspective, that "strikes the
appropriate balance between accuracy and practicality."39  The
390 See, e.g., SIA Response, supra note 65, at 8. The SIA's argument goes on to
note that "tax inventory methods largely follow best practice accounting methods, so
long as such methods meet the clear-reflection-of-income test." Id. at 9. This
statement is not helpful, since the issue at stake is to decide whether the clear
reflection of income test requires nonconforming tax inventory methods. The letter
argues the need to "sacrifice[] economic precision to reflect the practical realities of
business operations." Id. But "practical realities" are not at stake here. The
securities dealer business is in fact uniform in certain respects - so much so that
dealer spreads are less than five basis points on vanilla interest rate swaps.
391 Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 91 3, 4, 52 (emphasis added); see also Bank
One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at 22 ("Petitioner's swaps were valued at the
same amounts in its general ledger, its financial statements and its tax returns, as well
as in its internal monthly management reports.... [TIhe methodology that FNBC
selected was reasonable; it was implemented in a systematic, unbiased manner; and it
was consistent with generally accepted industry practices during the years at issue.").
The bank also asserted that the statement in the legislative history expressing an
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Amicus Brief in the Bank One case was quite specific on this point
(though it avoided use of the book-tax conformity label): it argued
that any dealer's "particular implementation" of a mark-to-market
accounting methodology is an "objective," bias-free, clear reflection
of income so long as it is consistently used for non-tax business,
regulatory, and financial accounting purposes.3 9 Edward Kleinbard, a
well-known tax lawyer who works closely with the SIA, has written
separately to make much the same argument for book-tax
conformity. 93 The SIA Response to the safe harbor ANPRM focuses
on the accounting profession's general views of clear reflection of
income as merely requiring a consistent, workable means of recording
regular business income. The group argues that reasonable reliability
and consistency should be considered especially important in this
area, quoting heavily from a few court cases on general inventory
valuation methods that emphasize straightforwardness and
reasonableness rather than accuracy or any structurally coherent view
of the way taxable income differs from book income. 94 The response
then emphasizes as a separate pragmatic concern the need for a
expectation that Treasury would relieve taxpayers of compliance burdens when
possible while still clearly reflecting income should be treated as a legislative intent
that Treasury would defer to business judgments and accept valuations that
conformed to book valuations. Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 52; see also Bank
One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at 101-02 ("Congress fully understood that
there was no one correct methodology of mark-to-market valuation in the case of
instruments not actively traded on a secondary market and that valuation in such
cases could be extremely complex.... Particularly in such a setting, the tax system
should take the economic endeavors of the Petitioner's business as it finds them and
impose a tax thereon in as administrable and unobtrusive manner as possible."). This
argument is flawed. Congress had the opportunity to legislate conformity and chose
not to do so. The expression of an expectation of relieving burdens should not be
taken as an instruction to do what Congress failed to do. The bank also hoped to find
support for its admittedly idiosyncratic methodology by reliance on valuation cases
arguably permitting subjective and uncertain valuations under a deferential business
judgment standard. See, e.g., Bank One Brief, supra note 229, 1$ 45-47 (arguing that
courts have given considerable deference to a taxpayer's subjective business judgment
in valuation cases dealing with inventory, bad debts, insurance reserves, and pension
reserves); Bank One Post-Trial Brief, supra note 229, at 89-91 (same); Bank One
Brief, supra note 229, 48 (arguing that "practical constraints" in valuation cases
require reliance on a taxpayer's business judgment; otherwise, courts would be in the
position of "fine-tuning or second-guessing" business decisions); Bank One Post-Trial
Brief, supra note 229, at 91 (same).
39 Amicus Brief, supra note66, 19,21.
393 See Some Thoughts, supra note 247, at 1173, 1175 (espousing book-tax
conformity as the only administrable solution).
394 See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 4-5 & 4 n.10.
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method that is "relatively easy to use, not ... unduly burdensome and
[can] be applied consistently from period to period." '395 The group
pointedly argues that any valuation methodology under section 475
must necessarily satisfy the accounting profession's matchingS •• 396
principle. In other words, the response argues for conformity based
almost entirely on pragmatic, simplicity-based concerns and the
accounting-driven matching principle. The premise is that tax values
will be satisfied by a taxpayer's "good faith calculations" that are
"employed consistently."39
Interestingly, the ISDA Response includes a subtle threat. Book-
tax conformity will avoid substantial costs, it asserts, because dealers
would likely challenge any alternative valuation method developed by
the Service as not being accurate, either because it failed to take into
account factors that are considered important for financial accounting
purposes or because it gave different weight to those factors than
given in financial accounting.! This argument is tautological, since it
assumes that fair market value for tax purposes can be nothing other
than what the financial accounting world concludes is the appropriate
measure of book income.399 Note that any tax alternative might also
be based on a midmarket method, but require or permit only specific
kinds of adjustments. Since there is currently no true methodological
"' Id. at 6.
'9 Id. at 5. But see supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the failure
of those who argue for a tax matching principle to understand the overall tax
structure and referencing the significant commentary against any such tax matching
principle).
"' SIA Response, supra note 65, at 11. A nalve citizen might ask why an ordinary
taxpayer with an average income around $40,000 that contributes a ten-year-old
vehicle to the Red Cross would be required to receive and maintain in its tax records
a statement from the charity indicating the value of the vehicle, but a sophisticated
taxpayer such as the Goldman Sachs securities dealing unit should be trusted to
designate the value of its multibillion dollar derivatives portfolio using its proprietary
valuation system based on its good faith efforts.
398 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 8 (claiming that "even if it were possible
for the Service and the Treasury Department to develop, constantly update and
administer an alternative methodology for determining the fair market value of OTC
derivatives, it is unlikely that any such alternative would be as accurate as the adjusted
mid-market method now used by dealers") (emphasis added).
39 The counterargument posited here is that even if the terms defining fair
market value for tax purposes and fair value for book purposes appear substantially
similar, that does not mean that fair value as determined under financial accounting
principles can fairly be used for tax purposes. This is because of the two values -
structural coherence and anti-manipulation - that require compatibility with the rest
of the tax structure and less variation than is acceptable for book purposes.
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uniformity among dealers, and any adjustments permitted under the
tax regulations would presumably be more careful to take into
account tax principles, it is hard to see how this bald assertion of
greater "accuracy" for financial accounting income concepts could be
true.
Without dealing straightforwardly with the current concern with
market inefficiencies caused by flawed or fraudulent audits, the SIA
Response suggests that GAAP valuations should be considered fair
since they are used for a range of other business purposes, such as
internal business and risk management, compensation, and regulatory
purposes, and "are subject to rigorous checks and balances by
different influential stakeholders. ',410 Valuations should satisfy tax, it
suggests, since traders would not want their compensation to be based
on a conservative bias.
These arguments have several shortcomings. First, the claim that
undervaluing derivatives to achieve tax purposes would be
detrimental to the OTC derivatives business because traders would
forego new profitable trades and unwind existing profitable trades
appears simplistic in light of the recent accounting scandals. If a
dealer knowingly and systematically undervalued its derivatives, it
could compensate by systematically taking into account in its internal
assessment of its profit status that the numbers produced to satisfy the
tax objective were less than the "actual" profits from the trades.
Freddie Mac, for example, had no trouble knowing that it had
considerable profits, even though it had intentionally and
systematically lowered its reporting of profits by engaging in various
swaps and other transactions, in order to smooth out its earnings
statements. 4°1 Second, because tax and financial accounting principles
are not equivalent, determinations of value and related compensation
bonuses under financial accounting principles may satisfy traders and
411dealers even though the values understate income for tax purposes.
Although internal consistency is not sufficient for proper taxation,
internal consistency is all that counts in being able to distinguish
"good" traders to be rewarded with bonuses (those with more deals at
higher values) from "bad" traders. Third, accuracy of valuations
according to financial accounting principles is what counts for dealers,
SIA Response, supra note 65, at 16.
401 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355, at 476-77 (noting that FNBC's
traders' bonuses were determined using unadjusted midmarket values and that even
the head of trading was unaware of the administrative and credit costs that might
reduce the value of swaps whose revenues were used for determining compensation).
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and this is not always the same as accuracy for tax purposes because of
the matching principle that defers income by accelerating recognition
of various costs that may not be recognized for tax purposes. Finally,
one of the most important uses of valuations is hedging of risks, and
dealers typically hedge market risks based on midmarket valuations
without adjustments for credit risks, administrative costs, or liquidity
needs. 4°3  If midmarket valuations are good enough for this
extraordinarily important purpose, it is not clear why they are not
appropriate as measures of taxable income.
The ISDA argues that any audited financial statement that is
provided to the SEC or any regulatory body or to shareholders or
creditors should satisfy the requirement that dealers have an incentive
to report values fairly.) This would include valuations reflected in
consolidated statements and statements of non-U.S. affiliates filed
with non-U.S. regulatory bodies. The association argues that these
statements are trustworthy because of audits or regulatory review that
ensure that the valuation methodology is reasonably and consistently
applied.
This confidence in the trustworthiness of financial statements
based on independent audits (assuming arguendo that the fair values
reflected there are appropriate for tax purposes if accurately derived)
disregards the current concern about the lack of trustworthiness of
financial audits arising from the widespread abuse of accounting rules
at Enron, WorldCom, Dynergy, Freddie Mac, HealthSouth, Parmalat,
and other corporations.45 These accounting scandals involve major
publicly traded corporations that in many cases used special purpose
subsidiaries, financially engineered transactions using swaps and other
derivatives, and/or the active assistance of financial institutions as
accommodation parties.4 At Parmalat, for example, the scandal may
See SIA Response, supra note 65, at 17.
404 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 29.
4D5 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Reed Abelson, Suit Says Ernst and UBS
Knew of HealthSouth Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at C2 (noting suspected roles of
an accounting firm and investment bank in the HealthSouth fraud); Parma Splat-
Europe's Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2004 (indicating that auditors
are at the center of the Parmalat scandal, as in the case of Enron); Erik Portanger,
David Reilly & Peter Mayer, Grant Thornton Cuts Ties to Unit Over Parmalat, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2004, at A9 (indicating that accounting firm had cut ties with its Italian
unit because of the unit's possible involvement in the multibillion dollar Parmalat
accounting fraud); supra note 216 (discussing the recent accounting scandals and
providing further references).
See, e.g., Emily Thornton & Mike France, Commentary, Enron's Bankers: A
Great Prison Escape, Bus. WK. ONLINE, July 31, 2003 (reporting that Citigroup and
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involve monies essentially laundered through offshore subsidiaries in
order to provide dividends to the founder. These accounting scandals
demonstrate special concerns about the reliability of information that
is reflected through several layers of corporate structure.4° It seems
unreasonable to add to the power of financial statements (by
permitting book income to determine a corporation's tax liability, in
part) at a time when the independence of auditors and public trust in
J.P. Morgan paid $300 million to settle government claims that their derivatives
groups assisted Enron in structuring transactions to manipulate its numbers), at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ju12003/nf20030731_4717_db042.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2004); supra note 216 (discussing the role of banks as
accommodation parties in corporate tax shelters). While some might argue that
financial institutions deserve more respect and an assumption of trustworthiness ab
initio because of their fiduciary role, financial institutions have been as involved as
other large corporations in attempting to structure transactions to reduce their own
tax liabilities or to profit from assisting others in developing potentially abusive
transactions or in misusing the market structure. See, e.g., Associated Press, Firms
Pay $241.8 Million To Settle Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at C5 (noting that
five specialist firms, including a Goldman Sachs subsidiary, would settle charges
related to illegal trading practices); Riva D. Atlas, Trades Backed By Big Banks Draw
Interest of Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at Cl (indicating that regulators are
focusing on the role of Bank of America and another bank in supporting improper
mutual fund trading through total return swaps and noting the similarity to financial
institutions' assistance in helping Enron manipulate its results); Carrick Mollenkamp,
Bank of America Faces Allegations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2003, at C15 (reporting
claim "that the bank used 'creative accounting' in booking financial losses"); Andrew
Pollack, Sealed Indictment is Said to Charge Bank With Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2003, at C1 (reporting indictment for fraud against Credit Lyonnais); Glenn R.
Simpson, Banks Shifted Billions Into Funds Sheltering Income From Taxes, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 8, 2003, at Al (reporting that nation's biggest banks set up captive regulated
investment companies to avoid state (and possibly federal) income taxes on their
interest income); Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Regulators Probe Roles of 2
Banks in Fund Scandal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2004, at C13 (noting financial and other
support for questionable mutual fund trading); Deborah Solomon, Deals & Deal
Makers: SEC to Vote on Its Settlement Involving Wall Street Analysts, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 24, 2003, at C6 (reporting $1.5 billion settlement with ten Wall Street firms for
role in stock analysts' misleading of investors). Because of financial institutions'
questionable practices in connection with the accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act mandated a report on financial services. See Financial Services Report of
Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 80-19 § 18 (Apr. 22,
2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 80-19).
... See, e.g., Patrick Barta, Restatement by Freddie Puts Fannie on Spot, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 12, 2004, at C1 (stating that the mortgage companies' "business and financial
statements have become so complex that they are effectively 'unanalyzable"' and
suggesting that financial institutions' financial statements are also hard to decipher, in
large part because of their "large volume[] of derivatives") (quoting James Bianco,
president of a Chicago-based fixed-income research firm).
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corporate financial officers is at a low ebb.
In addition to questions about the integrity of the audit process
itself, the inherently subjective nature of fair value measurements
raises further concern about the reliability of those measurements. As
the Office of the Chief Auditor of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board has noted, "[miany fair value measurements result
from approximations, rather than exact measures, and involve
numerous estimates, classifications, judgments, and allocations. "'0'
When fair value measurements rely primarily on entity-specific
assumptions rather than on market-based inputs, the reliability of
those measurements is difficult to verify because auditors cannot
observe management's expectations.9 The inherent difficulty in
auditing management's expectations was illustrated in the failed
Enron audits, in which most of the terms of the energy contract
transactions were not observable market conditions.410
Interestingly, while touting the consistency of the general
midmarket method, the ISDA argues against any requirement of
consistency across dealers (other than at the most general level of
assumption that all dealers use one form or another of an adjusted
midmarket methodology). This statement is worth quoting in its
entirety.
ISDA, however, also believes that it is critically important
that the Service and the Treasury Department not use the
differences in nomenclature and techniques that exist among
dealers either to conclude that a safe harbor should not be
prescribed or that such a safe harbor should be based on a
single set of techniques mandated in the safe harbor following
a survey of dealer practices. In this connection, even if all
dealers were required to make the same types of adjustments,
they would likely not make identical determinations of value
because their assumptions regarding creditworthiness of
counterparties, projected future market changes, etc. would
not be identical.4 1
4M Office of the Chief Auditor, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
Auditing Fair Value (Sept. 8-9, 2004) (discussion paper for Standing Advisory Group




411 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 35.
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In other words, securities dealers are well aware that financial
accounting rules permit considerable variation between dealers in the
way they calculate their income under the mark-to-market approach,
and they want this same flexibility to apply for tax purposes as well.
One might wonder if the reason for this insistence has more to do with
lowering tax burdens than easing administrative difficulties. After all,
it is clear that dealers do not use exactly the same valuation output for
all business purposes. Why would it be so hard to determine a
separate tax valuation if it is not so hard to determine a separate
valuation for bonus, internal risk management, or other non-tax
business purposes?
b. Variations in Applying the Basic Midmarket Valuation Model
Although dealers almost universally use similar valuation models
for interest rates swaps that treat the swaps as a series of forward
contracts, financial accounting permits a number of differences in the
calculations providing the basic midmarket valuation for vanilla swaps
under these models. Dealers are free to determine the pricing model
and discount rate without reliance on any specified set of objective
criteria. This ability to manipulate the values based on the choice of
discount rate or pricing model could be used to consistently lower
taxable income, even though the dealer also would have to report
lower book income. It is not clear that the impetus to report high
income for shareholders and creditors is sufficient to overcome the
temptation to manipulate taxable income to lower tax liabilities,
which would also be viewed favorably by shareholders and
creditors.412
The differences in value can be significant. For example, if one
dealer habitually adjusts the discount rate to reflect its judgments
regarding the creditworthiness of counterparties that are all equally
rated by a major credit rating agency (e.g., Standard & Poor's AA
rating), while another dealer does not adjust the discount rate for AA
or higher rated counterparties, the income reported by the first dealer
may be significantly less, determined in respect of a large number of
swaps initiated in any one year, than the income reported by the
second dealer, even though their transactions are otherwise
equivalent.
Financial accounting rules also permit dealers to use different
mathematical models for pricing their swaps, if they can provide a
412 See, e.g., supra note 140 (discussing Freddie Mac accounting scandal).
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reasonable basis for doing so. As a result, many dealers may not be
using the most accurate models for determining value when the swaps
book consists in large part of collateralized swaps. Recent research
suggests that the value of collateralized swaps can be more accurately
determined by models built on futures rates than by the standard
models for noncollateralized swaps assuming a package of forward
413contracts. Almost all standard interest rate and currency swaps are
collateralized, and this collateralization significantly reduces or totally
eliminates credit risk, so it may be that the valuation models currently
used for financial accounting purposes consistently understate swaps
income by permitting any credit risk adjustment. If the proposed safe
harbor is adopted, there will be no incentive for swaps dealers to
change their valuation models to take the recent research on
collateralization into account. As in the case of LIFO accounting, the
advantageous tax accounting result is likely to drive the financial
accounting rule, and swaps valuation methods that give the better
result for tax purposes will be retained.
c. Flexibility of Credit Carveouts
Another set of issues relates to the particular methodologies used
to determine whether any credit carveout is appropriate under the
terms of particular swaps. Does the combination of collateral and
netting provisions essentially eliminate all risk of loss? To what
degree do other provisions, such as special credit triggers or third
party guarantees, negate any credit carveout? The question here is
not whether the broad procedural approach of midmarket valuation is
generally appropriate, but rather whether the extraordinary flexibility
permitted under financial accounting rules is simply inconsistent with
the anti-manipulation tax requirement. The disagreement between
the government and FNBC in the Bank One litigation can be
understood as raising essentially this question in the context of an
examination of the details of carveouts - namely, (1) the potential
for inappropriate and significant deferral of income by frontloading
certain deductions that appear to function primarily as either a
conservatively measured, bank-wide bad debt reserve (i.e., not just an
appropriate reserve in respect of the reasonably determined expected
losses on a securities dealer's positions) or a deferral of spread income
until "earned" under the financial accounting matching principle and
(2) the myriad variations in ways of implementation, resulting, in
413 See Johannes & Sundaresan, supra note 321 and accompanying text.
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Bank One, in a tendency to understate income and, in general, in
substantial methodological inconsistencies that permit manipulation
by taxpayers.414 The carveout step appears to be more a statement of
aspirations than a refined methodology45 and has significant potential
for distortion of taxable income. To the extent that those adjustments
are based on an individual taxpayer's subjective determinations,
without any relation either to an accepted methodology that is
consistently applied across taxpayers or to objective benchmark
information (e.g., credit ratings, default loss histories, or other data)
that is available to all taxpayers, any claim for reliability appears
misplaced.
Furthermore, a dealer's own creditworthiness is clearly a factor in
the amount of any expected loss (or gain) on default.4 6 The failure of
414 See, e.g., IRS Brief, supra note 355, 166 (claiming that the bank's particular
implementation of midmarket valuations was unlikely to overstate income and the
many inappropriate carveouts were likely to significantly understate income, with the
result that the unadjusted midmarket values "were closer to fair market value than
the values after credit carve-outs and administrative adjustments"); Post-Trial IRS
Brief, supra note 355, at 562 (criticizing the bank's use of its credit exposure model
(CEM) to calculate its carveout amounts because the CEM "is not a measure of how
the marketplace currently values the swap or the current exposure" and "it provides
no measure whatsoever of whether interbank swap dealers in the marketplace with
less exposure to that customer, would be willing to enter into a swap with that
customer at prevailing rates); id. at 567, 570 (criticizing the bank's failure to take into
account the impact of netting, cross-default agreements, offsetting swaps, and other
types of protective features that the bank used to reduce its exposure to a
counterparty's default potential and stating that "[i]n the face of its failure to
incorporate netting, petitioner cannot establish that its own adjusted value is closer to
the true fair market value than the unadjusted mid-market value"); id. at 572-73
(criticizing the bank's failure to take into account various credit enhancements, such
as guarantees and collateral, because those enhancements "may be so effective as to
make a credit adjustment inappropriate" due to the fact that they may "effectively
bring a counterparty to an equivalent rating of an AA-rated counterparty," in which
case the "credit risk is already assumed in the discount rate used to arrive at the net
present value for the swaps.
415 For instance, it is not clear that swaps dealers habitually take both parties'
creditworthiness into account, take credit carveouts only for low-rated counterparties
where there is a non-de minimis risk of an actual default loss, limit the amount of the
credit carveout to the unadjusted midmarket value, or otherwise ensure that the
idiosyncratic components of their particular credit risk management systems do not
result in significant understatements of their swaps income.
416 Few dealers take their own creditworthiness into account. See supra note 315
and accompanying text. This failure results in errors in the determination of potential
economic losses from swap defaults. See Duffie Report, supra note 319, at 26-28
(discussing consideration of dealer's own creditworthiness); Bank One, supra note 12,
1 396-98 (discussing the economic impact of a dealer's own likelihood of default and
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swap valuation methods to take a dealer's own creditworthiness into
account would be especially significant in those cases where a
counterparty's rating is higher than the dealer's yet lower than a credit
rating equivalent to Standard & Poor's AA rating. In that case, a
dealer would likely reduce the income recognized on the swap with
the counterparty by a credit adjustment to reflect the fact that the
counterparty's credit rating is lower than the credit rating assumed for
the prevailing bid-ask rates. At the same time, the dealer would likely
not increase the income recognized to reflect the fact that the dealer is
more likely to default than the counterparty. While the FASB has
made it clear that it considers the creditworthiness of both parties
relevant to fair value determinations,417 it may well be that
establishment of a tax safe harbor at a time when many dealers
continue not to take their own declines in creditworthiness into
account may tend to fossilize the financial accounting rules at the
earlier stage.
The role of offsetting swaps is also relevant. 41' A dealer that
engages in a swap with one counterparty (call this counterparty A)
and an offsetting swap with another counterparty (counterparty B)
can only come out ahead on one of the swap positions. If the market
favors counterparty A (so that the dealer must pay A), then the
market will necessarily favor the dealer in its swap with counterparty
B, resulting in no net detriment to the dealer in the aggregate under
the two swaps. If counterparty A becomes less creditworthy, the
dealer will be at risk of loss from a default by counterparty A only
when the swap with counterparty A is in the market to the dealer -
holding that dealers must take their own creditworthiness into account under the
mark-to-market regime). As explained, a swap is neither pure obligation nor pure
asset. If a dealer were to default on a swap when the dealer owed a significant
payment under the swap, the dealer would have gain commensurate with the amount
of the unpaid obligation. Again, the analogy of swaps to corporate bonds is helpful.
If a corporation issues a bond that pays a 5 percent coupon annually with compound
interest, any accrued but unpaid interest is, in effect, a further principal amount that
accrues interest for the duration of the period in which it is unpaid. A dealer that
defaults on a payment obligation under a swap is in a position similar to a corporate
issuer that defaults on the payment of accrued and unpaid interest at maturity of the
bond.
417 See USING CASH FLow INFO. AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING
MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7, 1 78-88
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2000).
418 Mirror and offsetting swaps were also at issue in the Bank One litigation,
because the bank overstated its credit carveouts in respect of mirror and offsetting
swaps. Bank One, supra note 12, 1$ 410-11.
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i.e., when the dealer expects to receive a net payment from
counterparty A rather than to make a net payment to counterparty A.
Since the dealer is perfectly hedged with the offsetting swap with
counterparty B, counterparty A's decline in creditworthiness will not
be an issue when market conditions are such that the dealer is
expecting to receive payments under the offsetting swap from
counterparty B. Thus, an offsetting position in a second swap with a
third party not only reduces market risk but also reduces the credit
419
risk from exposure to a default of the counterparty to the first swap.
It is not clear that securities dealers take this type of reduction in
credit risk into account in their adjustments to midmarket valuations.
Certainly, the responses of the dealer groups to the ANPRM failed to
explain in detail the nature of the credit adjustments undertaken and
the extent to which they correct for these potential errors in credit
adjustments. Again, the ability to manipulate the adjustments in these
ways represents a serious flaw for tax purposes.
Securities dealers' potential use of parameters for credit exposure
from their loan businesses also permits significant manipulation of
valuations leading to overstatements of downward adjustments for
credit risks. First, the use of loan loss estimates derived from a bank's
regular lending business alone may significantly overstate the
potential for swap defaults. The rate of swap defaults appears to be
substantially lower than bond default rates. In fact, in the Bank One
litigation, the bank's experience with swap defaults was so limited that
it could only produce information about five or six defaults over an
extended period from the start of its swaps business to the early
1990s. 421 The explanation for why the probability of default is lower
for swaps than ordinary debt is as follows.412 In general, default on
any financial contract only occurs when two conditions exist: (1) one
419 This is another area in which the Bank One decision is flawed and should not
be followed by the Service in its development of valuation regulations. By leaving out
any explicit mention of mirror or offsetting swaps in his list of nine reasons and by
explicitly including the requirement that determinations be made on a swap-by-swap
basis, Judge Laro let stand an inconsistency that bears directly on a dealer's
determination of permissible credit carveouts and potentially distorts the measure of
income.
420 See, e.g., Duffle Report, supra note 319, at 12 (noting that "incidence of
default on short-term obligations by AA quality borrowers is exceptionally small");
Bank One, supra note 12, 265 (noting that swaps are "less risky" than loans).
421 See IRS Trial Memo, supra note 329, 91.
4M The following discussion is adapted from Ludger Hentschel & Clifford W.




party owes a payment under the contract and (2) that party is
insolvent. When a financial contract involves ordinary debt, the
debtor always owes a payment under the contract, and default will
occur if the debtor is insolvent. In the case of a swap, however, each
party to the contract potentially will owe a payment at various points
over the life of the contract. Even if one of the parties becomes
insolvent, default occurs only if the insolvent party also owes a
payment under the contract at that particular time-i.e., the insolvent
party's position in the swap is out of the money. The likelihood of the
insolvent party being out of the money is small for two reasons: (1) if
the party is using the swap to hedge its risks rather than speculate, its
swap is likely to be in the money at the time it is insolvent and (2) the
use of swaps to hedge risks decreases the likelihood of insolvency. 3
Second, even when there are defaults on swaps, the resultant
default loss amounts are generally significantly less than the losses
under defaulted loans of similar principal amounts. An interest rate
swap with a notional principal amount of $1 million would have a
significantly lower loss amount at risk at inception than a
corresponding loan with a principal amount of $1 million. In the case
of the swap, the nondefaulting party is not subject to the loss of any
principal payment on default of the counterparty, and single
transaction netting provisions limit the nondefaulting party's loss
upon a payment failure to the difference between the payment due
from the defaulting counterparty and the payment due from the
nondefaulting party. Accordingly, the "swap rate correction for
default risk is only about one hundredth of the bond rate correction
for default risk," and any correction upon initiation of a swap for
credit risk "is normally extremely small. 424 Any securities dealer that
relies too heavily on assumptions built from loan portfolio experience
and internal processes for assigning credit risks will likely have
inordinately high credit carveouts.
Use of a bank's historical experience with a loan portfolio as a
423 For example, assume a party X has floating rate debt, but has hedged the risk
of increased interest rates by entering into a pay fixed, receive floating swap. A sharp
increase in interest rates will increase the payments due under X's debt and thus
increase the probability of insolvency, but the increase in interest rates will also cause
his pay fixed, receive floating swap to be in-the-money. Additionally, the increased
payments received under the swap due to the increased interest rates will help X meet
his obligations under the floating rate debt and avoid insolvency. If X had not
entered into a swap, the increased interest rates might have pushed him to insolvency
and, consequently, to default.
424 Duffie Report, supra note 319, at 13.
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model for swap default analysis may permit banks intentionally or
inadvertently to distort the determination of the amount at risk in
respect of swaps in yet another way. Banks tend to evaluate their
risks of losses on loans conservatively. That conservative estimate
primarily affects how they risk-manage their portfolio of loans and
whether they (and their regulators) believe that they have sufficient
capital to sustain their banking operations. Regulators tend to
encourage banks not to overestimate the quality of their loan
portfolios. Because a loan puts a lender at risk for the principal
amount as well as the payment stream (without offset), a bank could
experience significant loss or a liquidity crisis upon a sudden default of
a small number of its largest loans. Furthermore, if there is a general
market disruption resulting in less liquidity and credit availability
generally, banks may find that they cannot sell troubled loans as
readily as desired. Because vanilla swaps differ significantly, in that
there is no principal amount at stake and netting provisions or other
credit enhancement typically offset a considerable portion of the risk
of loss on default, the conservative tendency of loan risk assessment
processes - actually encouraged by bank regulators and financial
accounting principles - would in itself tend to understate the
measure of income for tax purposes
Furthermore, the flexibility under accounting rules that permits a
bank to rely on subjective internal determinations of the parameters
for expected losses to be input into its proprietary models, including
the extent to which it wishes to "reserve" for maximum loss swap
default scenarios, is a direct violation of the anti-manipulation value.
An obvious flaw in FNBC's methodology, for example, was its misuse
of a simulation program intended to generate maximum loss scenarios
and its use of loss factors based on loan default experiences, leading to
some negative adjustments in respect of counterparties with credit
ratings of AA or better or on swaps for which the bank did not expect
to be a net receiver of cash.4a FNBC's methodology put it in the
position of subtracting apples from oranges. The loss determined
under its credit carveout methodology had no relation to the
midmarket valuation as of the time that the dealer entered into a
swap. Imagine. that a dealer enters into a swap with a midmarket
value of 10. Applying a methodology for computing credit carveouts
45 See Bank One, supra note 12, 1$ 236-37 (adjustments on swaps with most
creditworthy counterparties and when bank not a net receiver of cash); id. % 254
(bank's own credit rating downgraded at some point to risk class 3, roughly equivalent
to A or BBB credit rating, which would have been below its typical counterparties in
risk grades 1 and 2).
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that emphasizes maximum potential losses by selecting a confidence
level that includes a large number of radical and generally unlikely
swings in underlying reference rates, the dealer concludes that the
expected loss under the swap is 13. Applying that expected loss to the
midmarket valuation results in a negative mark-to-market value for
the swap of -3. Dealers who regularly entered into swaps for which
they expected such losses would be out of business. In the
hypothetical, it is likely that the dealer has entered into the swap with
the expectation of making a profit, and this extreme loss amount is an
inappropriate measure of potential loss that serves primarily to defer
income (or to satisfy a conservative regulatory function). In fact, any
credit risk carveout upon initiation of a swap may be inappropriate,
because dealers enter into swaps to make a profit and set swap terms
accordingly.
The considerable flexibility generally permitted dealers under
financial accounting rules also raises anti-manipulation concerns. The
rules generally permit dealers to rely on a range of predominantly
subjective estimates as part of the valuation process, without requiring
426that the estimates be tied to any particular objective benchmarks.
Such flexibility appears to directly violate the anti-manipulation value
in an area such as valuation methodology where estimates can have a
significant impact on overall income recognition.
Consider a simple example of the way that a dealer could distort
taxable income with subjective estimates. Assume a corporate end
user (E) enters into two swaps with identical terms with two different
dealers (D1 and D2). In both cases, E pays a fixed rate and the
dealers pay a floating rate. Assume that both dealers have been
assigned AAA credit ratings by Standard & Poor's, and assume that E
has a single A credit rating. Consequently, both dealers demand a
premium from E to enter into the swap with E. Assuming that the
prevailing bid-ask spread for AA or higher-rated counterparties for
this type of swap is 10 basis points (i.e., 6% ask; 5.9% bid, with a
midmarket value of 5.95%), the dealers might negotiate a rate for the
swap that corresponds to a 14 basis point bid-ask spread. In
determining its values for tax purposes, D1 assesses E based on
various factors, including a desire to understate income if at all
possible for tax purposes. D1 therefore reduces the value of the swap
426 When the financial accounting rules do tighten requirements to ensure that
valuations are based on objective evidence, they tend to use those requirements to
force dealers to adopt more conservative income inclusions, rather than to limit the




at year-end by a credit carveout from the credit risk adjusted swap
rate using prevailing bid-ask prices that is double the credit carveout
427determined by D2. If D1 uses this gambit throughout its swaps
portfolio, it would show substantially less taxable income than D2 for
a particular year, achieving a significant deferral.
Finally, credit enhancements are routinely incorporated in swap
agreements and virtually eliminate loss on default in most s
Yet financial accounting rules permit considerable variability in how a
dealer treats credit enhancements in valuing its swaps positions.
Accordingly, some dealers do not always take credit enhancement
into account, and dealers that do take it into account may vary in the
weight they give particular types of enhancement.429 With this type of
flexibility, a dealer could distort the valuation numbers intentionally,
without financial accounting consequences, in violation of the anti-
manipulation value.
Understanding that this highly subjective estimation could be
viewed as incompatible with tax accounting, the SIA reported on a
movement within the financial accounting standard-setting process to
"maximize the role of objective, verifiable data in the process of
determining fair value for derivatives and securities by establishing
clearer standards as to which types of evidence are acceptable.,430 The
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) undertook a project (EITF 02-3)
intended to provide guidance as to the type of evidence required for
431dealers to recognize income in respect of certain exotic derivatives.
427 For D2, the credit adjustment is only 1 basis point, reflecting the single A
rather than AA rating of E. Accordingly, D2 calculates its net income as 4 basis
points-i.e., one half the bid-ask spread (5 basis points) minus the credit adjustment
(1 basis point). D1, however, has exaggerated the expected risk of loss. Its
calculations show only 3 basis points of net income-i.e., one half the bid-ask spread
(5 basis points) minus the credit adjustment (2 basis points). In this case, the
unadjusted midmarket value (5 basis points) would be significantly closer to the
accurate determination of taxable income than the values arrived at using the
subjective adjusted midmarket methodology (4 basis points and 3 basis points,
respectively, for the two dealers): one-half the actual bid-ask spread for the premium
swap (7 basis points) minus the credit adjustment (2 basis points) equals net income
of 5 basis points (which is the same as the unadjusted midmarket value).
42 See, e.g., supra note 321.
429 See supra note 320.
430 SIA Response, supra note 65, at 39.
431 See EITF Abstracts, Issue No. 02-3: Issues Involved in Accounting for
Derivatives Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Contracts Involved in Energy
Trading and Risk Management Activities (last discussed Mar. 20, 2003) J 6 (noting
that one issue is whether unrealized gains on energy contracts can be recorded
without evidence from "quoted market prices or other current market transactions"),
[Vol. 24:301
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The EITF project or similar proposals may result in some limitation
on dealers' ability to use their own subjective value estimates. Such
approaches appear to throw the baby out with the bath water if used
for tax purposes, however, in that the goal is to prevent dealers from
recognizing any of their initial dealer spread on exotic derivatives (on
which dealers expect to earn higher-than-average spreads in part
because of the custom design of the derivative) unless they can
substantiate the valuation with observable market data.432  This
statement exemplifies the financial accounting conservative aim to
prevent puffery. Dealers argue that this deferral of their spread
411income should be respected for tax purposes,4 but it is hard to see
how the conservatism of this approach can be reconciled with the
MTM goal of enhancing revenues by accelerating recognition of
dealer spreads. The statement's aim at reducing puffery is a financial
accounting objective that has no place in tax.
Furthermore, even if the enhancement of the anti-manipulation
value provided by the increased emphasis on objective evidence
reported by the industry in respect of EITF 02-3 were considered
important enough to outweigh the likely increased deferral of spread
recognition for more exotic derivatives, there is no guarantee that the
final form of the financial accounting rules would adequately protect
the anti-manipulation value. Although the FASB decided not to
address EITF 02-3 in its current project on Fair Value Measurements,
it plans to address related issues in its project on revenue
recognition.M  Certainly the history of attempts to reform financial
7 (noting concern regarding recognition of revenue when fair value is "estimated
based solely on internal valuation models"), 1 14-16 (reporting October 25, 2002
decision to rescind EITF Issues 98-10 and 00-17 and concluding that additional
guidance is needed from FASB "with respect to measuring fair value in the absence
of quoted market prices or current market transactions with similar terms and
counterparties"). EITF 02-3 includes a footnote in which the FASB staff reports that
the Financial Accounting Standards Statement No. 133 definition of fair value
requires an estimate made using the "best information available in the
circumstances," which the FASB staff interpreted to mean the transaction price, in
the absence of quoted market values. Id. T 16, n.3. As a result, the FASB staff
indicated that no gain should be recorded unless the fair value is based on a quoted
price or other market data, or "a valuation technique incorporating observable
market data." Id. The overall approach is thus a conservative one that refuses to
allow management to "puff" revenues based on estimates of likely profits from
derivatives.
432 See ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 27 (noting that dealer's initial spread
would be deferred under EITF 02-3 unless there was objective evidence of value).
433 See id. at 28.
4 Fair Value Exposure Draft, supra note 210, C22-C23.
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accounting to expense stock options is not very encouraging in this
regard.435
3. Pragmatic Concerns
This Article has demonstrated that the case for a book-tax
conformity safe harbor under section 475 rests largely on concerns
about the administrative infeasibility of detailed tax rules in the
context of rapid innovations and the potentially onerous burden of
records maintenance to substantiate valuations under special tax rules
and disputes with tax authorities during audits regarding those
valuations. The ISDA indicates that the Service could not
"deconstruct a dealer's portfolio adjustments to determine the actual
effect of those adjustments on gain or loss for a single position.
436
In fact-specific contexts, it always will be simpler and less costly
for a taxpayer to import a financial accounting number onto its tax
return, and less costly for the government to accept such a number
than to audit details that are of particular relevance to tax accounting.
These concerns are not distinguishable from similar concerns that
arise whenever a tax provision imposes more stringent substantiation
requirements than required for book purpose, institutes a less flexible
method of reporting than permitted under financial accounting, or
applies a classification or timing rule that necessitates reconciliation of
different tax and accounting numbers.
In the derivative valuation context, these arguments based on
simplicity are simply not convincing. Banks have already
demonstrated that they use a variety of valuations for different
purposes, making it hard to accept their argument that to calculate a
particular type of value for tax would be an onerous burden. Again
the experience with LIFO accounting is helpful. Since adoption of the
mandatory booking requirement, financial accounting and tax rules
have moved in different directions, and thus LIFO numbers for tax
purposes may not be the same as LIFO numbers for book purposes.
These complications are a bother, but do not rise to the level of
disrupting business. The same would likely be true of a separate tax
determination of derivative values.
Furthermore, today's electronic capabilities make both
435 Arthur Levitt's reform attempts at the SEC were successfully stifled by
lobbyists' pressure on Congress. See ARTHUR LEvITr, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT
WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 109 (2002)
(describing congressional interference with financial accounting regulation).
43 ISDA Response, supra note 231, at 34.
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calculations and storage of data much simpler than it would have been
twenty or even ten years ago. It is not difficult to imagine that banks
could relatively easily create software modifications to make the
appropriate tax determinations based on the output of the software
used to produce their adjusted midmarket valuations for financial
accounting purposes. Additionally, given the range of electronic
storage and retrieval systems, there appears to be no reason why
retention of appropriate records in electronic format should be overly
burdensome on securities dealers.
The dire picture painted by securities dealers if they are not
permitted to simply report book numbers for tax purposes does not
hold up. Although the concerns about extra accounting burdens and
potentials for disputes on audit are real, they cannot outweigh
significant structural coherence and anti-manipulation concerns in a
context where the self-assessment value is threatened. Simply put,
simplicity cannot provide a reason for why the tax administrator
should not have as much right to demand a tax-appropriate valuation
as the bank regulator has to demand a banking-appropriate valuation.
D. Alternative Proposal for Comprehensive Valuation Regulations
Shoehorning taxable income determinations of value into
financial accounting rules that are designed with different goals and
are in an unusual state of flux could prove costly for the tax system.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that Treasury should address
securities dealers' genuine uncertainties by issuing comprehensive
regulations on permissible valuation methodologies under section 475.
Mark-to-market regulations need not be more complex than those
necessary in other regimes governing taxpayers today, such as the
rules governing uniform capitalization, accelerated cost recovery, or
consolidated returns. Any tensions between section 475 and securities
dealers' business models are best resolved through tailored regulatory
guidance that provides sufficient latitude to businesses without
sacrificing the goals of tax policy and the particular demands of a
mark-to-market regime.
A regulatory project would take some time and require
considerable input from the dealer community and interested
practitioners, It is beyond the scope of this Article to do more than
suggest a few of the areas that comprehensive regulations should
address and some approaches that might prove workable. It should
be noted, however, that such a project is inevitable even if an elective
conformity safe harbor is adopted, since any taxpayers who did not
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elect into the conformity safe harbor would require guidance on
proper considerations to be applied in determining valuations. This
fundamental need for comprehensive regulations means that the
proposed conformity election offers less of a reduction in burden for
Treasury than for electing taxpayers. It is merely another election
that permits taxpayers to reduce their tax burden relative to other
similarly situated taxpayers, rather than being required to determine
taxable income under generally prevailing rules.
1. Credit Carveouts
As the discussion on credit carveouts has shown, these carveouts
are particularly prone to violate the structural coherence and anti-
manipulation values. Regulations should therefore provide specific
bright-line rules for determining whether a taxpayer is entitled to take
a credit carveout and the range of carveouts permitted.
a. Permissibility of a Carveout
First, whether any carveout is necessary in respect of a particular
swap will depend on various provisions in the particular swap
agreement that reduce credit risk in respect of a dealer's counterparty
or increase the return to the dealer under the swap because of a
reduction in its own creditworthiness. The Bank One court
appropriately required that dealers take credit enhancements such as
collateral, netting, and credit triggers into account. Each of those
provisions reduces or eliminates credit risk.4 " A swap with various of
these credit enhancements essentially has zero default risk. The
regulations should acknowledge the importance of collateral and
437 For example, when a swap is collateralized, collateral is generally posted at
intervals so that it is maintained in the amount of the current mark-to-market value of
the swap. Market participants treat collateral as entirely eliminating risk of default
loss. See Johannes & Sundaresan, supra note 321, at 3. However, there may be an
incremental benefit (cost) of receiving (posting) collateral that impacts collateralized
swap rates. Id. at 1 (swap pricing theory for swaps as portfolios of forward contracts
that can be equated with par bonds does not hold true in the case of collateralized
swaps, which require a futures-based swap curve to account for "costly collateral").
Similarly, when a swap is conducted with a counterparty subject to a close-out netting
agreement, the amount of loss is restricted to the net payment due. Both single-
transaction netting and multiple transaction netting should significantly reduce risk of
loss on default. See, e.g., Jean-David Fermanian & Olivier Scaillet, Sensitivity
Analysis of VAR and Expected Shortfall for Portfolios under Netting Agreements




other credit enhancements in the swaps market and disallow credit
risk adjustments for swaps that are protected by those mechanisms,
unless the protection in the particular instance is insubstantial.
Moreover, the regulations should disallow any credit carveout
whatsoever at inception of a swap contract. This disallowance stems
directly from the pricing assumptions underlying the efficient market
hypothesis: the price and terms (length of contract, termination
triggers) are assumed to reflect all relevant information, including
current information about the credit status of the counterparties. The
dealer must be considered to have protected itself from any
foreseeable counterparty credit risk at the outset of the contract
through those terms. This is especially important since the midmarket
value forming the basis of the valuation takes into account quoted bid-
ask spreads rather than the specific rate a dealer may have negotiated
in respect of a particular counterparty, in the case of counterparties
with inferior creditworthiness. Any credit carveout at inception of a
swap would almost certainly understate taxable value and result in
undertaxation, just as in the case of bad debt reserve deductions prior
to the repeal of section 166(c).
Even if Treasury were to permit a credit risk carveout at
inception, it should at the least be limited to ensure current inclusion
of a reasonable minimum dealer profit (determined as a percentage of
the midmarket valuation) . In other words, no credit carveout
should be permitted to the extent that it exceeds the midmarket value
(after other adjustments) minus a minimum profit allowance. This
suggestion accords with the reality that dealers enter into swaps to
make a profit: a credit carveout that eliminates any expected dealer
profit at the outset is operating to defer the dealer's service income
rather than to offset gross income by expected default losses.
Similarly, the Bank One court held that FNBC should have
considered the relative creditworthiness of the two counterparties,
with upward adjustments in the value of a swap when its
creditworthiness declines relative to its counterparty's
creditworthiness. This requirement is economically appropriate, in
that it will result in more accurate valuations of swaps. Accordingly,
no credit carveout should be permitted at inception for swaps for
which the counterparty enjoys better creditworthiness than the dealer,
in accord with the general principle enunciated above, and any decline
4m This could also be stated in terms of mid-to-bid spread. Cf. Duffie Report,
supra note 319, at 8 (noting that carveouts should not reduce profits below the
dealer's bid price threshold).
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in a dealer's creditworthiness over the term of the swap should result
in a positive increment to valuation (and thus a reversal of any credit
adjustment previously taken in respect of a counterparty's credit risk).
Furthermore, the regulations should require that carveouts be
based on objective information that is publicly available (such as
credit default swap (CDS) information, credit agency ratings, and
bond rates) or verifiable and documented by the taxpayer (such as
historic swap default rates and amounts).439 This requirement stems
from the basic premise that measuring income consistently across
similarly situated taxpayers promotes fairness and efficiency."0 In an
ideal tax system, the symmetrical nature of swap credit risk would
result in corresponding valuation adjustments by the counterparties,
to the extent adjustments are appropriate:44 the fair market value to
442one would be the negative of the fair market value to the other. The
importance of symmetry argues for the development of objective
benchmarks (e.g., term of a swap, counterparty CDS spreads or credit
ratings, contractual credit enhancement, pool risk diversification
characteristics) by which parties can determine eligibility for, and
amount of, a credit carveout.
Given the anti-manipulation concerns inherent in permitting
dealers to rely too heavily on subjective estimates for fair value
computations, as well as the problems arising when using their loan
businesses as a proxy for credit risk, the important question becomes
whether objective data exists for measuring credit risk. Although still
439 Current research on credit risks suggests that credit ratings and bond spreads
provide a more accurate assessment of credit risk than companies' internally
generated analyses. Current research on credit risks suggests that CDs and bond
spreads incorporate market information differently and CDs pricing may be the most
informative about default risk. See, e.g., ROBERTO BLANCO ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INVESTMENT-GRADE BONDS
AND CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (Bank of England, Working Paper No. 211, 2003),
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/wp/index.html.
See generally JOSEPH DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX, 88-95 (1989) (discussing
fairness principles); supra note 158 and accompanying text (same).
441 In other words, if the dealer's own creditworthiness declines, leaving the
counterparty in the position of discounting the value of its position in the swap to
account for a greater potential of loss, the dealer's position in the swap should
increase in value (i.e., a negative credit carveout) to reflect the potential relief that the
dealer would receive on default from the obligation to make payments to the
counterparty.
42 IRS Brief, supra note 355, 113; see also Post-Trial IRS Brief, supra note 355,
at 538 (noting that "whenever a downward adjustment to mid-market value is
justified for a swap, a corresponding upward adjustment to mid-market value is
justified for another swap").
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young, the CDS market has the potential of becoming a major source
for such data. The market for credit derivatives began in the early
1990s in New York and London and has been growing rapidly ever
since.44" For example, in 1997, the British Bankers' Association
estimated that the outstanding notional value of credit derivative
contracts was $170 billion.4" That same group estimated that the
outstanding notional value of credit derivative contracts at the end of
2003 had grown to $3548 billion"5 By the end of 2006, the credit
derivatives market is expected to grow to $8206 billion.446 The CDS
market is by far the largest segment of the overall credit derivatives
market: in 2003, it made up 51% of the total market, which amounts
to approximately $1809 billion in outstanding notional amount of
CDS contracts.447
A CDS enables a protection buyer (who may or may not actually
hold obligations of a reference entity) to protect itself against losses
that would result from a reference entity's default on designated
obligations. 4" The most direct single-name CDS works as follows. A
protection buyer (A) wishes to protect itself from default losses on a
reference entity (C) obligation. A and the protection seller (B) enter
into a swap whereby B agrees to make a payment to A, determined by
reference to a notional amount, upon C's default on a designated
reference obligation. The notional amount and the terms of the
reference obligation are selected to compensate A for the loss that A
will experience if C defaults on the obligation A actually holds."4' For
that protection, A pays B a premium, generally in the form of periodic
payments expressed as a per annum percentage (in basis points) of the
notional amount of the contract.450  Physical settlement requires the
protection buyer to deliver obligations that are specified in the
43 PHILLIP J. SCHONBUCHER, CREDIT DERIVATIVES PRICING MODELS: MODELS,
PRICING AND IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2003).
"4 Id. at 4 tbl. 1.1.
445 BRITISH BANKERS' Assoc., CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT 2003/2004




See Edward D. Kleinbard, Competitive Convergence in the Financial Services
Markets, 2003 TAXES 225, 243-44.
"9 See generally SCHONBUCHER, supra note 443, at 15; Patrick Houweling & Ton
Vorst, Pricing Default Swaps: Empirical Evidence at 4-5 (Nov. 14, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=294799.
450 David Rule, The Credit Derivatives Market Its Development and Possible
Implications for Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV., June 2001, at 118.
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contract (generally ones that are pari passu with the reference
obligations) and requires the protection seller to pay the full notional
principal amount of the contract, while cash settlement requires the
protection seller to pay the difference between the notional amount
and the trading value of the reference obligations following the credit
event."' The various credit protection contracts thus transfer risk of
loss in respect of a default by the reference entity on designated
obligations from the protection buyer to the protection seller.
The CDS market can be an important resource for assessing
credit risk because a CDS essentially isolates the credit risk in an
obligation and allows that risk to be exchanged in an arms-length
transaction. Credit risk is isolated because the protection buyer,
which has an underlying exposure to the reference entity, retains the
market risk inherent in the obligation (e.g., the risk that the value of
the obligation will change due to changes in interest rates) but hedges
itself against the risk of the reference entity defaulting by selling that
risk to the protection seller.13 Therefore, the premium paid by the
protection buyer to the protection seller is the price of the reference
454
entity's credit risk. As the CDS market matures and becomes more
liquid, it will develop into a valuable source of objective information
about the credit risk of entities. Currently, however, pricing models
are still used to value many of the component risks, and these pricing
models may or may not provide a reasonable estimation of the market
prices of CDSs.
6
Accordingly, based on the increased availability of information on
relative credit rankings of parties, especially through credit default
swaps, it might be possible for Treasury to establish one or more
451 See Kleinbard, supra note 448, at 244.
452 Id. at 227.
453 See SCHONBUCHER, supra note 443, at 15.
454 The premium generally is not affected by the estimated risk of counterparty
default because if the protection seller is not willing to assume the default risk of the
protection buyer, it will either not enter into the contract or eliminate that risk by, for
example, demanding that the buyer provide collateral or make an up-front, rather
than periodic, premium payment. Houweling & Vorst, supra note 449, at 5.
455 Rule, supra note 450, at 117; Roberto Blanco, Simon Brennan, & Ian Marsh,
An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relationship Between Investment Grade Bonds
and Credit Default Swaps, Bank of England Working Paper No. 211 (2003), available
at www.bankofengland.co.uk/wp/index.html (suggesting that credit risk is priced in
both bond and CDS markets, but price discovery primarily occurs in CDS markets)
(last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
456 See Houweling & Vorst, supra note 449, at 29 (suggesting that pricing models
underestimated credit risk as priced in the market for speculative grade entities).
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credit risk filters that indicate that a default loss is highly unlikely, at
the time of valuation, based on objective terms of swaps and other
publicly available information regarding the creditworthiness of the
counterparties, and therefore disallow credit risk adjustments to swap
values whenever this filter applies. For example, the relative
creditworthiness of the two parties could be determined based on
publicly available information about their credit ratings, CDSs, or
bond issuances. Regulations could establish the following
characteristics of a counterparty's credit rating, CDSs, or bond
issuances as indicative that it would be inappropriate to establish a
carveout for credit risk in respect of that counterparty:
" An average credit rating, as assigned by public credit rating
agencies, equal to or higher than the taxpayer's own rating, or
" An average market price on credit default swaps in respect of
the counterparty that is equal to or lower than the average
price on similar credit default swaps in respect of the dealer, or
" A current issuance of bonds with a fixed or floating rate coupon
equal to or lower than the taxpayer's own bonds, or
" A weighted average coupon rate on outstanding bonds that is
equal to or lower than the taxpayer's weighted average coupon
rate, unless the counterparty's bonds have been issued over the
last four years at a rate that has increased during a period when
interest rates generally were stable or decreasing; or
" A weighted average coupon rate on outstanding bonds that has
declined when measured over a five-year look-back period and
that is not at the time more than 100 basis points greater than
the weighted average coupon rate of the taxpayer's outstanding
bonds.
The regulations should also clarify that a credit carveout is
permitted only for reasonably expected default losses and may not be
broadened to provide deferral of any risk premium that provides
compensation to a dealer for its credit intermediary function. 57 This
ensures that the services income related to the swap will be taken into
account upon inception of the swap and not deferred, in accordance
with the original intent of the mark-to-market revenue enhancement
provision to accelerate recognition of dealer swap income.
451 See supra note 290 and accompanying text (indicating that deferral of credit
intermediary service provider income violates structural coherence).
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b. Amount of a Carveout
Second, the regulations could provide a formula to establish
ceilings on acceptable carveouts - e.g., no more than one-tenth of a
basis point for each 100 basis points of spread between the
counterparty's and taxpayer's bond rates, or some other amount that
Treasury determines is appropriate based on industry data and the
results of the ongoing AIR program with broker-dealers. For
example, it may be that the spread between the two parties' CDS
prices would provide the most appropriate basis for a formulaic
ceiling on swap carveouts. Alternatively, dealers could be required to
maintain detailed records of swap losses due to defaults, and rules
similar to the Black Motor Company six-year rolling-loss formula for
increases to bad debt reserves could be used to set a ceiling to ensure
that credit carveouts are based on relevant swap default loss historical
experience.
It might also be appropriate to require a reasonable minimum
profit ' as a limit on credit carveouts throughout the life of the swap.
Recognition of credit carveouts that reduced or eliminated this
minimum profit amount would be permitted only upon the actual
default of the counterparty. This would accord with the general
hesitation in an income tax system to recognize losses before they
occur, which was reinforced by the elimination of the deduction for
additions to bad debt reserves in section 166(c).459
Finally, Treasury regulations governing credit carveouts should
include a general anti-abuse rule requiring that a dealer's method for
determining credit carveouts be consistent with its method for
determining midmarket valuations and the expectation that a dealer
enters into a swap intending to make a profit. These limitations would
provide a means of reconciling the MTM rules with the intent of the
rules for bad debt reserves while at the same time preventing dealers
from being able to take a bad debt reserve for their loan books
through the back door of an adjustment to their swaps portfolio.
451 See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
... See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
Inappropriate use of loan experience to determine swap credit carveouts
would mean that the credit carveout for swaps would overstate the amount at risk of
default loss. Assuming that a dealer's actual default losses are consistently less than
its carveout amounts, the excess carveouts act as a deferral engine to defer substantial
amounts of dealer operating income that should be taken into account and taxed in
the first year of the swap. This deferral engine serves as a back-door way to create an
otherwise impermissible deductible bad debt reserve in respect of the rest of the
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2. Swap or Portfolio?
The discussion of regulatory limitations on credit adjustments
assumed that gross valuations and adjustments are made on a swap-
by-swap basis. The Tax Court in Bank One explicitly ruled that
carveouts must be determined on a swap-by-swap basis rather than on
a portfolio basis. Although the literal language of the statute appears
4611to require a swap-by-swap valuation, there are arguments for
reading the statutory language more broadly in light of its purpose.
Recall that the genesis of mark-to-market accounting lay in the desire
of securities and commodities dealers for a "cure for the timing
mismatches that otherwise would result from reporting the income of
a hedged trading business on a non-realization basis for inventory and
a realization basis for everything else."4 2 The suitability of mark-to-
market for hedged businesses, that is, rests most particularly on the
fact that net income must be determined from aggregate portfolios
where either the individual positions cannot be discretely valued or
discrete valuation is likely to be an administrative and financial
burden to the taxpayer even while potentially distorting the
measurement of income. Where positions can be discretely valued
without such burdens, other sophisticated timing regimes, such as the
capitalization systems under sections 263 and 263A, are sufficient.
463
Thus, assuming for this purpose that a dealer's particular
carveouts and methods of determining their values are acceptable,
portfolio-based assessments of carveouts may be necessary to satisfy
structural coherence in the context of section 475. As each position is
added to the portfolio, the relevant characteristics of the portfolio
change. Tracking the portfolio provides information on overall
volatility, term, net expected cash flows and liquidity concerns, net
exposure to risky counterparties, and other factors that are relevant
for profit and loss analysis and risk management. This is particularly
true in respect of adequate reserves for expected default losses.
Because dealers now manage risk on an aggregate basis for an entire
portfolio, they can take into consideration collateral and netting
provisions, as well as mirror and offsetting swaps and partial hedges
across the portfolio. Risk is dispersed over the entire portfolio,
reducing the quantum of risk in respect of a particular swap.
dealer's business, in the guise of accelerating potential default losses to match the
accelerated income stream on the swaps. See supra note 376.
4 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
462 Kleinbard & Evans, supra note 54, at 797-801 (emphasis added).
463 Id. at 791.
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If, however, the court's swap-by-swap ruling were taken literally
to mean that each swap is considered as a stand-alone instrument
without regard to other instruments in a dealer's portfolio, it appears
that risk determinations would be inherently inaccurate. Under a
stand-alone analysis, it would be impossible for a dealer to make risk
and profit/loss determinations by taking into account any portfolio-
wide characteristics. In particular, risks and expected cash flows in
respect of a particular swap would be determined without regard to
the existence of a matching or partially offsetting swap or other hedge
or multiple-transaction netting arrangements. Market and credit risk
of the isolated swap would be overstated, and the dealer's swap
income would be understated. The result would be a significant
distortion not in line with the goals of mark-to-market accounting.
On the other hand, the Tax Court's decision may be amenable to
an interpretation that avoids the distortion of a stand-alone
assessment of risk while still adhering to the literal item-by-item
valuation requirement imposed by the decision and arguably required
by the statute. Under this view, the swap-by-swap determination is
primarily a substantiation requirement related to the anti-
manipulation value. A dealer would keep a separate record or
schedule for each swap in which it would record the year-end mark for
each swap, including both the midmarket value determined for that
swap and any carveout amounts allocated to that swap. The record
would essentially document the mark-to-market basis account for that
swap. That separate schedule, however, would not be generated in a
vacuum.
Credit risks and market risks are reduced by the pool balancing effects of
diversification. Assume Dealer (DR) enters into a series of offsetting fixed to float
swaps, in which Counterparties A, B, C, and D.pay fixed to DR and DR pays fixed to
counterparties E, F, G, and H, all under master agreements that permit cross netting
upon a default event. If counterparty E defaults and does not make a floating
payment to DR at the same time that counterparty A defaults and does not make a
fixed payment to DR, then DR will not have a default loss, since DR would have
merely passed the float payment from E over to A. Market risk would also be
overstated for a stand-alone swap, because there would be no way to recognize the
risk reduction from the overall hedging of the portfolio. If hedging costs are included
in administrative cost adjustments (which may have been the case in Bank One), then
those administrative costs may also be overstated to some degree. Note that credit
and market risk are related. Suppose in the hypothetical that A is a poor credit risk
and E is a good credit risk. A defaults, but E does not. DR therefore receives a
floating rate payment from E, but DR does not have to pass it along to A because of
A's default. A's default as to these offsetting swaps is harmless, because the contract
was in the money to A and not in the money to DR. A's credit risk is therefore only a
concern when the market favors DR rather than A.
[Vol. 24:301
Book- Tax Conformity
For example, a central component of a swap's basis is its
midmarket value at the end of the first year. It is possible that dealers
would continue to determine midmarket values separately for each
individual swap. They may, however, determine midmarket values for
groups of swaps acquired in a defined accounting period. Treasury
might provide that it would not be distortive in certain cases for
dealers to determine midmarket values for particular books of swaps
and allocate those values to particular swaps in proportion to their
notional principal amounts. Treasury regulations could establish the
characteristics of portfolios for which a book-wide determination is
not distortive and the types of information that a dealer should retain
to verify the determination.
Similarly, it might be that systems could be developed to permit
credit carveouts to be determined on a pool basis, with particular
regard for limitations specified in Treasury regulations along the lines
developed in the preceding section. For example, credit carveouts
would reflect reduced credit risk of portfolio arrangements such as
offsetting swaps and close-out netting, in addition to the credit
enhancement provided by single-transaction netting, collateral, and
other items that effectively eliminate risk for a particular swap. That
aggregate credit risk could be allocated to particular swaps according
to formulas that take into consideration the criteria used in
establishing the amount of the overall carveout amounts.
For example, Treasury regulations in accord with the previous
subsection would provide that a swap between investment grade
parties with credit enhancement of a certain type (credit triggers,
single transaction netting as well as a close-out netting agreement, or
specified levels of collateral) would not merit any credit carveout,
could not be allocated any portion of pool risk, and could not be
treated as contributing to pool risk. A dealer's determination of pool
risk would also have to take into account the lowering of risk when
the dealer enters into offsetting positions and the increase in risk
when offsetting positions are terminated, allocating that change
proportionately among all of the offsetting positions. In other words,
the regulations could set forth a broad scheme for a scheduler system
that would track data on each separate swap position by reference to
its particular terms but with regard to other positions in the portfolio,
taking into account the risk reduction offered by a hedged portfolio
but allocating that risk reduction appropriately to individual swaps.
The scheduler system would ensure that basis for the swap is tracked
appropriately and permit the dealer to recognize the correct amount




The advantage of this sort of swap-by-swap method, especially
from the government's perspective, is that it provides a spreadsheet
summary, documented over the life of the swap, recording the
relevant midmarket values, carveout, and mark-to-market increments
of income or loss. The government could easily determine on audit
whether a dealer had appropriately recalculated midmarket values
and carveout amounts at year-end and included (or deducted) the
corresponding incremental amounts as required. Like depreciation
adjustments and other items for which there is substantial detail as
well as substantial differences in timing between financial and tax
accounting, accountants should be able to develop systems to track
the needed reconciliation information.
The disadvantage, from the dealer perspective, is that this
approach would require development of an appropriate record
system, to the extent a dealer does not currently maintain accounts for
each swap. It is difficult to assess how burdensome this requirement
would be in practice. On the one hand, Kleinbard indicates that
dealers currently perform the midmarket valuation and carveout
determinations on a portfolio-wide basis.465 The industry's response
would likely be that it is an unreasonable burden for major swaps
dealers to generate and maintain these kinds of individual records of
this nature. The dealers may well view a comprehensive
recordkeeping requirement as substantially negating the advantages
of mark-to-market accounting. 46 On the other hand, dealers also
apparently claim to "carefully document[] their adjustments as case-
by-case exercises in valuation" to demonstrate the trustworthiness of
their numbers, although they may consider such recordkeeping a
wasteful exercise.467 If dealers have already been documenting their
adjustments on a case-by-case basis, there is no reason that they
should not be able to continue to do so. Even if a conformity safe
harbor is provided, it is likely to require dealers to provide
supplemental documentation beyond the information available in the
applicable financial statements.
In summary, these proposals suggest that Treasury must provide
explicit guidance on measurement of carveouts. Manageable
46 See, e.g., Some Thoughts, supra note 247, at 1174 (discussing valuation of a
swaps portfolio and adjustments on a portfolio-wide basis).
Cf Kleinbard & Evans, supra note 54, at 794 (noting that one of the reasons
for preferring a mark-to-market system is "that it obviates the need to identify the
particular future item of income or loss to which a current item relates").
467 Id. at 818.
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solutions for maintaining and reconciling different book-tax methods
have been developed in other contexts, such as the uniform
capitalization rules and accelerated cost recovery system. There is no
reason to believe that equally practicable solutions cannot be
developed here.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the renewed attention garnered by the relationship
between book and tax accounting, this Article reviews the history of
interest in conformity and examines the abstract principles of fairness
and efficiency that have served as guidance for the tax system over
several decades. The Article concludes that the most important
features of the tax system to consider when evaluating conformity
proposals are whether the conformity proposal is structurally coherent
with the tax provisions at stake and whether the conformity proposal
supports the self-assessment characteristic of our voluntary
compliance scheme by not providing too many opportunities for
manipulation of the measure of taxable income. Only when these two
features are appropriately respected can pragmatic concerns for
simplifying taxpayers' compliance burdens and tax administrators'
enforcement burdens merit consideration.
This Article also assesses the section 475 safe harbor for
valuations of derivatives currently under consideration by the
government. The case for conformity is based on easing compliance
for securities dealers. Securities industry participants insist that they
follow a universal and predictable methodology that the government
should respect solely because the resulting valuations (with or without
certain adjustments) are also used for some business purposes other
than tax reporting and are reported on trustworthy financial
statements. Their case rests almost exclusively on the pragmatic
argument from simplicity and administrative convenience.
Undoubtedly, their lives will be simpler if they can simply import
book income values to tax returns.
This Article takes issue with those proponents of conformity and
suggests instead that there is a strong case against adopting a
conformity requirement or safe harbor for securities dealers' mark-to-
market accounting for derivatives. The negative case rests on the two
prongs outlined in the earlier section of the Article: structural
coherence and anti-manipulation. Structural coherence concerns are
raised by the deferral of income resulting under financial accounting
because of tax-inappropriate adjustments or because it requires a
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more conservative approach to income inclusion, particularly in
respect of exotic derivatives. Ultimately, these results violate the
income tax value.
Anti-manipulation concerns arise because of accounting flexibility
that permits (or even encourages) material inconsistencies among
taxpayers that are otherwise similarly situated and the potential for
manipulation of timing of income through use of highly subjective
data to achieve tax or financial accounting goals. Using mark-to-
market accounting to manipulate timing of income goes against the
very essence of the tax mark-to-market method, which is intended to
mandate a current accounting of the increases in net wealth
represented by increases in value. The potential for abusive
manipulation of timing in the guise of marking to market is
particularly worrisome in this era of corporate accounting and tax
shelter scandals, such as those at Enron and Freddie Mac, that often
involve the use of complex derivatives to manipulate the timing of
recognition of income for book and/or tax purposes. The major
financial institutions have been far from guiltless in these scandals, as
a cursory glance at the headlines from the last two years readily
reveals. In particular, banks have used their expertise in derivatives
and other structured financial products to assist large corporations in
developing ways to accomplish their goals of manipulating accounting
(and possibly tax) income. Should we simply trust these large
financial institutions to get it right when they are reporting their own
transactions for tax purposes?
This Article proposes that Treasury should address the continuing
uncertainties about derivatives valuations under the mark-to-market
rules by issuing comprehensive regulations that establish guidelines
for permissible valuation methodologies. Tailored regulatory
guidance offers the best hope of ensuring that dealers are consistently
reporting their swaps income. Those regulations should be able to
provide guidance to businesses while ensuring that the principles
underlying the mark-to-market regime are upheld. Book-tax
conformity should be put back in the box where Congress left it when
it enacted section 475. Financial accounting rules that permit a large
measure of flexibility to the reporting entity simply do not provide the
assurance of consistency with the anti-manipulation value that the tax
law requires in the case of mark-to-market valuations.
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